This section is from the book "A Commentary On The Law Of Contracts", by Francis Wharton. Also available from Amazon: A Commentary On The Law Of Contracts.
When there is a difference between the laws of the place of contract and of the place of performance, then, when the question is whether the performance of the contract is illegal, the laws of the place of performance are to determine.1 Thus, a contract made abroad, if not champertous in the place of performance, will not be held champertous in the place of contract.2 But when an agreement is immoral, or conflicts with national policy according to the lex fori, it will not be enforced by the judex fori.3 On the other hand, a vendor, contracting in a place where a sale is lawful, can recover, notwithstanding the resale is to be in a state where the sale is unlawful, unless he is concerned in the resale, or unless the transaction is immoral by the lex fori.4
The prohibition of a statute cannot be evaded by putting a contract in a shape which, while nominally not inconsistent with the statute, virtually contravenes its provisions.5 This has been frequently held with regard to stipulations evading usury statutes,6 and with regard to assignments evading bankrupt laws.7 - If acon-tract conflicts with the general policy and spirit of a statute governing it, it will not be enforced, although there may be no literal conflict.8
In conflict lex loci solutionis prevails.
Evasions of statute invalidate.
1 Wh. Con. of L. sec 482-497; Story's Con. of L. sec 243 et seq.; Schlesinger v. Stratton, 9 R. I. 578; Scott v. Duffy, 14 Penn. St. 18. As to usury see infra, sec 463.
2 Richardson v. Rowland, 40 Conn. 565; see Grell v. Levy, 16 C. B. N. S. 79; Berrien v. McLane, 1 Hoff. Ch. 421; infra, sec 421 et seq.
3 Wh. Con. of L. sec 493; Pollock, 334; Santos v. Illidge, 8 C. B. N. S. 874.
4 Green v. Collins, 3 Cliff. 494; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253; Webber v. Donnelly, 33 Mich. 469. In Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 656, it was argued by Swayne, J., that a note given for a slave in a state where slavery existed, could be sued out in a state where slavery did not exist. See Roundtree v. Baker, 52 111. 241. And so under the federal constitution, before the abolition of slavery consequent on the late civil war. Com. v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193.
5 De Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 107; Booth v. Bank, 7 Cl. & F. 509; Bank U. S. v. Owens, 2 Pet. 27; Eber-man p. Reitzel, 1 W. & S. 181.
6 Evans v. Nagley, 13 S. & R. 218; Marsh v. Robeno, 5 Phila. 190; Man-derson v. Bk., 28 Penn. St. 379; see infra, sec 461 et seq.
7 Mackay ex parte, L. R. 8 Ch. 643; Williams ex parte, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 138; Pierce v. Evans, 61 Penn. St. 415; see infra, sec 379.
8 Steaines v. Wainwright, 8 Scott, 280; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410;.
If a statute prohibits an act, it is not necessary, in order to invalidate a contract to do the act, that the statute should provide a penalty.1 The fact that a thing is prohibited, if it be in the nature of a public wrong, makes its commission an offence; and in any view vitiates a contract for its performance.2
 
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