(x) Chard v. Fox, 14 Q. B. 200; Graham v. Sangston, 1 Md. 60; Mills v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 431; Metcalfe v. Richardson, 20 E. L. & E. 301.

(y) Mellersh v. Rippen, 11 E. L. & E. 499; Smith v. Whiting, 12 Mass. 6; To-bey v. Lenning, 14 Penn. St. 483; Cayuga County Bank v. Warden, 2 Seld. 19; Snow v. Perkins, 2 Mich. 239; Housa-tonic Bank v. Laflin, 5 Cush. 546; Den-nistoun v. Stewart, 17 How. 606.

(z) Bradley v. Davis, 26 Me. 45.

(a) Chapman v. Keene, 3 A. & E. 193; overruling Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167, 2 id. 186, n., and Ex parte Barclay, 7 Ves. 597; Beal's Adm'r v. Alexander, 6 Tex. 531. But the notice must be given by a party to the bill. If given by a stranger it will not suffice. Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Camp. 373; Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173; Wilson v. Swabey, 1 Stark. 34. So in case of non-acceptance, notice to the drawer by the drawee will not avail, for the latter is not a party. Stanton v. Blossom, 14 Mass. 116.

(b) Lysaft v. Bryant, 9 C. B. 46.

(c) Brown v. Ferguson, 4 Leigh, 37; Simpson v. Turney, 5 Humph. 419. See also Turner v. Leech, 4 B. & Ald. 451; Rowe v. Tipper, 20 E. L. & E. 220, n.

The party giving the notice must have with him the note or bill, unless there are special circumstances accounting for and excusing its absence. (hh)

* After the holder of a dishonored bill or note has given due notice to indorsers, he may indulge the acceptor or maker with forbearance or delay, without losing his claim on the indorsers, provided he retains the power of enforcing payment at any moment. (i) But if he makes a bargain for delay, promising it on a consideration which makes the promise binding, or under his seal, this destroys his claim against the indorser. (j) The reason is, that he ought not to claim payment of the indorsers, unless, on payment, he could transfer to them the bill or note, with a full right to enforce payment at once from the acceptor or maker. But he could give them no such right if he had, for good consideration, given to the acceptor or maker his promise that they should not be sued.

It has been a subject of some discussion whether the above rule applies in cases of assignments in insolvency.1 Bankrupt and insolvent laws usually provide that the discharge of the bankrupt or insolvent shall not discharge his indorsers or sureties; and it is sometimes attempted to effect the same result in voluntary assignments in insolvency. The indentures contain a provision that the creditors who become parties to them shall discharge the insolvent; but they also contain a further provision that the indorsers or sureties shall not be discharged. And the question has been whether the indorsers or sureties are discharged notwithstanding this provision. But we think the reason of the rule which discharges them, does not hold in this case. For where the debtor himself stipulates that his discharge shall not prevent his creditors from having recourse to his indorsers or sureties, it must be understood that he binds himself not to oppose such discharge to a suit against himself by the indorsers or sureties if they are held liable to his creditors * by reason of a provision which he himself expressly makes. The reason, therefore, fails, which generally makes his discharge their discharge. And, it may be added, that it is for their benefit that this provision should be carried into effect. For if his discharge necessarily operated their discharge, creditors would naturally prefer a claim against them to the dividend of an insolvent, and would therefore take nothing from him, but all from them. Whereas, if this clause permits them to get what they can from the insolvent, and look to the indorsers or sureties only for the balance, they would always do so, and the sureties would have the benefit of whatever was paid by way of dividend. (k)

(d) Valk v. Bank of State, 1 McMull. Eq. 414; Carter v. Bradley, 19 Me. 62; Lawson v. Farmers' Bank, 1 Ohio St. 206.

(e) Morgan v. Woodworth, 3 Johns. Cas. 90.

(f) Valk v. Gaillard, 4 Strob. L. 99.

(g) Poland v. Boyd, 23 Penn. St. 476.

(h) Jennings v. Roberts, 4 E. & B. 615.

(hh) Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen, 435.

(i) Pole v. Ford, 2 Chitt. 125; Philpot v. Bryant, 4 Bing. 717; Badnall v. Samuel, 3" Price, 521; Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 1 B. & P. 652; McLemore v. Powell, 12 Wheat. 554; Bank v. Myers, 1 Bailey, 412; Planters' Bank v. Sellman, 2 G. & J. 230; Gahn v. Niemcewicz, 11 Wend. 312; Frazier v. Dick, 5 Rob. (La.) 249; Walker v. Bank of Mont. Co 12 S. & R. 382; Freeman's Bank v. Rollins, 13 Me. 202; Bateson v. Gosling, L. R. 7 C. P. 9 , Tobey v. Ellis, 114 Mass. 120; Hagey v. Hill, 75 Penn. St. 108.

(j) Clark v. Henty, 3 Y. & Col. 1ST , Greely v. Dow, 2 Met 176; Wharton v. Williamson, 13 Penn. St. 273. See also Moss v. Hall, 5 Exch. 46. Unlike, how ever, the case of a surety, a party liable on a bill as indorser will not be discharged, though the party for whom he is bound take security of the acceptor and then release it without his consent. Hurd v. Little, 12 Mass. 503, Pitts v. Congdon, 2 Comst. 352.