Story Case

Dr. Jones was a veterinary surgeon who practiced his profession in the city of Chicago. During one summer he spent his vacation on a farm owned and managed by his brother. While there, a horse, belonging to his brother, became very sick. Dr. Jones was requested to try to relieve the animal. He found it in a serious condition. He worked all day in caring for the animal and by night the horse was much better. When Dr. Jones returned to his office in Chicago, he sent a bill, amounting to $25, to his brother for his professional services.

Because Dr. Jones had paid no board during the time that he remained on the farm, his brother refused to pay the bill. Dr. Jones thereupon brought suit for the recovery of $25, which he claimed was a reasonable sum for his services.

What should be the decision of the court in the foregoing case? Do you think it is significant whether or not Dr. Jones paid for his board and lodging while on the farm? Would the opinion of the court be altered had he been called to travel the entire distance from the city?

Ruling Court Case. Hertzog Vs. Hertzog, Volume 29 Pennsylvania State Reports, Page 465

John Hertzog was twenty-one years of age in the year 1825. After reaching his majority, he continued to live with his father, who was a farmer, and work for him on the farm. He spent one year in Virginia. When he returned he brought his wife with him, and again resided with, and worked for, his father. Sometime later his father put him on another farm, which was owned by the father, and two or three years later, the father and his wife, moved into the house with his son John, and there continued to live until the death of the father in 1849.

This suit was brought by John to recover from the estate of his father compensation for services rendered to the latter during the lifetime of the father.

The defendant, who was the personal representative of the father, contended that there could be no recovery because there was no contract by which the son was to be paid anything for his services. John, however, contended that there was an implied agreement on the part of the father to pay for the services rendered.

Decision By Mr. Justice Lowrie

Where one person renders services for another, a promise may be implied on the part of the one benefited to pay for such services. This, however, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury under all the facts of a given case. Implied contracts arise under circumstances, which, according to the ordinary course of dealings and the common understanding of men, show a mutual intention to contract. "Where services have been rendered by one relative for another, as in this case, the fact of relationship is strong evidence that there was no agreement that such services should be compensated for. Under the circumstances of this case the court was of the opinion that no agreement could be implied on the part of the parent to make compensation to his son for services of the latter. But if we find a son in the employment of his father, we do not infer a contract of hiring, because the principle of family affection is sufficient to account for the family association, and does not demand the inference of a contract. So it was held that John could recover nothing from his father's estate for the services he rendered to his father during the latter's lifetime.

Ruling Court Case No. 2. Gaffney Vs. Columbus Railway Company, Volume 65 Ohio State Reports, Page 104; Volume 61 Northwestern Reporter, Page 152

At Lancaster, Ohio, the Columbus Railway Company and the Cincinnati Railway Company form a junction and pass on opposite sides of a common depot. The distance between the two roads at the depot is about forty feet. By virtue of a contract which each railway company had with the United States Government to carry mail between certain points, it became the duty of each to transfer the mails from one road to the other when required in the course of transit.

Gaffney was under a contract with the government to carry all mails to and fro between the depot and the Lancaster post-office. For six years he carried the mail from one train to the other, a duty which, as stated above, belonged to the railway companies. He thought that this was a task imposed upon him under his contract. When he was informed by a government official that it was not, he ceased to transfer the mail from train to train and demanded of the two roads compensation for the time he had done so. They refused to recognize any such claim and Gaffney sued. He contended that there was an implied agreement on the part of the two companies to pay him for the work he had done.

The company contended that no agreement should be implied because the circumstances of the case, that is, because Gaffney thought he was under a duty to do this, showed that Gaffney never expected to receive any compensation and that they never intended to give any compensation.

Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, who delivered the opinion of the court, said:

"Contracts that are true contracts are frequently termed 'implied contracts', - as where, from the facts and circumstances, a court or jury may fairly infer as a matter of fact that a contract existed between the parties, explanatory of the relation existing between them. Such implied contracts are not generally different from express contracts. The difference exists simply in the mode of proof. Express contracts are proved by showing that the terms are inferred as a matter of fact from the evidence offered of the circumstances surrounding the parties, making it reasonable that a contract existed between them by tacit understanding. In such cases no fictions are or can be indulged. The evidence must satisfy the court and jury that the parties understood that each sustained to the other a contractual relation, and that, by reason of this relation, the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for services performed".

Judgment was given for the Columbus Railway Company, because the evidence offered by Gaffney failed to show that any such relation existed between them during the time that he was performing the services in question.

Ruling Law. Story Case Answer

It has just been stated that an express contract is one in which all the terms of the contract are expressly agreed upon. However, one or more terms of the contract may be contingent upon some future event, although that alone does not make it any the less express in nature.

An implied contract differs from an express contract only in the mode of proof. In an implied contract there must have been mutual assent on the part of both contracting parties, although that mutual assent may not have been expressed in words. Suppose that I should walk into a grocery store where I have marketed many times before; I see a basket of peaches that pleases me; I pick it up and remark to the grocer, "I will take these with me." Although apparently no contract is made, it is evident that I intend to pay for them; and certainly he expects to receive payment. In such a case, a contract will be implied in fact.

Whether or not in a given case a contract is to be implied depends upon the particular facts of each case. It is a question for the jury to decide. In many cases the relationship between the parties is such that it tends to show that there was no intention to contract. Thus, in the Story Case, it is evident that Dr. Jones' brother was quite unaware that he would be charged for the services rendered. Since Dr. Jones was the guest of a brother, it is fair to conclude that he had no such intention at the time he did the work. It is very probable that he would be unable to collect from his brother for his services. Had Dr. Jones been paying board and room expenses while living with his brother, so that there was the relationship of business between them, or had he gone out from the city at great expense, it could readily be implied that his brother did not expect him to work gratuitiously and therefore an implied contract would exist.