(g) Thus, the owner of a several fishery recovered nominal damages of the defendant, in an actiou of trespass, for fishing in it, although no fish were taken. Patrick v. Greenway, I Saund. 346, 6. So nominal damages may be recovered for an unlawful flowing of the plaintiff's land, although no actual damage is done. Chapman v. Thames Manuf. Co. 13 Conn 269; Whipple v. Chamberlain Manuf. Co. 2 Storv, 661; Pastorius v Fisher, 1 Rawle, 27; 'Ripka v Sergeant, 7 Watts & S. 9. So they may be recovered for the diversion of a watercourse, without proof of actual damage. Webb v. Portland Manuf.

Co 3 Samner, 189; Plumleigh v. Dawson, I Oilman, 544; Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal Co. 7 Exch. 282, 9 Eng L. & Eq. 513. And see Appleton v Fullerton, 1 Gray, 186 The principle upon which these cases rest, is thus stated by Serjeant Williams, Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Saund. 346 b note (b): "Wherever any act injures another's right, and would be evidence in future in favor of the wrongdoer, an action may be maintained for an invasion of the right, without proof of any specific injury.

('gg) Chicago, etc R. R. Co. v Swett, 45 111 197.

1 Nominal damages only can be given for mere loss of time, where no proof is produced of its value, or of facts by which its value may be estimated Leeds v Metropolitan Gas Light Co. 90 N. Y. 26 That nominal damages may be recovered for wrongfully overflowing the plaintiff's land, even though benefit has actually resulted to the plaintiff, see Jones v Hannovan, 55 Mo. 462. If a grantee promises, as part of the consideration of his deed, to pay a tax already due, and at his request this promise is omitted in the deed, the grantor in an action for breach of the covenant against incumbrances is liable for only nominal damages. Newcomb v. Wallace, 112 Mass. 25. In an action against the assessors of a town for refusing to place on its tax list, as reouired by statute, a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the towu, it was held, Clifford, J., dtssentmtj, that the judgment having been put on the list after the suit was brought, and no actual damage having been shown, only nominal damage* were recoverable. Dow v. Humbert, 91 U. S. 294. In an action against a telegraph company for failure to deliver a telegram sent by the plaiutiff, ordering his agent to buy wheat at its market price on a specified day, with the privilege to tie seller of deliverv on any day during the month, the measure of damages was held to be the excess of the market value of wheat on the last day of the month over the market value on the day specified in the telegram for buying, and since the market value on the last day was actually less than on the specified aay, only nominal damages were granted, although, had the contract of par-chase been made on the specified day, the wheat might have been resold at one time during the month at a profit. Hibbard o. West. Un. TeL Co. 33 Wis. 558. - K.

*Thus, in respect to a disturbance of, or interference with easements, or a continuing disregard of a right of any kind it is usual, at least in England, to give, in the first action, little more than nominal damages, because the judgment deter-mines the right; and if the defendant persists in his wrong-doing, the plaintiff may bring successive actions, until repeated and exemplary damages compel him to desist from his wrong, (h)

Cases of this class have sometimes been decided, on the ground that nominal damages may be recovered for only probable, or even possible, damages, (i) And sometimes a jury uses the same means of expressing its opinion that the plaintiff has failed substantially, although he has succeeded formally. As when in slander, or assault and battery, the jury find for the plaintiff, but assess damages at a few cents. (J)

(gh) Potter v. Chicago, etc R. R. Co. 22 Wis. 615.

(h) Battishill v Reed, 18 C. B 696.

(i) Wells v. Watling, 2 W. Bl. 1233; Weller v Baker (the case of the Toil-bridge Well Dippers), 2 Wilson, 414 , Allaire v. Whitney, 1 Hill, 484. Generally, in an action for a breach of a contract, the breach, but no actual damage, being proved, nominal damages will be awarded. Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q. B. 515. II Clark & F. 1 ; Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415. So if an agent violate instructions, although no actual damage be shown. Frothingham v. Ever-ton, 12 N. H. 239, Blot v. Boiceau, 3 Comst. 78, 84. So if a sheriff neglect his dutv, although no actual damage arise. Lafin r. Willard, 16 Pick. 64: Glezen v. Rood, 2 Met. 490; Bruce v. Pettengill, 12 N. H. 341. The Supreme Court of Vermont seems to have gone very far in refusing to sustain an action of trespass for the taking of personal property. In Paul r. Slason, 22 Vt. 231, the defendant, a sheriff, attached hay belonging to the plaintiff, and in removing it used the plaintiffs pitchfork. For the taking of this, among other things, the action of trespass was brought. The court below "charged the jury, that if they found that it was merely cued for a portion of a day in removing the plaintiff s property, thus attached, and was left where it was found, so that the plaintiff had it again, and that it was not injured by the use, they were not bound to give the plaintiff damages for such use." This charge was sustained, and Poland, J, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: " It is true that, by the theory of the law, whenever an invasion of a right is established, though no actual damage be shown, the law infers a damage to the owner of the property, and gives nominal damages. This goes upon the ground, that either some damage is the probable result of the defendant s act, or that his act would have effect to injure the other's right, and would be evidence in future in favor of the wrong-doer, if his right ever came in question. In these cases an action may be supported, though there t>e no actual damage done, because otherwise the party might lose his right. So, too, whenever any one wantonly invades another's right, for the purpose of injury, an action will lie, though no actual damage be done the law piesumes damage on account of the unlawful intent But it is believed that no case can be found, where damages have been given for a trespass to personal property, when no unlawful intent, or disturbance of a right or possession, is shown, and when not only all probable, but all possible, damage is ex* pressly disproved.

(j) Where the plaintiff had destroyed her own character by her dissolute conduct, the jury, in an action of slander, may give nominal damages. Flint v, Clark, 13 Conn. 361.