Sec 658

When, however, the words of a contract have a clear and consistent meaning, and when no mistake or fraud is set up, the intention of the parties cannot be proved for the purpose of overriding this meaning. To intention expressed solemnly in a contract, intention proved orally is to yield in all cases in which fraud or mistake is not established. Many persons are chary and intentionally enigmatical in expressing their real intentions. Others like to hint at tentatory schemes which they have no fixed purpose of realizing; others like to mystify, sometimes from policy, sometimes from habit, sometimes from cynicism. Then, again, my intention a moment ago, and that which I declared to be my intention, may not be my intention now. The mind changes rapidly; caprice, or a new though sudden light, may bring about a real and instant change of my purposes. Or, supposing my mind remains unchanged, to permit my private intention to overrule the natural and obvious meaning of my written engagement, would be to give to secret mental reservations an ascendency destructive of fair business dealing. And, even supposing there be no such taint, to permit the treacherous medium of memory as to conversation to supersede the more exact and more loyal medium of a written statement, is to subordinate the more trustworthy to the less trustworthy mode of proof.1 sec 659. But when a description in a document is equally applicable to two or more objects, the declaration of the author may be received to explain to which of these objects the description refers. The subject matter of a contract may be shown by parol evidence of the surrounding circumstances."1 The object is, not to create a new agreement for the parties, but to determine to what extrinsic facts the agreement made by them relates. It should be remembered, however, that while a "latent" or objective ambiguity, i. e. doubt as to which of several objects the parties mean, may be cleared by extrinsic testimony, it is otherwise with "patent" or subjective ambiguity, i.e. doubt as to whether the parties had any specific meaning. The courts may declare to what objects certain terms relate. But they cannot introduce objects the parties did not intend. In other words, the courts may determine to what thing a contract relates, but by the parties alone can the contract be made.2 - The provisions of the Roman law are to the same effect. "Cum in verbis nulla ambiguitas est, non debet admitti voluntas questio."3 "Non aliter a significatione verborum recedi oportet, quam cum manifestum est, aliud sensisse testatorem."4 - At the same time when a word is left out by mistake, it will be inserted if the context supplies the material.5

But supposed, intent not to be introduced to override words.

Otherwise as to ambiguous terms.

1 Shore V. Wilson, 9 Cl. & F. 525; Peel in re, L. R. 2 P. & D. 46; Great W. R. R. V. Rous, L. R. 4 H. L. 650; Hunt V. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174; Wiggin V. Goodwin, 63 Me. 389; Bishop V. White, 68 Me. 104; Delano V. Goodwin, 48 N. H. 203; Ripley V. Paige, 12 Vt. 353; Fitchburg V. Lunenburg, 102 Mass. 358; Elliott V. Weed, 44 Conn. 19; Long V. R. R., 50 N. Y. 76; Huffman V. Hummer, 2 C. E. Green, 269;.

Kirk V. Hartmann, 63 Penn. St. 97; McClernan V. Hall, 33 Md. 293; Woodell V. Greater, 51 Ind. 539; Mc-Cormick V. Huse, 66 Ill. 315; Hartford Ins. Co. V. Webster, 69 Ill. 392; Pilmer V. Bank, 16 Iowa, 321; Turner V. Wilcox, 54 Ga. 593; Sanford V. Howard, 29 Ala. 684; and other cases cited Wh. on EV. sec 937. As to conflict between thought and word, see supra, sec 174.