(ii) Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 Ia. 663. See also Pollock v. Landis, 86 Ia. 651.

(j) This question was discussed in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the case of the Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cosh. 417. In that case one Russell, the agent and servant of the plaintiff, a corporation, came to Boston with a large number of witnesses, to take charge of a law-suit in behalf of the corporation, bringing with him one thousand dollars to defray the expenses of the suit, and put up at the defendants' inn as a guest, with several of the witnesses, for whose board he promised to be responsible to the defendants, but at an agreed price for board by the week, -the price to be greater if they did not stay a week, - and under said agreement stayed at the defendants' inn for eighteen days. It was held, that the relation of landlord and guest was established instantly upon his arrival at the inn, and his reception as a guest, and was not affected by his staying for a longer or shorter time, if he retained his character as a traveller, and the fact that there was an agreed price for board would not take away his character as a traveller and guest. And Fletcher, J., said: "It is maintained for the defendants that Russell was not a guest in the sense of the law, but a boarder. But Russell surely came to the defendants' inn as a wayfaring man and a traveller, and the defendants received him, as such wayfaring man and traveller, as a guest at their inn. Russell being thus received by the defendants as their guest at their inn, the relation, with all the rights and liabilities of the relation of landlord and guest, was instantly established between them. The length of time that a man is at an inn makes no difference, whether he stays a week or a month, or longer, so that always, though not strictly transient, he retains his character as a traveller. Story on Bailm. § 477. The simple fact that Russell made an agreement, as to the price to be paid by him by the week, would not, upon any principle of law or reason, take away his character as a traveller and a guest A guest for a single night might make a special contract as to the price to be paid for his lodging, and whether it were more or less than the usual price would not affect his character as a guest. The character of a guest does not depend upon the payment of any particular price, but upon other facts. If an inhabitant of a place makes a special contract with an innkeeper there, for board at his inn, he is a boarder, and not a traveller or a guest, in the sense of the law. But Russell was a traveller, and put up at the defendants1 inn as a guest, was received by the defendants as a guest, and was, in the sense of the law, and in every sense a guest" See also Chamberlain v. Masterson, 26 Ala. 871; and Johnson v. Reynolds, 8 Kans. 257.

(jj) Carter v. Hobbe, 12 Mich. 52.

1 See Jalie v. Cardinal, 85 Wis. 118.

The responsibility of a boarding-house keeper is considered at much length, in a recent English case. Wightman, J., and Erle, J., held that a boarding-house keeper was not a bailee of the goods of a lodger, and not answerable for loss caused by the negligence of her servants, unless she was herself negligent or in default for hiring the servants, or in some other way. Campbell, C. J., and Coleridge, J., held that she was liable for * the negligence of her servants without having contributed thereto, as she was for her own negligence. We cannot but think this latter view more consistent with reason, and with the authorities, so far as they bear upon the question. (k)

One invited into an inn as a visitor by the innkeeper, from whom no pay is expected, is not a guest for whom the innkeeper is liable. (l)

Another question has arisen, whether he is a guest who only sends or carries his property to an inn, and places it in the custody of the innkeeper, but does not go there himself to eat or to lodge. Upon this question the authorities are directly antagonistic; (m) but we think that such person is not a guest, and that the innkeeper is then only a depositary for compensation, and liable as such. (mm) We think the test is this. Is he bound to receive and to keep goods so sent or brought to him? He is certainly bound to receive them - if not unreasonable in quantity, or dangerous in quality - if the guest comes and stays with them; and then insures them as above stated. But he may refuse to take charge of them if the owner does not accompany them; for the custody of the goods, as we have already said, is merely accessory to the principal contract. He may refuse them, and therefore if he receives them it is not as an innkeeper, or at least not so as to subject him to the peculiar liability of an innkeeper. It is quite certain that he is not answerable for goods left by the owner, for which he is to receive no compensation. (n) A guest undoubtedly may leave an inn for a time, and still leave his property under the safeguard of the landlord's liability. And it is impossible to say precisely * how long he may so leave it, without ceasing to be a guest. On the other hand, it must be certain that one cannot lodge for a day or two at an inn, and then depart, leaving valuable property for an indefinite period, and the landlord be subjected, as long as the owner pleases, to the peculiar liability of an innkeeper. In such case he would be, like a warehouseman or other depositary, liable only for his negligence. (o)

(jk) Pinkerton v. Woodward, 88 Cal. 657.

(k) Dansey v. Richardson, 28 Law J. Q. B. 217.

(l) Southcote v. Stanley, 1 Hurl. & N. 247.

(m) This question was decided in the affirmative by a majority of the judges, against the opinion of Lord Holt, in Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866: s. c. nom. York v. Grindstone. 1 8alk. 888. And on the authority of this case it was decided the same way in Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280. See also the case of Peet v. McGraw, 26 Wend. 663, which contains a dictum by Nelson, C. J., to the same effect; and Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417, in which the point is noticed, but no opinion given. On the other hand, in Grinnell v. Cook, 8 Hill (N. Y.), 486, the Supreme Court of New York, after much consideration, decided the same question the other way, conformably to the opinion of Lord Holt. See also Thickstun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. 686, to the same effect See also Smith v. Dearlove, post, p. * 166, n. (s).