Perry v. Green, 4 Harrison, 61; Mechanics' Bank v. Griswold, 7 Wend. 165; Cod-dington v. Davis, 3 Denio, 16; Bond v. Farnham, 5 Mass. 170; Stephenson v. Primrose, 8 Port. (Ala.) 155. - Aliter, of only part security. Spencer v. Harvey, 17 Wend. 489; Bruce v. Lytle, 13 Barb. 163; Burroughs v. Hannegan, 1 McLean, 309; Kyle v. Green, 24 Ohio, 495 , Woodman v. Eastman, 10 N. H. 359; Andrews v. Boyd, 3 Met. 434; Otsego Co. Bank v. Warren, 18 Barb. 290. - And the whole doctrine itself is subject to many qualifications; and in Kramer v. Sandford, 4 W. & S. 328, where the American authorities are fully reviewed, Gibson, C. J., observed that this doctrine of waiver in consideration of security had no footing in Westminster Hall. See infra, p * 317. (k) Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45; Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Met. 495, 499; per Shaw, C. J.; Duncan v. McCullough, 4 S. & R. 480; Lehman v. Jones, 1 W. & S. 126; Wheeler v. Field, 6 Met. 290; Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307; Central Bank v. Allen, 16 Me. 41; Bruce v. Lytle, 13 Barb. 163; Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251; Ratcliff v. Planters' Bank, 5 Sneed, 425. - So when the maker of the note was a seafaring man, having no residence or place of business in the State, and was at sea when payment was due, no demand was held requisite. Moore v. Coffield, 1 Dev. 247. So where the maker of a promissory note removes from the State subsequently to making, and continues to reside abroad until its maturity. Foster v. Julien, 24 N. Y. 28. - But where the holder was told, at the time of the indorsement, that the maker was a transient person, and his residence unknown, an effort should be made, notwithstanding, to find him. Otis v. Hussey, 3 N. H. 346.

* should be given. And it has been held that where demand of payment was delayed by political disturbances, or by any invincible obstacle, it was enough if the demand was made as soon as possible after the obstruction oeased. (l)

Where the bill or note is made payable at a particular place specified in the body of it, it seems to be the rule in England that it must be presented for that purpose at that place, [to make even the acceptor or maker liable], for the place is part of the contract; (m) but "payable at," etc., out of the body of the note, either at the bottom, or in the margin, is but a memorandum, which binds nobody.(n) And in this country, neither a bill or note drawn payable at a place certain, nor a bill drawn payable generally, but accepted payable at a specified place, need be presented at that place, (0) in order to * sustain an action against the maker or acceptor; but he may show by way of defence, that he was ready there with funds, and thus escape all damages and interest; (p) and if he can show positive loss from the want of such presentment (as the subsequent failure of a bank where he had placed funds to meet the bill), he will be discharged from his liability on the bill to the amount of such loss. Such seems to be the prevailing, though not the only view, taken of this subject by the American authorities; for some of much weight hold, that where the acceptance is thus qualified, the holder may refuse it, and protest as for non-acceptance, but if he receives and assents to it he is bound by it, and can demand payment nowhere else. The drawers and indorsers are certainly discharged by a neglect to demand payment at such specified place. (q) If the place be designated only in a memorandum not in the body of the bill or note, presentment may be made at such place, but may also be made where it might have been without such memorandum. (r) If the note be payable at any of several different places, presentment at any one of them will be sufficient. (s) It has been held that where a note was made payable at a certain house, and the occupant *of the house was himself the holder of the note at its maturity, it was demand enough if he examined his accounts, and refusal enough if he had no balance in his hands belonging to the party bound to pay. (t)

(/) Patience v. Townley, 2 Smith, King's Bench, 223. See Rouquette v. Overmann, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525; Bond v. Moore, 93 U. S. 593; Dunbar v. Tyler, 44 Miss. 1; Norris v. Despard, 38 Md. 487. And so the prevalence of a contagious malignant fever in the place of residence of the parties, which occasioned a stoppage of all business, has been held a sufficient excuse for a delay of two mouths in giving notice of a non-payment. Tuuno v. Lague, 2 Johns. Cas 1. If the holder deposits the note in the post-office in season to reach the place of payment at the proper time, to be there presented by his agent, but through the mistake of the postmaster it is misdirected and delayed, these facts have been held to excuse the delay. Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213.

(m) Rowe v. Young, 2 Br. & B. 165; Sanderson v. Bowes, 14 East, 500; Spind-ler v. Grellett, 1 Exch. 384; Emblin v. Dartnell, 12 M. & W. 830. These decisions, however, led to the enactment of 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 78, which provides that an acceptance at a particular place is a general acceptance, unless expressed to be payable there only, and not otherwise or elsewhere. On the construction of this statute, see Selby v. Eden, 3 Bing. 611; Fayle v. Bird, 6 B. & C. 531.

~(n) Masters v. Barretto, 8 M. G. & S. 433; Exon v. Russell, 4 M. & Sel. 505; Bowling v. Harrison, 6 Bow. 259.

(o) United States Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171; Foden v. Sharp, 4 Johns. 183; Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 248; Caldwell v. Cassidy, 8 Cowen, 271; Haxtum v. Bishop, 3 Wend. 15; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 13G; Carley v. Vance, 17 Mass. 389; Watkins v. Crouch, 5 Leigh, 522; Ruggles v. Patten, 8 Mass. 480; Allen v. Smith's Adm'r, 4 Harring, (Del.) 234; Dougherty V. Western Hank of Georgia, 13 Ga. 288; Ripka v. Pope, 5 La. An. 61; Blair v. Bank of Tenn. 11 Humph. 84; Weed v. Van Houten, 4 Halst. 189; McNairy v. Bell, 1 Yerg 502; Mul-herrin v. Hannum, 2 id. 81 , Bacon v. Dyer, 3Fairf.l9; Remick v. O'Kyle, id. 340; Dockrav v. Dunn, 37 Me. 442; Nichols v. Pool, 2 Jones (N. C.). 23; Irvine v.

Withers, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 234; Eldred v. Hawes, 4 Conn. 465; Waite, J., in Jackson v. Parker. 13 id. 358; Payson v. Whitcomb, 15 Pick. 212; Sumner v. Ford, 3 Ark. 389; Green v. Goings, 7 Barb. 652; Brigham v. Smith, 16 N. H. 274; Hills v. Place, 48 N. Y. 520; Yeaton v. Berney, 62 Ill.61; Mahan v. Waters, 60 Mo. 167. Contra, per Story, J., Picquet v. Curtis, l Sumner, 478. See also New Hope D. B. Co. v. Perry, 11 Ill. 467; Ganes v. Manning, 2 Green (Ia.), 251; Andrews v. Hoxie, 5 Tex. 171; Carter v. Smith, 9 Cush. 321; McKenzie v. Durant, 9 Rich. L. 61; Bank of State v. Bank of C, F. 13 Ired. L. 75. - If the bill or note be payable at a particular place, on demand, then, according to Savage, C. J., in Caldwell v. Cassidy, 8 Cowen. 271, demand is necessary. This is denied in Dougherty v. Western Bank of Georgia, 13 Ga 287; but it is there decided that hank-notes are exceptions to the general rule, on the ground of public policy, and demand upon them must be made. This may, however, be doubted.

(p) Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 248; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136; Savage, C. J., in Haxtum v. Bishop, 3 Wend'. 21; Wilde, J., in Carley v. Vance, 17 Mass. 392; Caldwell v. Cas-sidy, 8 Cowen, 271.

(q) See 3 Kent, Com. 97, 99; Picquet v. Curtis, 1 Sumner, 478; Gale v. Kemper's Heirs, 10 La. 305; Warren v. Allnut, 12 La. 454; Bacon v. Dyer, 12 Me. 19. Contra, in Iowa, Fuller v. Dingman, 41 Ia. 506.

(r) Williams v. Waring, 10 B. & C. 2. This was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note by the indorsee against the maker. The note was in the following form. "31st January, 1827. Two months after date I promise to pay to A. B. £25, value received. J. Waring. At Messrs. B. & Co.'s, Bankers, London." The note was in the handwriting of the defendant, the maker, and the memorandum was written at the time the note was made. For the defendant it was contended that the note should have been described in the declaration as payable at Messrs. B. & Co.'s, and that evidence of presentment there should have been given. The judge overruled the objection, but gave leave to move to enter a non-suit. It was moved accordingly, and contended that the memorandum was as much parcel of the contract as if it had been in the body of the instrument, and that therefore presentment at the house where the note was made payable should have been averred and proved. Lord Tenterden, C. J.: " In point of practice, the distinction between mentioning a particular place for payment of a note, in the body and in the margin of the instrument, has been frequently acted on. In the latter case it has been treated as a memorandum only, and not as a part of the contract; and I do not see any sufficient reason for departing from that course." Bayfey, J., cited the case of Exon v. Russell, 4 M. & Sel. 505, as being sufficient to decide this case in favor of the plaintiff. See also Morris v. Husson, 4 Sandf. 93.

(s) Langley v. Palmer, 30 Me. 467.

(t) Sanderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bl. 509.