(cc) Eaton v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. 11 Allen, 600.

(d) Johnson v. Hudson River R. R. Co. 20 N. Y. (6 Smith) 65; Wilds v. Same, 24 N. Y. (10 Smith) 430.

(e) Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 646; Cook v. The Champlain Transportation Co. 1 Denio, 01. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held, that the act of the Assembly of that State, changes the onus of proof as to negligence, from the owner of stock injured by a railroad train, where the common law leaves it to the defendant company. Keech v, B. & W. R. R. Co. 17 Md. 32.

(f) Vaughan v. Taff Vale R. Co. 6 H. & N. 670.

it would seem that the mere distance of the property burned is not a defence: (ff) but if sparks from an engine set fire to a house, and from this fire is communicated to another house and destroys it, the company is not liable for this last house; the rule, "causa proxima non remota," applying. (fg) There are quite a number of cases in which the liability of a railroad company for injuries to property near the railroad has arisen. It would seem that the company is not liable for such injury, unless it be caused by some negligence or default on their part, as to their cars or engines, or of their servants in the use of them. (fh)

Railroad companies are liable, not only for injuries to property, but to persons who are not passengers. In all our States they are required to take certain precautions when crossing common roads, as by signals, whistles, ringing the bell, etc. But it is wisely held, that their duty is to take sufficient care when crossing roads; and a mere compliance with these requirements, if not sufficient in any given case from its peculiar circumstances, leaves them liable. (fi)

A railroad company is also liable for injury to one of its own servants, if the company have been guilty of negligence, but not otherwise. (fj)

In cases of injury by collision, he whose negligence causes * the injury is responsible. What is called the law of the road, is, in this country, little more than that each party shall keep to the right; in England, each party keeps to the left. At sea, a vessel going free must give way to one on the wind; one on the larboard tack gives way to one on the starboard tack. And steamers must give way to sailing vessels. These rules, as to vessels, are based upon the simple principle, that the vessel which can alter her course most easily must do so; and they are often qualified by an application of this principle. (g) An observance of these rules, or a disregard of them, is often very important in determining the question of negligence; especially where the parties meet very suddenly. But the law of the road alone does not decide this question; for a violation of it may be for good cause, or under circumstances which negative the presumption of negligence which might otherwise arise from it. (h)

(ff) Smith 9. London, etc. R. R. Co. L. R. 6C.P. 14.

(fg) Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 62Penn. St 353.

(fh) See Indianapolis, etc R. R. Co. v. Paramore, 31 Ind. 148; and Fitch v. Pacific R. R. Co. 46 Mo. 822.

(fi) Richardson v. New York Central R. R. Co. 46 N. Y. 846.

(fj) Harrison v. Central R. R. Co. 1 Rob. 482; Nashville R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 1 Cold. 611; Hands v. London, etc. R. R. Co. Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 439, n.

(g) Lowry v. The Steamboat Portland, 1 Law Rep. 313; Lockwood v. Lashell, 19 Penn. St. 344.

It is said that he who suffers injury from collision caused by the negligence of another, cannot recover damages if he was himself at all negligent, and if his negligence helped to cause the injury. In some cases this principle has been applied with great rigor, and asserted in very broad terms; but it is obvious, that, as a general rule, it must be considerably modified. It is impossible that he who seeks redress for a wrong which he has sustained by the negligence of another, should always lose all right, where he has himself been in any way negligent. There must be some comparison of the negligence of the one party with that of the other, as to its intensity, or the circumstances which excuse it, or the degree in which it enters as a cause into the production of the injury complained of. In each case, it must be a question of mixed law and fact, in which the jury, under the direction of the court, will inquire whether the defendant was guilty of so great a degree of negligence as, in the particular case, will render him liable, and then, whether the plaintiff was also guilty of so much negligence as to defeat his claim. (i)

As the carrier of goods must allow a consignee a reasonable time to receive and remove his goods, so a carrier of passengers is bound to allow his passengers a reasonable time to leave the cars or carriages. (ii) And this is the time within which prudent persons usually get off the cars in like circumstances. (ij)

(h) See Pluckwell v. Wilson, 6 C. & P. 376; Kennard v. Burton, 26 Me. 39; Chaplin v. Hawes, 3 C & P. 554; Clay v. Wood, 6 Esp. 44; Wayde v. Carr, 2 Dow. & R. 255; Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East, 60; Turley v. Thomas, 8 C. & P. 103; Wordsworth v. Willan, 6 Esp. 273; Mayhew v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 423; McLean v. Sharpe, 2 Harring. (Del.) 481.

(i) See Rigby v. Hewitt, 6 Exch. 240 ; Greenland v. Chaplin, id. 248; Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115; Kennard v. Burton, 26 Me. 39; Marriott v. Stanley, 1 Man. & G. 568; Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B.439; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Penn. St. 463; Trow v. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 24 Vt. 487; Catlin v. Hills, 8 C. B. 123; Bridge v. The Grand Junction Railway Co. 3 M.

& W. 244; Davies v. Mann, 10 id. 546; Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 218; Moore v. Inhabitants of Abbot, 32 Me. 46; Munroe v. Leach, 7 Met 274; Churchill v. Rosebeck, 16 Conn. 369; Carroll v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. 1 Duer, 571. In C, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Dewey, 26 Ill. 266, it is said, that if the negligence of one party is only slight, and that if the other appears gross, a recovery may be had. See also ante, p. *280, note (e). Fox v. Town of Glastenbury, 20 Conn. 204; Willis v. L. I. R. R. Co. 82 Barb. 308.