Sec 220

A specification of a warranty on one point may exclude the implication of warranty on other points.13 Thus a contract to deliver Centre County iron, for a full market price, is satisfied if Centre County iron, believed at the time to be good, is delivered.14 On the sale of a fertilizer the following statement was given: "It is guaranteed to me, as to its effect on crops, only as to the analysis of the state inspector, as evidenced by his brand on each and every article." It was held in Georgia, in Warranty on one point excludes general implied warranty.

1 Infra, sec 903.

2 Infra, sec 904. 3 Infra, sec 905.

4 Infra, sec 906.

5 Infra, sec 907.

6 Infra, sec 910.

7 Infra, sec 911.

8 Infra, sec 913.

9 Infra, sec 914.

10 Infra, sec 225, 565.

11 Infra, sec 915 el seq. 12 Infra, sec 918.

13 Infra, sec 909; Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 666; Budd v. Fairmaner, 8 Bing. 51; Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East, 314; Dickson v. Zizinia, 10 C. B. 602;' Willard v. Stevens, 24 N. H. 271; Deming v. Foster, 42 N. H. 165; Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37 N. Y. 487; Gill v. Kaufman, 16 Kan. 571.

" Kirk v. Nice, 2 Watts, 367. Whether a statement that a cow is "all right" is a warranty is a question of fact for the jury. Tuttle v. Brown, 4 Gray, 457. In Power v. Barham, 7 G. & P. 356, 6 N. & M. 62, 4 Ad. & El. 476, Lord Denman left it to the jury to determine whether a statement, " Four pictures, views in Venice, Canaletti," was a warranty. See more fully, infra, sec 249. An opinion (there being no fraud) that a mare is kind and gentle is not a warranty. Jackson v. Wetherill, 7 S. & R. 480; McFarland v, Newman, 9 Watts, 55. Nor is an opinion as to value. Infra, sec 250; Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Penn. St. 448; Whitaker v. Eastwick, 75 Penn. St. 229.

1880, that the purchaser could claim on no other warranty than that as to the genuineness of the inspector's brand.1 sec 221. Supplying for a particular purpose implies fitness for that purpose in all cases where special con6dence is placed in the vendor.2 In point of law, if a person sold a commodity for a specific purpose, and with knowledge at the time of sale that it was to be applied to that purpose, he must be understood to warrant that the commodity so sold should be reasonably fit and proper for the purpose for which it was sold.3 Even a latent defect, unknown to the vendor, is within this rule. A carriage builder, for instance, who supplies a customer a pole for a carriage, fitting it to the carriage, is to be regarded as warranting its soundness, and is responsible for a latent defect, of which he is not aware, which causes the pole to break.4 But selling for a particular purpose is not to be understood as warranting that the thing sold will be adapted to any peculiar conditions in which it may be placed. General adaptation is all that is implied.8 Nor is a warranty of fitness implied in the sale by a peddler of a patented article.6 - In connection with the above rulings may be noticed a case before the Eng-.

Supplying for particular purpose implies fitness.

1 Jackson p. Langston, 61 Ga. 392.

2 Infra, sec 248, 263 et seq. As to warranty, sec 905. As to articles made to order, sec 903; Leake, 2d ed. 404; Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 645 et seq.; Brown v. Edgington, 2 M. & G. 279; Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 64; Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533; Ollivant v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 288; Jones p. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 202; Smith v. Marrahle, 11 M. & W. 5; Lomi v. Tucker, 4 C. & P. 15; Deming v. Foster, 42 N. H. 165; Doggett v. Emerson, 3 Story, 700; Beals v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114; Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197; Winsor v. Lombard, 18 Pick. 60; Mansfield v. Tregg, 113 Mass. 354; Pacific Iron Works v. Newhall, 34 Conn. 67; Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. 468; Gallagher v. Waring, 9 Wend. 20; Dounce v. Dow, 57 N. Y.

21; Rodgers p. Niles, 11 Oh. St. 48; Byers p. Chapin, 28 Oh. St. 300; Brenton p. Davis, 8 Blackf. 317; Leopold p. Van Kirk, 27 Wis. 152; Rob-son v. Miller, 12 S. C. 586; Byrne v, Jansen, 50 Cal. 624. That an article made to order must answer order, see infra, sec 905.

3 Lord Tenterden, Gray v. Close, 6 D. & R. 200.

4 Randall v. Newson, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 102. See notes to Chandler v. Lopus, 1 Smith's L. C. 7th ed. 299 et seq.; infra, sec 903.

5 Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399: Port Carbon Iron Co. v. Groves, 68 Penn. St. 149.

6 Matthews v. Hartson, 3 Pitts. 86. That when the vendor is specially trusted his representations bind is herealter seen. Infra, sec 905.

lish Court of Appeals in 1881. The plaintiff* agreed to take a named steam-tug;, towing six sailing barges, from Hull to the Brazils, paying and providing for the crew, and furnishing all necessary instruments. The defendants agreed to pay for these services 1020/. After the starting, the boilers.and engines of the steam-tug in question turned out to be considerably out of repair, and in consequence the voyage occupied sixty days more than it would otherwise have done. The fact of the engines being out of repair was not known to either party at the time of the contract. Judgment was entered by Lord Coleridge for the plaintiff. This, however, was reversed in the Court of Appeals, on the ground that there was no implied warranty by the defendants that the tug should be reasonably efficient for the purposes of the voyage.1

1 Robertson v. Amazon Tug Co., 45 L. T. N. S. 317; reversed, S. C. L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 598.

The reversal, however, was carried by Brett, L. J., and Cotton, L. J., against Bramwell, L. J., who concurred with Lord Coleridge; and the question, so far as the weight of authority is concerned, must be considered still open.

"The plaintiff," said Lord Coleridge, in the court below, "undertakes to conduct the fleet across the Atlantic, that is. to do under particular circumstances particular work. He furnishes a great deal of the necessaries incidental to the voyage - not the engines or engineers - but he engages the sailors, stokers, and trimmers, from Hull to Para. There must be an undertaking on the part of the defendants that the Villa Bella was reasonably fit to do the work on which she was to be engaged. The plaintiff was entitled to say: ' I had an instrument supplied by the defendants to do this work, and such instrument ought to have been reasonably fit to do it.' The contrary contention seems full of difficulties, insuperable difficulties to my mind.