Sec 440

For the reason that the right to labor is inalienable, a party who agrees (unless for a specific consideration in reference to a particular place) not to labor except for a specific price, is not bound by his agreement.2 Agreements, also, not to work for a particular obnoxious individual, so as to preclude him from procuring labor, are invalid.3

Sec 441

On the same ground, an agreement of all employers of labor in a particular line limiting themselves in the hiring of labor for a particular time, is void, the right to employ as well as the right to be employed being inalienable.4 And, aside from this ground, such an agreement amounts to duress which invalidates contracts based upon it. A laborer is entitled to a market for his labor. For all employers to unite to exclude him, except on extortionate concessions, from employment necessary to sustain life, is to apply to him a duress which invalidates the concessions thus extorted. The question is whether such a duress is actually applied. It certainly is not when a group of employers agree to reduce wages to a figure proportioned to their temporary receipts. It certainly is when all the employers of a community agree to reduce wages unreasonably,leaving to the operative the choice only between submission and starvation.

Sec 442

Whenever a particular staple is essential to the health and comfort of the community, a combination to absorb it for the purposes of extortion is invalid. This is the case in respect to a combination to absorb all of a particular kind of necessary food;5

Agreements not to labor except at a certain price or for a particular person are invalid.

And so of combination of employers.

Agreements to absorb a staple or fix prices invalid.

1 See supra, sec 149; infra, sec 738.

2 Leake, 2d ed. 741, citing Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B. 612; Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551.

3 Collins v. Locke, L. R. 4 Ap. Ca. 674.

4 Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 E. & B. 66. 5 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 80, s. 3; 1 Bl.

and a combination to absorb all coal procurable in the market.1 But a combination between a coal company and a carrying company by which the latter grants to the former half of its capacity, is not of itself invalid.2 On the other hand, an Com. 150; R. v. Waddington, 1 East, 143 (a combination to force up price of hops); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 111. 346; Raymond v. Leavitt, Sup. Ct. Michigan, 1881 (a combination to force up price of wheat).

1 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Penn. St. 173; Arnot v. Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558. Crawford v. Wick, 18 Oh. St. 190, held invalid an agreement between the lessor and the lessee of a coal mine, by which the latter was to use his influence over his employees in favor of the former's store, and by which the lessee was neither to give nor accept an Order on any other store.

2 Com. v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 43 Penn. St. 295. See Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Penn. Coal Co., 21 Penn. St. 131.

In Collins v. Locke, L. R. 4 Ap. Ca. 674; 28 W. R. 189, an agreement was set up between the stevedores of the port of Melbourne distributing the business of the port among themselves, and providing that if any merchant refused to give his business to the stevedore designated in the agreement, the party doing the work should give an equivalent, to be fixed by arbitrators, to the party superseded. The agreement was held not invalid.

In Raymond v. Leavitt, ut supra, Campbell, J., said: "The object of the arrangement between these parties was to force a fictitious and unnatural rise in the wheat market for the express purpose of getting the advantage of dealers and purchasers, whose necessities compelled them to buy, and necessarily to create a similar difficulty as to all persons who had to obtain or use that commodity, which is an article indispensable to every family in the country. That such transactions are hazardous to the comfort of the community is universally recognized. This alone may not be enough to make them illegal. But it is enough to make them so questionable that very little further is required to bring them within distinct prohibition. The cases of Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Penn. St. 173, and Arnot v. Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558, held contracts involving similar dealings with coal, to be against public policy. And we think the reasoning of those cases is based on familiar common law principles, which apply more strongly to provisions than to any other articles.

"There is no doubt that modern ideas of trade have practically abrogated some common law doctrines which are supposed to unduly hamper commerce. At the common law there is no doubt such transactions as were here contemplated, although confined to a single person, were indictable misdemeanors under the law applicable to forestalling and engrossing. Some of our states have abolished the old statutes which were adopted on this subject, and which were sometimes regarded as embodying the whole law of such cases. Where this has been done, as in New York, the statutes have replaced them by restraints on combinations for that purpose, leaving individual action free. In England there have been several statutes narrowing or repealing all of the ancient statutes, and more recently covering the whole ground. But so long as the early statutes only were repealed, it was conagreement to create a corner in stock, so as to control a market, and then, when the fact of this absorption is unknown, to make purchases for future delivery, is void.1 It is held, also, that an agreement by an association of salt manufacturers that no member should sell salt for a specific term below prices to be fixed by a committee is invalid, as in restraint of trade;2 and so of an agreement by several business houses not to sell cotton bagging for three months, except with the consent of a majority of their number.3 - "All restraints upon trade are bad, as being in violation of public policy, unless they are natural and not unreasonable for the protection of parties in dealing legally with some subject-matter of contract."4 "We must wilfully shut our eyes, before we can fail to see that a combination between a man who furnishes money, and dealers who manipulate the market sidered that enough remained of the common law to punish combinations to enhance the value of commodities. . . . " We do not feel called upon to regard so much of the common law to be obsolete as treats these combinations as unlawful, whether they should now be held punishable as crimes or not. The statute of New York, which is universally conceded to be a limitation of common law offences, is referred to in the case in 68 N. Y. as rendering such conspiracies unlawful, and this had been previously held in People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, where the subject is discussed at length. There may be difficulties in determining conduct as in violation of public policy, where it has not before been covered by statutes as precedents. But in the case before us the conduct of the parties comes within the undisputed censure of the law of the land, and we cannot sustain the transaction without doing so on the ground that such dealings are so manifestly sanctioned by usage and public approval that it would be absurd to suppose the legislature, if attention were called to them, would not legalize them. We do not think public opinion has become so thoroughly demoralized; and until the law is changed we shall decline enforcing such contracts. If parties see fit to invest money in such ventures, they must get it back by other than legal measures."