What constitutes such delivery often presents a difficult question. In Wheeler v. Wheeler, 43 Conn. 503, the purchase of a horse by a husband with the expressed intention of making an immediate gift to his wife and the keeping it in his stable was held a sufficient delivery. But merely pointing out an animal with the words " That is your property, I give it to you," is insufficient, Brewer v. Harvey, 72 N. C. 176. Delivery of the key of a box in a safety deposit vault with intent to give the contents is a sufficient delivery. Pink v. Church, 14 N. Y. Supp. 337, 60 Hun, 580. Delivery of a negotiable bond with intent to give is effectual. Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 455. Likewise a gift of non-negotiable securities as shares of stock, Commonwealth v. Crompton, 137 Pa. 138; or an unindorsed note, Letts v. Letts, 73 Mich. 138; Hopkins v. Manchester, 16 R. I. 663; or a policy of insurance, Crittenden v. Phoenix, etc. Ins. Co., 41 Mich. 442. The delivery of a savings-bank book with an order for the payment of the whole deposit for the purpose of transferring the money to the donee is a valid gift, and is effectual although the book and order are not presented to the bank until after the donor's death. Kimball v. Leland, 110 Mass. 325; Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590. See also Schollmier v. Schoendelen, 78 Ia. 426. So of a delivery of the book alone. Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88; Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572. See also Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512; Kerrigan v. Rautigan, 43 Conn. 17; Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550; Pierce v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 129 Mass. 425; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421. But delivery of the donor's check or draft payable after his death does not constitute a valid gift. Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 212. Appeal of Waynesburg College, 111 Pa. 130. And death operates as a revocation of a check payable on demand delivered with the intention of making a gift of the fund on which it was drawn, if payment is not obtained before the drawer's death. Simmons v. Cincinnati Savings Soc. 31 Ohio St. 457. If stock is transferred to the name of another as a gift without the latter's knowledge, the gift is effectual and cannot be revoked. Standing v. Bowring, 31 Ch. D. 282. But merely registering bonds in the name of an intended donee will not have a like effect. In re Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560. And a writing purporting to give a note therein described, the note not being delivered, is ineffectual. Gammon Seminary v. Robbins, 128 Ind. 85. Nor is delivery of possession enough unless accompanied by an intention to make an immediate and final gift. Jones v. Lock, L. R. 1 Ch. 25. See also Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177. If the subject of the intended gift is already in the possession of the donee, no further delivery is needed. Winter v. Winter, 9 W. R. 747; Prov. Inst, for Savings v. Taft, 14 R. I. 502; Miller v. Neff's Adm. 33 W. Va. 197. But see Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 231. So if the donee obtains possession before the uncompleted gift is revoked, it is as valid as if delivery had been simultaneous with the expression of intent on the part of the donor. Carradine v. Carradine, 58 Miss. 286; Whiting v. Barrett, 7 Lansing, 106. The delivery may be with the understanding that the property shall be held by the donee for his own benefit only on the happening of a contingency, as the donor's death. Tyndale v. Randall, 154 Mass. 103. Redelivery of the subject of the gift by the donee to the donor does not revest the property in the latter. Ivey's Adm. v. Owens, 28 Ala. 641; Ector v. Welsh, 29 Ga. 443. Even if the intent is that the title shall revest in a certain contingency, provided the contingency never takes place. Marston v. Marston, 64 N. H. 146. Whether delivery to a third person inures to the benefit of the intended donee depends upon the character in which the third person acts. If he is merely the donor's agent, as his authority is revocable the gift is not complete. Barnum v. Reed, 136 Ill. 388; Smith v. Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229; Augusta Savings Bank v. Fogg, 82 Me. 538; Sessions v. Mosely, 4 Cush. 87; Scott v. Lauman, 104 Pa. 593; Dicke-schied v. Exchange Bank, 28 W. Va. 340; Wells v. Collins, 74 Wis. 341. If, however, acceptance, is then irrevocable by the donor.1 But if it be prejudicial to existing creditors, it is, as a transfer without consideration, void as to them. It is not, however, void as to subsequent creditors, unless made under actual or expected insolvency, or with a fraudulent purpose as to future creditors. In either of these cases, gifts, or voluntary transfers or settlements of any kind (all of which are regarded by the law as gifts), are void.(f)

* From the established principles in regard to promises without consideration, and the necessity of delivery and . acceptance, it may be inferred, that if a gift, inter vivos, be made by a note or promise, not under seal, it may be avoided by the donor, for it is not a present gift, but a promise without consideration.2 If it be by a check, or order, or draft, then it can be revoked, and payment or acceptance stopped. But if it is paid in good faith and before revocation, it becomes a completed and irrevocable gift. So it would be if it were accepted in such a way as to bind the acceptor. On the other hand, if any consideration which the law acknowledges enters into a transaction which is called a gift, it changes it at once into a sale or barter, if delivery be made, and otherwise into an executory and enforceable contract.