Sec 641

"We have already observed that, while the work of interpretation is mainly devoted to the meaning of words, appealing therefore to the critical faculties, that of construction is mainly devoted to the exposition of the sense of an entire document, appealing to the logical faculties.7 The rules, it is true, which are applicable to interpretation are of importance in determining questions of construction, not only because the construction of a , document cannot be reached until the interpretation of its component words is settled, but because the rules bearing on interpretation, so far as they are rules of logic, bear more or less closely on construction.8 But the work of construction is nevertheless distinct from that of interpretation, requiring the exercise of different faculties, and subjected to different adjudications. These will now be examined.1

Nomen generalissi-mum to be largely construed.

Construction determinable by laws of logic.

2 See cases in Wh. Cr. PL & Pr. sec 237.

3 R. V. Clegg, 3 Cox C. C. 295.

4 See Packard V. Hill, 7 Cow. 434; 5 Wend. 375.

5 R. V. Cooke, 2 East P. C. 616; R. V. Douglass, 1 Camp. 212; R. V. Wil-lard, R. & R. 494; Hooker V. State, 4 Ohio, 359; State V. Plunket, 2 Stew. 11; Turley V. State, 3 Humph. 323.

6 Hooker V. State, 4 Ohio, 350.

7 See supra, sec 627 et seq.

8 See Railroad Companies V. Schutte, 103 I'. S. 118.

Sec 642

At common law, no distinct degree of validity was assigned to a written contract which was not under seal. The difference between a written and an unwritten contract, supposing the latter was unsealed, was a difference solely in degree; and in pleading it was not necessary to aver a contract, when not sealed, to be in writing, this being a mere matter of evidence.2 In the old writers, written contracts are spoken of as At common law, unsealed written contracts differ only in degree from unwritten.

1 Dr. Lieber gives the following as the leading rules for construction (Her-meneutics, 136 - 7): -.

"1. All principles of interpretation, if at all applicable to construction, are valid for the latter.

"2. The main guide of construction is analogy, or rather, reasoning by parallelism.

"3. The aim and object of an instrument, law, etc., are essential, if distinctly known, in construing them.

"4. So also may be the causes of a law.

" 5. No text imposing obligations is understood to demand impossible things.

"6. Privileges, or favors, are to be construed so as to be least injurious to the non-privileged or unfavored.

"7. The more the text partakes of the nature of a compact, or solemn agreement, the closer ought to be its construction.

"8. A text imposing a performance expresses the minimum, if the performance is a sacrifice to the performer; the maximum, if it involves a sacrifice or sufferance on the side of the other party.

"9. The construction ought to harmonize with the substance and general spirit of the text.

" 10. The effects which would result from one or the other construction may guide us in deciding which construction we ought to adopt.

"11. The older a law, or any text containing regulations of our actions, though given long ago, the more extensive the construction must be in certain cases.

"12. Yet nothing contributes more to the substantial protection of individual liberty than a habitually close interpretation and construction.

" 13. It is important to ascertain whether words were used in a definite, absolute, and circumscribed meaning, or in a generic, relative, or expansive character.

" 14. Let the weak have the benefit of a doubt, without defeating the general object of the law. Let mercy prevail if there be a real doubt.

"15. A consideration of the entire text or discourse is necessary, in order to construe fairly and faithfully.

"16. Above all, be faithful in all construction. Construction is the building up with given elements, not the forcing of extraneous matter into a text."

That the construction must be reasonable, see Com. Dig. Agreement, C.; Freeland V. Burt, 1 T. R. 703; Saward V. Anstey, 2 Bing. 522; Robertson V. French, 4 East, 135.

2 Infra, sec 684; Leake, 2d ed. 169; Seddon V. Senate, 13 East, 74; Young V. Austin, L. R. 4 C. P. 553; Corkling parol; all contracts not under seal, written as well as un-written, having this title.1 On the other hand, the word parol, when denoting a distinct species of evidence, is used as convertible with oral; and when we speak of parol evidence being received to explain a written document, we mean oral evidence.2 As is elsewhere seen, secondary evidence of documents is inadmissible, no matter what phase of inferiority con-stitutes such secondariness;3 the general test, however, not being authority or dignity, but immediateness of relation to the object to which the document refers.4 Hence, no primary testimony is rejected because of faiutness.5 - So far as concerns the right to vary a document by parol, no distinction is now recognized between sealed and unsealed writings.6.