A question has been raised in relation to ratification by an infant, whether, if the contract be one of those which is declared to be not voidable, but void, any ratification could restore it. And contracts by an infant for purposes of trade have been declared absolutely void. But the exact distinction between the void and the voidable contracts of an infant is rather obscure, and the better opinion, as well as the stronger reason, seems to be, as we have already stated, that in reference to its ratification, no contract is void; or, in the language of Parke, B., in Williams v. Moore, (a) " the promise of an infant is not void in any case, unless the infant chooses to plead his infancy " (b)

The rules of the common law concerning infancy are varied in many of our States by statutory provisions. In some of them the ratification must be in writing; but a note or memorandum expressing the intention of ratification is sufficient. (bb)

(z) Cresinger v. Welch, 15 Ohio, 156; Hoyle v, Stowe, 2 Dev. & B. 320; Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58; Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. 539; Jackson v. Burchin, 14 id. 124: Bagley v. Fletcher, 44 Ark. 153; Losey v. Bond, 94 Ind. 67, 70; Cor-bett v. Spencer, 63 Mich. 731; Dawson v. Helmes, 30 Minn. 107; Mustard v. Wohl-ford's Heirs, 15 Gratt. 329. But to constitute a disaffirmance, the second deed must be so inconsistent with the first, that both cannot consistently stand. Eagle Fire Company v. Lent, 6 Paige, 635; Singer Mfg Co. v. Lamb, 81 Mo. 221.

(a) 11 M. & W. 256.

(b) The words " void " and "voidable " have often been very vaguely used when applied to contracts, and the word " void " has been frequently used to denote merely that the contract was not binding, and as expressing no opinion whether such contract might or might not be ratified. Thus, in Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 Johns. Cas. 127, the marginal note indicates that the court held the contract " void," and the case is so cited in Mason v. Denison, 15 Wend. 71; and in 2 Kent, Com. 241; but the language of the court was: " The bond is voidable, only at the election of the infant." So in Curtin v. Patton, 11 S. & R. 311, Mr Justice Duncan, speaking of an infant's contract of suretyship, calls it in one place " absolutely void," but in the very next line he makes use of such expressions as "confirming," " distinct acts of confirmation," etc, plainly showing that, while calling the contract void, he did not mean to deny that it was susceptible of ratification, and if so, that it was not " absolutely void," but only voidable, as it has often been held by the same court. Hinely v Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428. In a similar manner, Bayley, J., in Thornton v. Illingworth, 2 B. & C. 824, speaking of an infant's contract of trade, calls it void, but the case clearly shows that if the ratification which was shown in the case had been before the action was commenced, instead of after, the infant would have been bound, a conclusion impossible had the contract been really void. So an infant's acceptance of a bill of exchange has been called " void," but it is only voidable, and is susceptible of a ratification. Gibbs v. Merrill, 3 Taunt. 307 Another instance occurs in the application of the word " void " to fraudulent contracts, but they are only voidable, and if the person defrauded choose to ratify he may do so, and hold the other party. Avers v. Hew-ett, 19 Me. 281 These instances are sufficient to illustrate the vague and indefinite use of the word " void," and may perhaps serve to reconcile the conflicting language of some cases, and to account for the application of the word " void " to any of an infant's contracts. See also Arnold v Richmond Iron Works, 1 Gray, 434, and ante, p. *295, note (u).