1 Carmichael v. Vandebur, 50 Iowa, 651.

2 Savage v. Stevens, 126 Mass. 207.

3 Dyer v. Hargrave, 10 Ves. 505; Attwood v. Small, 6 Cl. & F. 232; Slaughter v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 379; Mead v. Bunn, 32 N. Y. 275; Clark v. Everhardt, 63 Penn. St. 347; Halls v. Thompson, 1 Sm. & M. 443; infra, sec 261 et seq., 282.

4 Central R. R. v. Kisch, L. R. 2 H. L. 99; Warner v. Daniels, 1 Wood. & M. 90; Tuthill v. Babcock, 2 Wood. & M. 298; Somes v. Skinner, 16 Mass.

inquiries have been rendered abortive by extrinsic influences, and have been followed by a repetition of the prior fraudulent misrepresentations.1 - When a false representation is proved

348; Watson v. Atwood, 25 Conn. 313; Mead v. Bunn, 32 N. Y. 275; Biggs v. Perkins, 75 N. C. 397; Wilder v. De Cow, 18 Minn. 470; Phelps v. Quinn, 1 Bush, 375; Gant v. Shelton, 3 B. Mon. 423; Robertson v. Clarkson, 9 B. Mon. 507; Bailey v. Smock, 61 Mo. 213.

1 David v. Park, 103 Mass. 501; Risch v. Van Lillienthal, 34 Wis. 250; see Manning v. Albee, 11 Allen, 520; Brown v. Castles, 11 Cush. 348; infra, sec 252 et seq., 286.

In Redgrave v. Hurd, L. R. 20 Ch. D. 1, where to an action for specific performance the defendant set up negligence on the part of the plaintiff in examining the papers submitted to him (see case cited supra, sec 214), Jessel, M. R., said: "There is another proposition of law, of very great importance, which I think it is necessary for me to state, because, with great deference to the very learned judge in matters of specific performance from whom this appeal comes, I think it is not quite accurately stated in his judgment. If a man is induced to enter into a contract by a false representation, it is not a sufficient answer to him to say: 'If you had used due diligence you would have found out that the report was untrue. You had the means afforded you of discovering its falsity, which you did not choose to avail yourself of.' I take it, it is a settled doctrine of equity, not only as regards specific performance, but also as regards rescission, that that is not an answer, of course subject to the exception of the statute of limitations, when it is made a statutory answer on the ground of delay. That, of course, is a different thing altogether. There delay deprived a man of his right, and the only question to be considered was from what time the delay should count. It was decided, and is now so made law by statute, that the time counted from the date when, by due diligence, the fraud might have been discovered. Nothing can be plainer, I take it, on the authorities in equity, than that false representation is not got rid of by the defendant - that is, the person resisting its performance, or asking for rescission on the ground of deceit - being guilty of negligence. One of the most familiar instances in modern times, and one which occurs in case after case, both reported and unreported, is this: Men issue a prospectus containing false statements - false statements of the contracts made before the formation of the company, and on similar matters - and then say the contracts themselves may be inspected at the office of the solicitors. It has always been held that those who accept those false statements as true are not deprived of their remedy merely because they neglected to go and look at the contracts themselves, though they were told the contracts were in writing and might be inspected if they asked to see them. Another instance with which we are familiar is a false statement as to the contents of a lease; such a case as a man saying that there was no covenant or provision in the lease to prevent the carrying on, in the house to be sold, the trade which the purchaser was known by the vendor to be desirous of carrying on therein. Although the lease itself might be produced at the sale, or might have been open to the inspection of the purchaser long previously to the sale, it was held to have been made under circumstances likely to impose, the burden is on the party making the representation to show not only that the other party had independent information, but that he relied on such information, and was not misled by the false representation.1 And where the owner of a ship, seeking insurance, misrepresented the time of sailing, the insurance based on this representation was held void, though the underwriter could have obtained correct information from Lloyd's list, since the underwriter was supposed to have reason, until the contrary was proved, to rely on the owner's statement.2 - Even to patent defects warranties may be framed to extend,3 and when there is nothing in the condition of things glaringly inconsistent with a statement made, a vendee has a right to rely on such statement;4 and so where the purchaser, relying on the vendor's statements, waives an examination he might have made.5 Where, also, the vendor that the vendor could not be allowed to say, 'You were not entitled to give credit to my statement, either by word of mouth or in writing.' It is .not sufficient, therefore, to say that a man has had the opportunity of investigating the real state of the case, but has not availed himself of that opportunity. It has been apparently supposed by the learned judge in the court below that the decision of the house of lords in the case of Attwood p. Small, 6 Cl. & F. 232, is an authority which conflicts with that proposition. He says the defendant ' inquired into it to a certain extent, and, if he did it carelessly and inefficiently, that is his own fault. As in the case of Attwood v. Small, those directors and agents of the company who made ineffectual inquiry into the business which was to be sold to the company were nevertheless held, by their investigation, to have bound the company, so here, I think, the defendant, who made a cursory investigation into the position of things on the 17th of Feb., must be taken to have accepted the statements which appeared in those papers.' Those are the remarks which are, I think, inaccurate in law; and, what is more, I think they are not borne out by the case to which the learned judge referred." It is further argued that the authority of Attwood v. Small was weakened by the fact of the strength of the dissenting minority.

1 Leake, 2d ed. 381, citing Torrance v. Bolton, L. R. 8 Ch. 118; Bates v. Hewitt, L. R. 2 Q. B. 595; and see Holbrook v. Burt, 22 Pick. 546.

2 Morrison v. Ins. Co., L. R. 8 Ex. 40.'.

3 Supra, sec 227 et seq.

4 Kerr, F. & M. 79; Kisch v. R. R-, 3 De G. J.& S. 122; S. C. L. R. 2 H. L. 99; Rawlings v. Wickham, 3 De G. & J. 319; Smith's case, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 614; Bean v. Herrick, 12 Me. 262; Mead v. Bunn, 32 N. Y. 275; Thorne v. Prentiss, 83 111. 99; Young v. Harris, 2 Ala. 108.

5 Tuthill v. Babcoek, 2 Wood. & M. 299; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 220; Savage v. Stevens, 126 Mass. 207; Long v. Warren, 68 N. Y. 426; Nowlin misrepresents through mere heedlessness, he may, if the misrepresentation be material, be precluded from specific performance, although a more cautious person than the purchaser might not have been misled.1.