Welland Canal v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480; Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 215, and see note (r), infra. The party introducing matter of estoppel must have acted on the faith of the representation or conduct complained of. Lawrence v. Brown, 1 Seld. 394; Dezell v. Odell, Welland Canal v. Hathaway, and Howard v. Hudson, cited above. Trescott v. Davis, 4 Barb. 495; Wallis v. Truesdell, 6 Pick. 455; Dewey v. Field, 4 Met. 381; Watkins v. Peck, 13 N. H. 360; Hicks v. Cram, 17 Vt. 449. Thus, in Farrell v. Higley, Hill & Denio, 87, where a debtor informed the sheriff that goods did not belong to him, but the sheriff seized them, the debtor was not afterwards estopped from showing they were his own. In Flanigan v. Turner, 1 Black, 491, it was held, that a respondent, sued in admiralty for the repairs of a vessel, cannot deny that he is sole owner of the vessel, if the vessel has been sold by the order of another court, and he has claimed and received the proceeds as sole owner; and in Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654, it was said, that, as no reasonable man could have acted on the representation, taken altogether, there was no estoppel. So where an admission is made to third persons, without intending to influence the party who heard and acted upon it, there is no estoppel. Reynolds v. Lounsbury, 6 Kill, 534; Pierce v. Andrews, 6 Cush. 4; Barker v. Binninger, 14 N. Y. 270. "An estoppel of this kind is an equitable abandonment of a claim, - a kind of perpetual disclaimer; and a party cannot be covertly led into it. It goes upon the ground of the obligation resting on one owner or part-owner to disclose the true state of the title to another, who is, or who is about to become, interested in the same thing. And the party to be affected by the estoppel should be made fully aware of the interest of the party making the inquiry, or that the declaration is going to be or will be likely to be relied upon by some one." Wooley v. Chamberlin, 24 Vt. 270; Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Me. 525; Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 577 ; Pennell v. Hinman, 7 Barb. 644; Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn. 23; but the case must be clearly made out. Morris v. Moore, 11 Humph.

1 See Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank, 2 Q. B. D. 194; Goodwin v. Robarts, L. R. 10 Ex. 337: 1 App. Cas. 476.

433. Though the act of the party alleging matter of estoppel must be based on the statements or conduct complained of, it need not be immediate and contemporaneous. The statements or conduct will operate by way of relation and by estoppel for a reasonable time. Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307, 315; and in the recent case of Smith v. Schroeder, U. S. C. C. Rhode Island, 21 Law Reporter, 739, during a treaty for the sale of certain mills, representations were made, true at the time, as to the machinery therein, which was removed before the execution of the deed. Per Curtis, J.: "This representation, not having been withdrawn, must be taken to be a continuing representation, and operative at the very time of the contract, when the defendant knew it to be false, and must have designed to mislead the plaintiff, because he himself had previously removed the articles." Where the declarations of one party have been acted on, we have seen they are conclusive; but if by the declarations one acquired no advantage, nor the other sustained injury, there is no estoppel. Wallis v. Truesdell, 6 Pick. 455. This was a trespass for attaching property; but on the principle above stated the plaintiff was not estopped from showing title by his declarations to the contrary made at the time of the attachment. These estoppels are "confined to their legitimate purpose of preventing one man from being injured by the wrongful act or misrepresentation of another. But where no injury, results from a representation, its discussion belongs to the forum of morals, and not to the judicial tribunals." Bitting & Waterman's Appeal, 17 Penn. St. 211; Cole v. Bolard, 22 id. 431. The object of the estoppel is to continue the parties in the same relative position in which the representation or line of conduct complained of, placed them. Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Me. 525. Newton v. Liddiard, 12 Q. B. 925, and where the position of the parties is unchanged there is no estoppel. Steele v. Putney, 15 Me. 327. Thus, though persons have held themselves out as partners, one of them may sue alone and show the absence of a partnership, if his debtor is in no way prejudiced thereby. Kell v. Nainby, 10 B. & C. 20; Parsons v. Crosby, 5 Esp. 199. See also Brockbank v. Anderson, 7 Man. & 6. 295; Poole v. Palmer, 9 M. & W. 71. So, in Hawes v. Marchant, I Curtis, 136, Curtis, J., says: "He was silent when he should have spoken, and he cannot now speak." Smith v. Smith, 30 Conn. 111. And in Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 577, Bayley, J., declares a party is at liberty to prove admissions were mistaken or untrue, and is not estopped nor concluded by them, unless another person has been induced by them to alter his condition. Lewis v. Clifton, 14 C. B. 245; Newton v. Liddiard, supra. And where the admission was a convenient assumption between the parties, and does not alter their position, it does not estop. Thus, where one procured another to admit a fact to answer a particular purpose, he may not, in a suit against that party, insist on it as conclusive. Davis v. Sanders, 11 N. H. 259; Pecker v. Hoit, 15 id. 143; Danforth v. Adams, 29 Conn. 107. In Audenried v. Betteley, 5 Allen, 382, it is held, that an assignment under the insolvent laws does not vest in the assignees property which has been put into the hands of the debtor for the fraudulent purpose of giving him false credit, although some of his creditors may have been defrauded thereby.

(r) An admission of the contents of a

1 See Polak v. Everett, 1 Q. B. D. 669, that it is not the duty of a surety to warn a creditor, whom he sees about to do that which, if done without the surety's consent, and in * which the State is interested, have been allowed to mature, the acquiescence of parties estops them from subceipted for by the owner, by reason of which no other attachment was made; and the owner was estopped from showing his title in an action on the receipt. Dewey v. Field, 4 Met. 381. In Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 215, a receipt for goods attached was held to be an estoppel of title, but if given through fraud or mistake there would be no estoppel. The doctrine has been extended to real estate. Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Vera. Ch. 186. Wendell v. Van Rennselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. 844, declared as an established equitable doctrine, that if a man knowingly though passively suffers another to purchase and expend money on land under an erroneous opinion of title, without making known his claim, he shall not be permitted afterwards to exercise his legal right against such person: qui tacet, consentire videtur; qui potest et debet vetare jubet. It is an act of fraud, and his conscience is bound by this equitable estoppel. Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166; Dixon v. Green, 24 Miss. 612; Nixon v. Carco, 28 id. 414; Morford v. Bliss, 12 B. Mon. 255; Sugden on Vendors, 1022, n.; Marshall v. Pierce, 12 N. H. 127 ; Swain v. Seamans, 9 Wall. 254; Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519; Lee v. Kirkpatrick, 1 McCarter, 264; Trapnall v. Burton, 24 Ark. 371; Mills v. Graves, 38 Ill. 455. But the owner must be charged with knowledge of his rights. Watkins v. Peck, 13 id. 360; Casey v. Inloes, 1 Gill, 430. And intentionally or negligently encourage the purchase. Morris v. Moore, 11 Humph. 433; Muse v. Letterman, 18 S. & R. 167, 171. But whatever is sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry is a notice to him of the owner's title. Epley v. Witherow, 7 Watts, 163. Nor can this estoppel arise where all the parties are acquainted with the true state of the title. Wilton v. Harwood, 23 Me. 131. Nor where the silent party was under no obligation to speak. Burleson v. Burleson, 28 Texas, 383; Page v. Arnim, 29 Texas, 53. And in E. I. Co. v. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83, it was said, that if a man suffers another to build on his ground, without setting up a right until afterwards, the court will oblige him to permit quiet enjoyment. A tenant under a defective lease is protected. Stiles v. Cowper, 3 Atk. 692; Story's Equity Jur. §§ 388, 889 ; Hall v. Fisher, 9 Barb. 17, 31; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 4 Barr, 193; Lord Mansfield, quoted in Rex v. Butterton, 6 T. R. 554. But the bad faith of the owner must be made out. Dann v. Spurrier, 7 Ves. 231. Nor does the doctrine apply to encroachments on land where the title is known. Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. 186. But these remedies are to be sought only in equity, except in jurisdictions where no chancery courts or powers obtain. Thus, in Swick v. Sears, 1 Hill, 17, a court of law refused to apply the doctrine of estoppel, where an owner not only stood by but encouraged a sale, and declared the title good. And it is always stated, that the legal title is not lost; but a court of equity will not permit the owner to prejudice an innocent party by asserting it. This restraint is adapted to the nature of each case, and the extent of the fraud. In case of purchase the vendee may be secured in the full benefit of it. Niven v. Belknap, 2 Johns. 573 ; and (since the amalgamation of law and equity in New York) Hall v. Fisher, 9 Barb. 17. A parol agreement to purchase, and improvements made in relation thereon, may entitle to specific performance. Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 14 Johns. 15; Carpenter v. Stilwell, 12 Barb. 128. Where a wall, by mistake of builder and fraud of land-owner, encroaches beyond the line, it will be protected, or the claimant be saddled with the expenses of its removal. A court of law may construe such acquiescence into a license, but no title passes thereby. Miller v. Platt, 5 Duer, 272. Where one knew that his land would be flooded by a dam which he assisted in building, it is evidence of license, but not conclusive as an estoppel to prevent an action for flowage. Batchelder v. Sanborn, 4 Foster, 474. But see West v. Tilghman, 9 Ired. 163; Danley v. Rector, 5 Eng. 211; McPherson v. Walters, 16 Ala. 714, where the whole doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence at a sale is repudiated, and the parties turned over to equity for relief. Where the owners of adjoining lots of land settle and establish a division line by parol agreement, and that agreement is executed, the line shall not be disturbed,' though it afterwards appear that it is not the true line according to the paper title, especially after long acquiescence. Rockwell v. Adams, 6 Wend. 467; McCormick v. Barnum, 10 id. 104; Dibble v. Rogers, 18 id. 536; Lindsay v. Springer, 4 Harring. (Del.) 547 ; Avery v. Banm, Wright, 576; Chew v. Morton, 10 Watts, 321; Thompson v. McFarland, 6 Barr, 478; Kellogg v. Smith, 7 Cush. 875; Gilchrist v. McGee, 9 Yerg. 455; Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660; Whitehouse v. Bickford, 9 Foster, 471. See contra, Crowell v. Bebee, 10 Vt. 33; Colby v. Norton, 19 Me. 412.