In the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that " no State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts. * (a)1 Under this clause two questions of great importance have been agitated. One is, What is a contract within the meaning of this section? (b)2 The second is, What operation upon or interference

(a) This clause does not apply to laws enacted by the States before the first Wednesday of March, 1789, - the day when the Constitution of the United States went into operation. Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420. Nor does it affect the powers of Congress. Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C. 322.

(b) "The provision of the Constitution never has been understood to embrace other contracts than those which respect property or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice."Dartmouth College v Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; per Marshall, C. J., 629.

1 The contract clause of the United States Constitution applies equally to the contracts of States as of individuals. Danolds v. State, 89 N. Y. 36. A State'constitution is a "law" within the meaning of the contract clause of the United States Constitution. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. McFarlan, 4 Stewart, 706. Equally so a constitutional amendment or ordinance. Pacific K. Co. v Maguire, 20 Wall. 36. [When contract rights are acquired under a construction of a statute, by the highest court of a State, subsequent judicial decisions changing the construction of the statute are within the constitutional prohibition so far us they affect such rights. Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356, and cases cited. But a change of judicial decisions, except in the construction of statutes, is not within the prohibition. Allen v. Allen, (Cal.) 30 Pac. Rep. 213; Ray v. Natural Gas Co. 138 Pa. 576. See also New Orleans Water Works Co. v Louisiana Co. 125 U. S. 18.] Any State is equally prohibited from enforcing, as well as passing, any law to impair the obligation of a contract, from whatever source originating; as an enactment of the Confederate States to sequestrate debts owed by citizens of those States to any citizen of a loyal State, as an alien enemy. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176. Any law relieving a debtor from a strict and literal compliance with the requirements of a contract enacted by a State in the exercise of its taxing power, as where a city, under a taxing power, attempted to withhold a portion of interest due from it on certain obligations under the guise of a tax, is unconstitutional and void, as impairing the obligation of a contract. Murray v. Charlestown, 96 U. S. 432.- K.

2 An act discharging a city, upon delivery by it to a bank of duplicate bonds, from liability upon certain original negotiable bonds issued by it and stolen from the bank, "to all persons purchasing the same after due publication of the notice specified" in the act, destroys the negotiable quality of the bonds, and so impairs the obligation of a contract. People v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48. Where a State, in chartering a bank, provides for a tax on its stock "in lieu of all other taxes,' the subsequent imposition of a tax on the with a contract, is to be considered as impairing the obligation thereof? Neither question has received a positive and universal answer, settling by definition all the subordinate questions which may arise under it But we have authoritative and instructive adjudication upon both.

It seems to be settled conclusively, that a grant is a contract; executed, it is true, but still a contract;l and that it comes within the scope of this provision, (c) and therefore, if there be a grant, in itself valid, any law which is, or permits, a direct interference with the enjoyment of the things granted, or a diminution of their value or any deprivation of the things granted, or of the rights or interests belonging to them, by the grantor, impairs the obligation of the contract (d)

(c) Therefore, the grant of lands by the legislature of a State, constitutionally empowered to make it, cannot be revoked by its successor. See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crauch, 87, 136. Marshall, C. J.: 'A contract is a compact between two or more parties, and is either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in which a party binds himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing; such whs the law under which the conveyance was made by the governor. A contract executed is one in which the object of the contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the grant. A contract executed, as well as one which is executory contains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not to re-assert that right. A party is, therefore, always estopped by his own grant. Since, then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues; and since the Constitution uses the general term "contract," without distinguishing between those which are executory and those which are executed, it must be con-' strued to comprehend the latter as well as the former. A law annulling conveyances between individuals, and declaring that the grantors should stand seised of their former estates, notwithstanding those grants, would be as repugnant to the Constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from the obligation of executing their contracts by conveyances It would be strange if a contract to convey was secured by the Constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected. If, under a fair construction of the Constitution, giants are comprehended under the term contracts, is a grant from the State excluded from the operation of this provision ? Is the clause to be considered as inhibiting the State from impairing the obligation of contracts between two individuals, but as excluding from that inhibition contracts made with itself 1 The words themselves contain no such distinction. They are general, and are applicable to contracts of every description. If contracts made with the State are to be exempted from their operation, the exception must arise from the character of the contracting party, not from the words which are employed. Whatever respect might have been felt for the State sovereignties, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the Constishares in the stockholders' hands is void, as impairing the obligation of the former contract. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679; cf. New Orleans, etc. R. R. Co., v. City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192. The State of Tennessee organized a hank in 1838, and agreed in the charter to receive its notes for taxes, and in 1865 declared its issues daring the rebellion void, and forbade their receipt for taxes. It was held that the later provision impaired the obligation of a contract. Keith ?;. Clark, 97 U. S. 454. But where a statute, to which a foreign insurance company is obliged to conform, contains no allusion to taxation, the imposition of a license tax by a municipality, upon such a company, does not impair the obligation of any contract. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta. 93 U. S. 116. - K.