(sz) Hawkins v. Great Western R. R. Co. 17 Mich. 67; Indianapolis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Allen. 31 Ind. 394; Michigan, etc. v. Heaton, id. 897.

(sa) Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co. v. Cur-ran, 19 Ohio, 21.

(sb) Adams Express Co. v. Reagan, 29 Ind. 21. See also Harrison v, London, etc R. R. Co. 2 B. & S. 122.

(sc) Bankard v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. 34 Md. 197.

(t) Peek v. North S. Railway Co. 4 B. & S. 1005. The plaintiff sent three marble chimney-pieces to the station of the defendants, to be forwarded to London, and told the carter to ask what the insurance would be, the company having previously sent a printed notice to plaintiffs agent, that the company would receive and forward goods only subject to conditions, one of which was that they would not be responsible for loss or injury to any marbles unless declared and insured according to their value. The company's clerk told the carter, they could not tell what the insurance would be unless the value of the marbles was stated, and afterwards told the plaintiff's agent that the rate, if uninsured, would be 55s.; but if insured it would be 10 per cent on the declared value in addition. Plaintiff's agent afterwards by letter directed the company to forward the marbles "not insured," and they were forwarded accordingly, and when delivered were injured by exposure to rain. The defendants pleaded that they carried the goods by a special contract under the Railway Traffic Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 81, § 7). The case was first tried before Erle, J. (Q. B.), who held the company discharged from liability. The abstract of this case in a note, although little can be learned from it but the extreme difficulty of the question. The question has arisen, whether, where a reasonable and legal notice has been given to the sender, there still rests on the carrier the obligation of a special inquiry; so that without such inquiry the sender may transmit, or the passenger may take, his goods in silence, and have them covered by the same responsibility as if he had complied with the notice, and had stated the extra value of the goods, and paid the extra price. We cannot doubt that the weight of authority, as of reason and of justice, is, that such notice makes such inquiry unnecessary, and that the owner of the goods would, in such case, be considered either as taking the risk upon himself, or as endeavoring to cast it fraudulently upon the carrier. (u) plaintiff's counsel obtained a rule on the defendants to show cause, - and the court of Queen's Bench (Lord Campbell, C. J., and Crompton, J., against Erle, J., dissenting), made the rule absolute. On appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, the judges ( Williams, J., dissenting) reversed the judgment of the Queen's Bench. The case was then appealed to the House of Lords. The Lords calling on the judges, Blackburn, J., and Cockburn, C J., gave opinions in favor of the plaintiff; Willes, J., Martin, B., Williams, J., Pollock, C. B., for the defendants. Then the House of Lords reversed the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber. The case turned very much upon the construction of the statute above mentioned, which is as follows: "Every such (railroad) company as aforesaid shall be liable for the loss of, or for any injury done to any horses, etc., or to any articles, goods, or things in the receiving, forwarding, or delivering thereof, occasioned by the neglect or default of such company or its servants, notwithstanding any notice, condition, or declaration made and given by such company contrary thereto, in any wise limiting such liability, every such notice being hereby declared null and void; provided always, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the said companies from making such conditions with respect to the receiving, forwarding, and delivery of any of the said animals, articles, goods, or things, as shall be adjudged by the court or judge before whom any question relating thereto shall be tried, to be just and reasonable, provided always, that no greater damages shall be recovered for the loss of, or for injury to, any such animals, beyond the sums hereinafter mentioned, &c; provided, also, that the proof of the value of such animals, articles, goods, or things, and the amount of the injury done thereto, shall in all cases be upon the person claiming compensation for such loss or injury; provided also that no special contract between such company and any other parties respecting the receiving, forwarding, and delivery of any animals, articles, goods, or things, as aforesaid, shall be binding on, or affect any such party, unless the same be signed by him, or by the person delivering such animals, articles, goods, or things, respectively, for carriage; provided also that nothing herein contained shall alter or affect the rights, privileges, or liabilities of any such company, under the said act (11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 68), with respect to articles of the descriptions mentioned in the said act." In a later case, certain conditions of carriage were declared void, because unreasonable, although expressly agreed to. Gregory v. West Midland R. R. Co. 2 Hurl, & Colt. 044.

1 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Selby, 47 led. 471.

(u) It would be of no avail for a carrier to publish a notice if be was still bound to make a special inquiry; for this he may do without publishing a notice, and the bailor must inform him correctly, at his peril. That a notice brought to the knowledge of the bailor dispenses with any further inquiry, see Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Ald. 21; Marsh v. Horne, 5 B. & C. 822; Duff v. Budd, 3 Br. & B. 177; Harris v. Pack-wood, 3 Taunt. 264; Bodenham v. Bennett, 4 Price, 31; Garnett v. Willan,

* There may be other special agreements between the carrier and his passengers; and there seems to be some tendency to construe them precisely, if not strictly. Thus, one who buys a ticket entitling him to a through passage for a reduced price, cannot require the railroad (or other carrier) to take him up at an intermediate point, if he chooses to stop at one. (a) 1