In the application of this rule we shall see a gradual enlargement, until, in this country at least, it seemed to be a little more than nominal. The cases are quite numerous, but we believe that the first one in which a contract was sought to be enforced, in which the renunciation was absolute, was in Massachusetts, in 1837; (a) and this was also nearly, if not quite, the first in

19 Pick. 623. The whole subject was examined at much length by Branson, J., in the subsequent case of Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157 (1839). See further, Ross v. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 166; Jarvis v. Peck, 1 Hoff. Ch. 479 (1840); Bowser v. Blits, 7 Blackf. 344 (1845); Grasselli v. Lowden, 11 Ohio St. 349.

(a) Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 61. This was debt on a bond conditioned that the obligator should never carry on or be concerned in the business of founding iron. The case was argued at great length before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, and all the cases from the Year-Books to that time were cited. And Morton, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "Among the most ancient rules of the common law, we find it laid down, that bonds of restraint of trade are void. As early as the second year of Henry V. (a. d. 1415), we find by the Year-Books that this was considered to be old and settled law. Through a succession of decisions, it has been handed down to us unquestioned till the present time. It is true, the general rule has, from time to time, been modified and qualified, but the principle has always been regarded as important and salutary. For two hundred years the rule continued unchanged and without exceptions. Then an attempt was made to qualify it, by setting up a distinction between sealed instruments and simple contracts. But this could not be sustained upon any sound principle. A different distinction was then started, between a general and a limited restraint of trade, which has been adhered to down to the present day. This qualification of the general rule may be found as early as the eighteenth year of James I. (a. d. 1621), Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro. Jac. 596, where it was holden, that a contract not to use a certain trade in a particular place was an exception to the general rule, and not void. And in the great and leading case on this subject, Mitchell v. Reynolds, reported in Lucas, 27, 85, 130, Fortescue, 296. and 1 P. Wms. 181, the distinction between contracts under seal and not under seal was finally exploded, and the distinction between limited and general restraints fully established. Ever since that decision, contracts in restraint of trade generally have been held to be void; while those limited as to time, or place, or persons, have been regarded as valid, and duly enforced. Whether these exceptions to the general rule were wise, and have really improved it, some may doubt; but it has been too long settled to be called in question by a lawyer. This which such a promise was declared to be wholly null, by direct adjudication; the statements in other cases, that a local limitation was necessary, and would make the promise enforceable, being for the most part, if not altogether, obiter. In the previous cases, such a promise, it is said, would be avoided by the law; but in none of them was this done, as there was always some limitation. But this was sometimes very wide. In one, for example, a promise not to use certain machines in any of the United States except two (Massachusetts and Rhode Island), was held good, because "agreements to restrain trade in particular places are valid in law, and may be enforced." (b) In the case of Alger v. Thacher, already referred to, it was argued, that the reason of the law against such contracts had passed laid down in previous cases. This may be regarded as a leading authority, and it leaves no other question than as to what shall be deemed "a reasonable limitation." (c) 1 In a latter case in the same State, a contract not to set up or carry on a certain business within the State was held to be void. (cc) 2 In Pennsylvania, a contract not to practise medicine within twelve miles of a certain town was held valid. (cd) 3 A contract not to run a steamboat on any of the waters of California was held void, because in restraint of commerce. (ce) If this question is to be answered by a reference to the cases, the probable conclusion would be, that almost any limitation would suffice. Still, however, if the courts adhere to the rule which seems now to be established, the limitation, to protect the contract, must be bona fide, and not a slight and unreal exception, inserted as a mere evasion of the law. (d) away, and that this was shown by an extension of the exception which made the rule itself unmeaning; for it could hardly be said that all the United States except two were any "particular place," if this phrase was to be used with any reference to its ordinary meaning. The court, however, were of opinion, that although the connection between such contracts and the law of apprenticeship might have originated the rules of law in relation to these contracts in England, and we never had here a similar law or usage of apprenticeship, still there were sufficient reasons for sustaining the rule, in this country, as it had been doctrine extends to all branches of trade and all kinds of business. The efforts of the plaintiff's counsel to limit it to handicraft trades, or to found it on the English system of apprenticeship, though enriched by deep learning and indefatigable research, have proved unavailing. In England, the law of apprenticeship and the law against the restraint of trade may have a connection. But we think it very clear that they do not, in any measure, depend upon each other. That the law under consideration has been adopted and practised upon in this country and in this State, is abundantly evident from the cases cited from our own reports. It is reasonable, salutary, and suited to the genius of our government and the nature of our institutions. It is founded on great principles of public policy, and carries out our constitutional prohibition of monopolies and exclusive privileges. The unreasonableness of contracts in restraint of trade and business is very apparent from several obvious considerations. 1. Such contracts injure the parties making them, because they diminish their means for obtaining livelihoods, and a competency for their families. They tempt improvident persons, for the sake of present grain, to deprive themselves of the power to make future acquisitions. And they expose such persons to imposition and oppression. 2. They tend to deprive the public of the services of men in the employments and capacities in which they may be most useful to the community as well as themselves. 3. They discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish the products of ingenuity and skill. 4. They prevent competition, and enhance prices. 6. They expose the public to all the evils of monopoly. And this especially is applicable to wealthy companies and large corporations, who have the means, unless restrained by law, to exclude rivalry, monopolise business, and engross the market. Against evils like these, wise laws protect individuals and the public, by declaring all such contracts void."