5 Romilly, M. R., Pulsford v. Richards, 17 Beav. 87.

1 Burrowes v. Locke, 10 Ves. 470; Slim v. Croucher, 2 Griff. 37; Foster v. Charles, 6 Bing. 396; 7 Bing. 105; Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 401. To the same effect see remarks of Wells, J., in Fisher v. Mellen, 103 Mass. 506; and see further, Twitchell v. Bridge, 42 Vt. 68; Cabot v. Christie, 42 Vt. 121; Savage v. Stevens, 126 Mass. 207; Gunby v. Sluter, 44 Md. 237; Parmlee v. Adolph, 28 Oh. St. 10; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Reed, 33 Oh. St. 283; Smith v. Mitchell, 6 Ga. 458. See notes to Chandeler v. Lopus, 1 Smith's L. C. 7th Am. ed. 299.

2 Eq. Jur. 12th ed. sec 193.

3 Story's Eq. Jur. 12th ed. sec 193, citing Ainslie v. Medlycott, 9 Ves. 21; Pearson v. Morgan, 2 Bro. Ch. 389; Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & "W. 401.

4 Supra, sec 214.. 5 Supra, sec 214.

6 Redgrave v. Hurd, L. R. 20 Ch. D. 1; cited in detail supra, sec 214, infra, sec 245. As will be seen (infra, sec 1043), an action for negligence can be maintained by a party injured by a negligent erroneous assertion. In Mathias v. Yetts, 46 L. T. N. S. 503 (1882), Jessel, M. R., said: " The term legal fraud has a much wider signification. It was denned in the case of Evans v. Edmonds (13 C. B. 777, 786), by Maule,.

J., in a way which has not been questioned, and which has been frequently followed. I may mention especially the late case of Hart v. Swaine (L. R. 7 Ch. D. 142), before Fry, J., a decision which, as I read it, was approved of by the House of Lords in Brownlie v. Campbell (L. R. 5 Ap. Ca. 925). Therefore, even at law, fraud has a wider signification than that. At law, I take it, it is clear that a man who knew a fact cannot say, if he misstates it, and it is a material fact, that he had forgotten it. It is still fraud at law. If he chooses to take upon himself to state that as true which he ought to have known was not true, you cannot look into his mind to see whether he remembers it or not. It is quite sufficient to know that he did know and ought to have recollected; and, if he chooses after that to state it untruly, he must take the consequences. But the case I have referred to goes further. It says that, if a man takes upon himself to make a material misstatement without inquiry, having the means of ascertaining the truth, it is fraud at law. That is Evans v. Edmonds. Equity has gone much further. In equity it never was necessary that there should be what I will call actual sec 242. There must be a causal relation between the fraud and the injury. Of this the first constituent is, that the party injured should have sustained the injury in consequence of his reliance on the other's fraudulent misstatement; in other words, this fraudulent misstatement should have contributed to induce him to assent to the proposal from which the transaction injurious to him sprang. This need not have been the sole motive;1 but it must have been a contributory motive, and must have been of such a character that, had its falsity been known, the decision would have been the other way. A fraudulent representation does not avoid a contract that it did not induce; nor, unless it was operative in inducing the opposite party to take steps to his disadvantage, does it expose the party making it to an action for deceit or to a prosecution for obtaining goods under false pretences.2 - In an English case where this or moral fraud. A man who makes a material misstatement innocently, that is, in the sense that he believes it to be true, is not thereby exonerated. We have had that over and over again; and it is hardly necessary to refer to the numerous cases from The Reese River Silver Mining Co. v. Smith (L. R. 4 H. of L., 64) downwards, which have established that proposition. It is laid down in the fullest terms in a number of cases; and, as I read that last case of Brownlie v. Campbell, it is laid down there also. That being so, there is another point to be considered. It must be no doubt a material misstatement, and the other party must have been induced to act upon it. As it was sometimes said, it must be material to the inducing of the contract, but it need not be the only inducement. If it is a part of the inducement it will do. We had to consider the matter in the appeal court only recently in Redgrave v. Hurd (45 L. T. Rep. N. S.485;20Ch.Div.l). Therewesaid, if a man has a material misstatement made to him which may, from itsna-ture, induce him to enter into the contract, it is an inference that he is induced to enter into the contract by it."

Must be causal relation between fraud and injury.

1 Infra, sec 242 a; R. v. Hewsgill, Dears. 315; R. v. English, 12 Cox C. C. 171; Matthews p. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48; Safford v. Grout, 120 Mass. 20; Mo-Aleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439; Rogers v. Higgins, 57 111. 244; Rutherford p. Williams, 42 Mo. 18; Winter v. Bandel, 30 Ark. 362; Com. v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481; Thomas v. People, 34 N. Y. 351.

2 Attwood v. Small, 6 Cl. & F. 232; Horsfall v. Thomas, 1 H. & C. 90; R. v. Gardner, 7 Cox C. C. 136; Collins v. Cave, 6 H. & N. 131; R. v. Dale, 7 C. & P. 352; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. C. 775; Traill v. Baring, 4 D. J. S. 330; Doggett v. Emerson, 3 Story, 732; Mason v. Crosby, 1 Wood. & M. 342; Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26; Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659; Wells v. Water-house, 22 Me. 131; James v. Hodsden, 47 Vt. 127; Com. v. Davidson, l Cush. 33; Story v. R. R., 24 Conn. 94; Tayquestion was mooted,1 the suit was on a bill of exchange accepted by the defendant, in payment for a cannon sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, which cannon, it was alleged, was worthless, on account of a defect which the plaintiff had endeavored to conceal by the insertion of a metal plug in the weak spot of the cannon. It was proved that the defendant never examined the cannon, and that therefore the plaintiff's conduct in covering up the defect could not have influenced him. The court held that, the deceit, not having been an inducement of the transfer, did not avoid the sale. "If the plug," said Bramwell, B., "which it was said was put in to conceal the defect, had never been there, his position would have been the same; for, as he did not examine the gun or form any opinion as to whether it was sound, its condition did not affect him." It will be observed that the single issue here was whether the bargain was avoided by this particular deceit; and as the bargain was not induced by the deceit, the deceit did not avoid it.2 - Where fraud which induces a pur-.

1or v. Guest, 58 N. Y. 262; Morris Canal Co. v. Everett, 9 Paige, 168; Adding-ton v. Allen, 11 Wend. 374; People v. Miller, 2 Park. C. R. 197; Bruce v. Burr, 67 N. Y. 237; State v. Toinlin, 5 Dutch. 14; Phipps v. Buckman, 30 Penn. St. 401; Burkholder v. Beetens, 65 Penn. St. 496; Weist v. Grant, 71 Penn. St. 95; Ely v. Stewart, 2 Md. 408; Central Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305; Percival v. Harger, 40 Iowa, 286; Young v. Hall, 4 Ga. 95; Bryan v. Osborne, 61 Ga. 51; Todd v. Fam-bro, 62 Ga. 664; Duncan v. Hogue, 24 Miss. 671; Morrison v. Lods, 39 Cal. 381; Purdy v. Bullard, 41 Cal. 444; Klopenstein v. Mulcahy, 4 Nev. 296. To the effect that fraud, to be the basis of litigation, should succeed in defrauding, see further Neville v. Wilkinson, 11 Bro. Ch. 546; Small p. Attwood, 1 Young, 407; 6 Cl. & F. 232; Teague v. Irwin, 127 Mass. 217; Vandewalker v. Osmer, 65 Barb. 556; Bacon v. Bron-son, 7 Johns. Ch. 201; Duffany v. Ferguson, 66 N. Y. 482; Miller v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 558; Marsh v. Cook, 32 N. J. Eq. 262; Clark v. Everhardt, 63 Penn. St. 347; Gunby v. Sluter, 44 Md. 237; Bowman v. Carithers, 40 Ind. 90; Hale v. Philbrick, 47 Iowa, 217; Noel v. Horton, 50 Iowa, 687; Bond v. Ramsey, 89 111. 29; Schwabacker v. Riddle, 99 111. 343; Turnbull v. Gadsden, 2 Strobh. Eq. 14; Tobin v. Bell, 61 Ala. 125; Winter v. Bandel, 30 Ark. 362; Dunn v. Remington, 9 Neb. 82; and see Poland v. Brownell, cited supra, sec 232. That the fraud must have preceded damage, see supra, sec 239.

1 Horsfall v. Thomas, 1 H. & C. 90 (see criticism in Anson, 152).

2 See remarks of Cockburn, C. J., in Smith v. Hughes, L. R. 6 Q. B. 605. That the party injured must have been deceived by the false statement, see further Bispham's Eq. sec 215; Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659; Veasey v. Doton, 3 Allen, 380; Connersville v. Wadleigh, 7 Blackf. 102; Tuck v chase is proved, the sale will be set aside; as where a grantor orally agrees upon a sale of land at a specific price by the acre, and warrants the quantity at a specific figure, and the deed is made out with such a covenant, and the covenant is then fraudulently erased by the grantor, and the deed is then delivered to the grantee, who is deceived into the belief that the deed contains that covenant. In such a case, equity will intervene and direct a rectification.1.