Story Case

Andrew Collier and Helen Dufree were attending a social party when it was proposed by a friend at the party that the two become husband and wife. The proposal was made in the nature of a dare but Collier and Miss Dufree took it up in jest. Collier secured a bona fide license from the county clerk who was present, and then the mock ceremony was had before another friend, James Dunn. Dunn was a justice of the peace and actually qualified to conduct the ceremony although the other parties did not know this and Dunn remained silent on this point. After the mock ceremony he informed the parties of his authority to act in marriages, whereupon they became thoroughly frightened and wanted to know at once if they were really married, when they had no intentions to marry. What should Dunn tell them?

Ruling Court Case. Roszel Vs. Roszel, Volume 73 Michigan Reports, Page 133; Volume 16 American State Reports, Page 569

The right of the complainant to relief in this case turned upon the legality of the marriage of the defendant with one Christian Zenninger.

This marriage was alleged to have taken place when the defendant was only eighteen years of age. She admits that there was a marriage ceremony performed by Esquire Allen, but she denies that the ceremony ever made her the wife of Zenninger because she never assented to it. She claimed that her parents attempted to force her into a marriage to this man when she was but eighteen years of age; that she told the justice that if he tied the knot forty times it would not stay tied, for she did not like the man and would not live with him. But her objection to the contrary notwithstanding, the marriage ceremony was carried through. The question came up in this case whether this was a valid marriage.

Mr. Justice Champlin said: "It is laid down by Mr. Bishop, in his work upon Marriage and Divorce, that 'the ruling principle as to the constitution of marriage is that it is a mutual contract to the formation of which the consent of both parties must be really, deliberately, definitely and irrevocably given'."

The Court was therefore of the opinion that the foregoing ceremony in no sense constituted a marriage, because there was an entire lack of consent on the part of the woman.

Ruling Court Case. Jane Tilley Vs. Andrew Damon, Volume 11 Cush-Ing's Massachusetts Reports, Page 217

The evidence in this case showed that the plaintiff was delivered of a bastard child, of which the defendant was father. On her complaint a warrant was issued against the defendant by Levi Taylor, Esq., a justice of the peace for the county of Hampshire, directed to the constable of the town of Ludlow, in the county of Hampden, where the defendant lived. The defendant was arrested under the warrant so issued, taken before Taylor, and while thus under arrest, he promised to marry the plaintiff. After being set free he refused to marry the plaintiff and she thereupon brought this action for damages resulting from the breach of promise.

Decision: The warrant, as issued, and under which the defendant was arrested, was void, because the justice of one county has no power or authority to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person living in another county. Such being the case the defendant was unlawfully arrested; and being unlawfully under arrest when he made the promise to marry such a promise was procured by duress. A promise obtained under duress is not binding on the person. Therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this action. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover.

Ruling Law. Story Case Answer

In the formation of the contract to marry, practically the same rules apply which govern the formation of any other contract. We have just seen that such a contract is always supported by a valuable consideration. Furthermore, mutual consent of the parties is essential to its binding effect. If the consent of the woman, for instance, is procured by fraud, duress or coercion, in an action for breach of the contract to marry she has a good defense and no damages may be recovered against her.

It must be noted that there is a wide difference between the reality of consent in reference to the contract to marry and the contract of marriage. What has been said in the foregoing paragraph has reference only to the contract to marry. In other words, it has reference to the situation where the man and woman are engaged to be married as it is termed in a popular sense. When they have married, the relation is then termed in law, the marriage contract or contract of marriage. This will be discussed more fully in another connection.

In the Story Case, not only is there a lack of any consent, for a contract to marry, but there isn't any consent at the time of the supposed marriage. The parties never intended to make a contract to become husband and wife in the future, nor did they enter into any contract of marriage, because this was not their intention. Therefore the ceremony was of no effect.