In this case the defendant applied several times to Harris ft Stratton to obtain the discount of a bill for £200, who had replied that they could not advance money, but only goods. Subsequently the defendant agreed to take a certain quantity of goods, which were delivered to him, and the bill of exchange delivered to Harris ft Stratton, together with col-lateral security for its payment. They goods were disposed of by the defendant to an auctioneer for £120. In an action upon the bill, against the defendant, to which the defence of usury was pleaded, Lord Mansfield directed the jury that they were to consider, whether the transaction between the defendant and Harris ft Stratton, was not, in truth, a loan of money, and the sale of goods a mere contrivance and evasion. The jury having found the contract usurious, a rule for a new trial was granted, and subsequently Lord Mansfield delivered the Opinion of the court discharging the rule. In Barker v. Vansommer, 1 Brown Ch. 149, the plaintiff had given a promissory note to Vansommer & Co. for £2,225, upon receiving from them silks valued by the parties at that amount, but which were sold by the plaintiff for £799. This bill was brought by the plaintiff to have amounts to taking a mortgage as security, and is usurious. Phelps v. Bellows, 53 Vt. 539. And an agreement to take a policy of insurance and pay premiums thereon in addition to paying the highest legal interest on money lent, is a usurious transaction. Missouri Valley Ins. Co. v. Kittle, 1 McCrary, 234. As to a loan of money at usurious interest under the form of a redeemable ground rent, see Montague v. Sewell, 57 Md. 407. But an agreement to pay interest on a sum of money retained by the lender until the borrower can perfect the title to real estate on which the sum is to be lent, is, in the absence of a corrupt intent, not usury, although the lender used the money during the time. Bevier v. Covell, 87 N. Y. 50. - That members of building associations, in ascertaining the amount due from them, are entitled to be credited with all sums paid by them in excess of legal interest, and that such associations cannot, under the form of " premium," exact more than legal interest, see Citizens' Security Co. v. Uhler, 48 Md. 455; Border State, etc. Assoc, v. McCarthy, 57 Md. 555; Home, etc. Assoc. v Thereby, 58 Md. 284; Geiger v. Eighth, etc. Assoc, id. 569; Building, etc. Assoc, v. Dorsey, 16 S. C. 462; Burlington Mut. Loan Assoc. v. Heider, 55 la. 424; Hawkeye. etc Assoc v. Blackburn, 48 la. 385. But Holmes v. Smythe, 100 111. 413, held, that where a member of a building association, in bidding the highest premium for a loan, coupled with other conditions common to such associations, pays a greater price for the use of money than is allowable, the transaction is not usurious, as such a result follows only on his failure to perform the conditions, and may be looked upon as liquidated damages. See also Massey v. Building Assoc. 22 Kan. 624. - K.

Bank of U. S. v. Waggener, 9 Pet. 400; Willoughby v. Comstock, 3 Edw. Ch. 424. And where the discount upon uncurrent money is very trifling, and the same will pass in the market in the way of trade, it seems that its reception at par is no violation of the statute. Slossum o. Duff, I Barb. 432. Or if the borrower has the option of returning the depreciated banknotes at the same rate at which he received them, this it seems prevents the transaction from being usurious. Caton v. Shaw, 2 Harris & G. 13.

(b) Rich v. Topping, 1 Esp. 176; Coombe v. Miles, 2 Camp. 553; Grosve-nor v. Flax & Hemp Manuf. Co., 1 Green, Ch. 453.

(c) Hargreaves v. Hutchinson, 2 A.& E. 12; Davis v. Hardacre, 2 Camp. 375. In this case the defendant applied to the plaintiff to discount a bill of exchange of £700 for him The plaintiff refused to do so unless the defendant would take a check for £250, a promissory note for £286, and a landscape in imitation of Poussin, to be valued at £150. The action was brought by the plaintiff upon the bill. Lord Ellenhorongh said: "Where a party is compelled to take goods, in discounting a bill of exchange, I think a presumption arises that the transaction is usurious. To rebut this presumption, evidence should be given of the value of the goods by the person who owes on the bill. In the present case I must require such evidence to be adduced, and I wish it may be understood that, in similar cases, this is the rule by which I shall be governed for the future. When a man goes to get a bill discounted, his object is to procure cash, not to encumber himself with goods. Therefore, if goods are forced upon him, I must have proof that they were estimated at a sum for which he could render them available upon a resale, not at what might possibly be a fair price to charge to a purchaser who stood in need of them." them, he cannot keep the price by proving the contract to be usurious, nor is he answerable for them in their value at the time they were delivered; but for what he actually receives; as it is considered that they were given him to be sold. Some of the devices resorted to, it is difficult to detect or to prevent; but, in all cases, the only question for the jury is, Has one party had the use of the money of the other, and has he paid him for it more than lawful interest, in any way or manner? And in this determination the contract will not be held good, merely because, upon its face, and by its words, it is free from taint, if substantially it be usurious; nor, if it be in words and form usurious, will it be held so, if in substance and fact it is entirely legal, (d)1 And these questions are for the jury only, who must judge of the intention of the parties which lies at the foundation of the inquiry, from all the evidence and circumstances, (e) And the questions which are presented thus are sometimes extremely nice. Thus, a contract to borrow stock, valued at more than the marked price, and to pay lawful interest on this valuation, would, in our opinion, be usurious, although the interest reserved might be no more than the stock earns; (f)2 but,*if the stock be sold, and the money aris(d) Per Lord Tenterden, C. J., Beete v. Bidgood, 7 B. & C. 458; Andrews v Fond, 13 Pet. 76.