Sec 43

The evils which resulted in England from improvident bargains by minors, and the growing couviction in that country, that the line between v. Leighton, 5 N. H. 343; McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. 84.

By statute all contracts of infante made void.

As is noticed in a learned note to the 11th Am: ed. of Chitty on Cout. i. 200, Weeks v. Leighton, McCoy v. Huffman, are per curiam opinions, relying on Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, which case, however, as explained in Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252 (see infra, sec 48), does not sustain the doctrine that an infant, by avoiding his contract when partly executed, forfeits the right to recover for the services rendered. See infra, sec 717 et seq. Weeks r. Leighton is now overruled by Laton v. King, 19 N. H. 280, and Lufkin v. Mayall, 25 N. H. 82 ; and McCoy v. Huffman by Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill, 110.

In Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572, Putnam, J., put the question on the right ground : "By the avoidance the contract was annihilated, and the parties are left to their legal rights and remedies, just as if there had never been any contract at all." But the contract, if an advantageous one at the time it was entered into, and fully con-sidered on both sides, cannot be treated by the infant, when he arrives at age, as void, so as to enable him to recover a higher rate of compensation, even though, in consequence of the rise of wages, such compensation, had there been no contract, might have been recovered. See Breed v. Judd, 1 Gray, 460 ; and see infra, sec 48 a.

» Wood v. Fenwick, 10 M. & W. 195 ; Leslie v. Fitzpatrick, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 229.

2 Ibid.; R. v. Lord, 12 Q. B. 759.

3 Whitley v. Loftus, 8 Mod. 190 ; McKnight v. Hogg, 3 Brev. 44 ; King v. Amesly, 10 M. & W. 195 ; Woodruff v. Logan, 1 Engl. Ark. 276.

For enlistment statutes and the rulings under them, see Wh. Cr. PI. and Pr. sec 980, 983.

4 Tyler on Infancy, 2d ed. sec 97 ; Beard *r. Webb, 2 B. & P. 96 ; Day v. Everett, 7 Mass. 145 ; People v. Gates, 57 Barb. 291 ; People v. Gates, 43 N. Y. 40.

minority and majority should be firmly fixed, led, in 1874, to the adoption of the following statute (37 & 38 Viet, c 62): - " 1. All contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, henceforth entered into by infants for the repayment of money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries), and all accounts stated with infants, shall be absolutely void; provided always, that this enactment shall not invalidate any contract into which an infant may by any existing or future statute, or by the rules of common law or equity enter, except such as now by law are voidable." - " 2. No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age, to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full age of any promise or contract made during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age." "In fact," says Mr. Pollock,1 when commenting on this statute, "the operation of the present act seems to be to reduce all voidable contracts of infants ratified at full age, whether the ratification be formal or not, to the position of agreements of imperfect obligation, that is, which cannot be directly enforced, but are valid for all other purposes." "The proviso about new consideration," he adds, " was presumably introduced by way of abundant caution, to prevent colorable evasions of the act by the pretence of a new contract founded on a nominal or trifling new consideration. Where a substantial consideration appears on the face of the transaction, these words can hardly be supposed to impose on the court the duty of inquiring whether the apparent consideration is the whole of the real consideration." He proceeds to argue that, when an infant buys and pays for goods, the statute does not entitle him, when of full age, to recover back the moneys paid. " Such a consequence would be most unreasonable, and is not required by the policy of the statute, which is obviously to protect infants from running into debt, and to discourage tradesmen and others from giving credit to them, not to deprive them of all discretion in making purchases for ready money." " On this more reasonable construction, it is difficult to see what result is obtained by the first section which is not equally well or better obtained by the second. At common law, the infant was not bound by any of the contracts specified in the first section, unless he chose to bind himself at full age: by the second section he cannot henceforth so bind himself. No more complete protection can be imagined, and the first section appears superfluous." In Connecticut, certain contracts by infants are made void by statute.1 In other states, such contracts are void, unless there be a written ratification.2

1 Cont. 3d. Eng. ed. 61.