Voluntary payment to another's use cannot be recovered back, but otherwise as to payment at request, sec 756.

Request may be inferred from circumstances, sec 757.

Money must have been actually paid, sec 758.

When A. is required by law to make payment for B. he may recover from B., sec 759.

So of party whose goods are attached to pay another's debt, sec 760.

Not necessary that execution should issue, sec 761.

Person whose goods are distrained on another's premises may recover from such other, sec 762.

No recovery when the party paying acted negligently or officiously, sec 763.

Party paying maritime liens may claim contribution, sec 764.

Co-debtors and co-sureties paying common debt entitled to contribution, sec 765.

Contribution limited by contract between parties, sec 766.

Same principle extended to members of associations, sec 767.

Surety entitled to contribution from principal, sec 768.

And to share securities with co-surety, sec 769.

Insurer may recover from person causing loss, sec 770.

Money contributed to illegal enterprise cannot be recovered back, nor can tort-feasor recover contribution, sec 771.

Sec 756

A party in whose behalf a voluntary payment is made by another is not bound in law to reimburse the party making the payment. Whether I will make a particular investment; whether I will subscribe to a particular charity; whether I will relieve particular goods belonging to me from a burden to which they are exposed; whether I will reinsure my property, whose insurance has expired: these, and similar questions are for me to decide. I may have my own reasons for not making a payment which would apparently be advantageous to me;1 at all events, if parties are entitled to recover money they lay out for the apparent relief of others, or for the apparent credit of others, the lines which protect business from the incursions of strangers would be broken down. When such money is paid by the request of the party relieved or credited, or when it is paid under compulsion, then, as we will see, it can be recovered back; but it cannot be recovered back when made voluntarily without request.1 Hence, where a drawer of a bill of exchange made for the accommodation of the acceptor, after being discharged from liability by the holder neglecting to notify him of dishonor, paid the bill in part, it was held that he could not recover what he paid from the acceptor, though the latter was pro tanto relieved, the reason being that the payment was voluntary;2 and so, it seems, of a payment made by a surety for a principal on a contract which could not have been enforced as not valid under the statute of frauds.3 For the same reason payments made by a physician on account of a pauper patient cannot be recovered from the parish authorities unless they authorize the expense.4 A volunteer, also, who pays out money for the support of a lunatic, without any contract, express or implied, cannot recover the money from the lunatic's committee.5 It is otherwise as to money paid by the plaintiff at the defendant's request, either express or implied. In such cases the defendant is bound to refund.6 Hence where A. at Voluntary payment for another cannot be recovered back, but otherwise as to payment at request.

1 See infra, sec 784; supra, sec 506.

1 Infra, sec 763; 1 Wms. Saund. 264, n. (1); Leake, 2d ed. 85; Stokes V. Lewis, 1 T. R. 20; Child V. Morley, 8 T. R. 610; Durnford V. Messiter, 5 M. & S. 446; Johnson V. Steam Packet Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 43; Bates V. Townley, 2 Ex. 152; England V. Marsden, L. R. 1 C. P. 529; see Dearborn V. Bowman, 3 Met. Mass. 155; Richardson V. Williams, 49 Me. 558; Day V. Holmes, 103 Mass. 306; Bigelow V. Davis, 16 Barb. 561; Springer V. Springer, 43 Penn. St. 518; Davis V. Calloway, 30 Ind. 112.

2 Sleigh V. Sleigh, 5 Ex. 514.

3 Leake, 2d ed. 85; citing Pawle V. Gunn, 4 Bing. N. C. 445; Indian. R. R. V. O'Reilly, 38 Ind. 140.

4 Wing V. Mill, 1 B. & Ald. 104; see Lamb V. Bunce, 4 M. & S. 275.

5 Hehn V. Hehn, 23 Penn. St. 415.

6 1 Saund. 264, note 1; Power V. Butcher, 10 B. & C. 346; Grissell V. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 15; Driver V. Burton, 17 Q. B. 989; Benson V. Thompson, 27 Me. 471; Willis V. Hob-son, 37 Me. 403; Rumney V. Ellsworth, 4 N. H. 138; Wilson V. George, 10 N. H. 445; Beach V. Vandenburg, 10 Johns. 361; Rensselaer Factory V. Reid, 5 Cow. 603; Little V. Gibbs, 1 South. 213; Hatton V. Robinson, 4 Blackf. 479; Taylor V. Colten, 6 Ired. 69; Wharton V. Franks, 9 Porter, 232. That the request must be averred, see Stokes V. Lewis, 1 T. R. 20; Exall V. Partridge, 8 T. R. 308; Brittain V. Lloyd, 14 M. & W. 762; Packard V. Lienow, 12 Mass. 11; Hassinger V. Solmes, 5 S. & R. 4.

B.'s request becomes responsible for a debt of B. to C, and is compelled to pay such debt, A. may sue B. for the money so paid.1 - The Roman law, which subjects a party to liability for payment made in his absence in relief of his estate, which would otherwise be sacrificed, prevails throughout continental Europe;2 and it is accepted in Louisiana, though with some qualification.3 Our own law is unquestionably inconsistent in rejecting the Roman doctrine on the ground that no man should have a creditor forced on him without his consent, and yet permitting a stranger to purchase claims against any one against whom there may be claims in the market. The merchantability of debts, however, has now become essential to business, and to this the old doctrine of the common law has to yield. It has yielded, however, only so far as the exigencies of commerce require; and it should yield no further. Under the old Roman system, where, from the insulation of business men, ruin would often follow unless aid by a nego-tiorum gestor could be secured, it was natural that it should be held that the negotiorum gestor should be entitled to be reimbursed. But in our times, each day adds to the facilities by which the owner of property can be advised of disaster to it and communicate his instructions; while each day the increasing complications of business add to the embarrassments which would be produced were volunteers to be permitted to step in and arrange whatever they might consider out of place. And though, undoubtedly, we have been obliged to relax the old rule so far as to permit the assignment of debts, yet, with this limitation, the increasing complexity of our civilization adds to the arguments against permitting parties to place themselves in the position of creditors to others as to debts such others do not choose to incur. If I incur a debt to A., I now do it, it is true, with the understanding that A. may assign this debt to B. - But the fact that I incur a debt of a particular character to A. is no reason why C, without my knowledge, should subject me to a debt which I have never authorized at all.

1 Hassinger V. Solmes, 5 S. & R. 4; Taylor V. Gould, 57 Penn. St. 152.

2 See Windscheid, tit. Neg. Gest.;.

Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 62; Wh. on Ag. sec 356.

3 White V. Jones, 14 La. An. 681; Erwin's Succession, 16 La. An. 132.