* 214 for the whole route, * would be evidence going far to prove such undertaking. (v) 1 Hence the purchase of what is and carried on business on their line between Lancaster and Preston, as common carriers. At Preston, the defendants' line joined that of the North Union Railway. The plaintiff, a stone mason, living at Lancaster, had gone into Derbyshire in search of work, leaving his box of tools to be sent after him. His mother accordingly took the box to the railway station at Lancaster, directed to the plaintiff at a place beyond Preston, in Derbyshire, and requested the clerk at the station to book it. She offered to pay the carriage in advance for the whole distance, but was told by the clerk that it had better be paid at the place of delivery. It appeared that the box arrived safely at Preston, but was lost after it was despatched from thence by the North Union Railway. The plaintiff brought this action to recover for the loss of the box. Rolfe, B., before whom the case was tried, stated to the jury, in summing up, that where a common carrier takes into his care a parcel directed to a particular place, and does not, by positive agreement, limit his responsibility to a part only of the distance, that is prima facie evidence of an undertaking to carry the parcel to the place to which it is directed; and that the same rule applied, although that place were beyond the limits within which he, in general, professed to carry on his trade of a carrier. On a motion for a new trial, the Court of Exchequer held the instruction to be correct. Lord Abinger said: "It is admitted by the defendants' counsel, that the defendants contract to do something more with the parcel than merely to carry it to Preston; they say the engagement is to carry it to Preston and there to deliver it to an agent, who is to carry it further, who is afterwards to be replaced by another, and so on until the end of the journey. Now that is a very elaborate kind of contract; it is in substance giving to the carriers a general power, along the whole line of route, to make at their pleasure fresh contracts, which shall be binding upon the principal who employed them. But if, as it is admitted on both sides, it is clear that something more was meant to be done by the defendants than carrying as far as Preston, is it not for the jury to say what is the contract, and how much more was undertaken to be done by them? Now, it certainly might be true that the contract between these parties was such as that suggested by the counsel for the defendants; but other views of the case may be suggested quite as probable; such, for instance, as that these railway companies, though separate in themselves, are in the habit, for their own advantage, of making contracts, of which this was one, to convey goods along the whole line to the ultimate terminus, each of them being agents of the other to carry them forward, and each receiving its share of the profits from the last. The fact that, according to the agreement proved, the carriage was to be paid at the end of the journey, rather confirms the notion that the persons who were to carry the goods from Preston to their final destination were under the control of the defendants, who consequently exercised some influence and agency beyond the immediate terminus of their own railway. Is it not, then, a question for the jury to say what the nature of this contract was; and is it not as reasonable an inference for them to draw that the whole was one contract, as the contrary? I hardly think they would be likely to infer so elaborate a contract as that which the defendants' counsel suggest, namely, that as the line of the defendants' railway terminates at Preston, it is to be presumed that the plaintiff, who intrusted the goods to them, made it part of his bargain that they should employ for him a fresh agent, both at that place and at every subsequent change of railway or conveyance, ana on each shifting of the goods give such a document to the new agent as should render him recalled a through ticket of an * agent authorized by sun dry carriers to sell such a ticket, and the price of which is sponsible. Suppose the owner of goods sent under such circumstances, when he finds they do not come to hand, comes to the railway office and makes a complaint, then, if the defendants' argument in this case be well founded, unless the railway company refuse to supply him with the name of the new agent, they break their contract. It is true that, practically, it might make no great difference to the proprietor of the goods which was the real contract, if their not immediately furnishing him with a name would entitle him to bring an action against them. But the question is, Why should the jury infer one of these contracts rather than the other? Which of the two is the most natural, the most usual, the most probable? Besides, the carriage-money being in this case one undivided sum, rather supports the inference that although these carriers carry only a certain distance with their own vehicles, they make subordinate contracts with the other carriers, and are partners inter se as to the carriage-money; a fact of which the owner of the goods could know nothing, as he only pays the one entire sum at the end of the journey, which they afterwards divide as they please. Not only, therefore, is there some evidence of this being the nature of the contract, but it is the most likely contract under the circumstances; for it is admitted that the defendants undertook to do more than simply to carry the goods from Lancaster to Preston. The whole matter is therefore a question for the jury, to determine what the contract was, on the evidence before them. ... In cases like the present, particular circumstances might no doubt be adduced to rebut the inference which prima facie must be made of the defendants having undertaken to carry the goods the whole way. The taking charge of the parcel is not put as conclusive evidence of the contract sued on by the plaintiff; it is only prima facie evidence of it; and it is useful and reasonable for the benefit of the public that it should be so considered. It is better that those who undertake the carriage of parcels for their mutual benefit, should arrange matters of this kind inter as, and should be taken each to have made the others their agent to carry forward." This case is fully approved and confirmed by the case of Watson v. The A. N. & B. Railway Co. 3 E. L. & E. 497, in the Queen's Bench. That was an action for the recovery of damaces sustained by the plaintiff, by reason of the non-delivery, in proper time, of plans and models sent by him from Grantham to Cardiff. The defendants' railway extended only as far as Nottingham, where it was joined by another railway, which was continued to Bristol. It appeared that a person of the name of Chevins had been appointed by the defendants as their station-master at Grantham, to receive and deliver parcels to be sent by the railway from that place, and that in such capacity he had received the package in question, which was directed to Cardiff; and there was some evidence to show that Chevins had told the plaintiff that the package would arrive at Cardiff in time. The station-master had said, when the package was delivered to him, that he could receive payment for it only so far as Nottingham, as he had no rates of payment beyond; and thereupon the words on the package "paid to Bristol," were erased, and the words, "paid to Nottingham," substituted by Chevins, but this was done without the knowledge of the plaintiff, and the original direction was left on the package, which, being detained at Bristol, did not arrive at Cardiff in due time. The court held that the defendants were liable. Patteson, J., said: "The case of Muschamp v. The Lancaster and Preston Junction Railway Co., is directly in point; and if carriers receive a package to carry to a particular place, whether they themselves carry it all the way or not, they must be said to have the conveying of it to the end of the journey, and the other parties to whom they may hand it over are their agents. We must adhere to this principle, and the company are clearly liable, unless the facte snow that their responsibility has determined. Their not having taken the amount of the carriage is immaterial, and is explained by the fact of their not knowing what that amount would be. Chevins appears to have been the agent of the defendants; he receives the parcel to carry it to Cardiff, and makes out an invoice which the defendants have refused to produce. Now, putting these circumstances together, there is abundant evidence that they contracted to carry the package to Cardiff, and they were guilty of negligence in detaining it at Bristol." And per Erle, J.: "The first question is, whether there is any evidence of the defendants having contracted: and I think the person to whom the package was delivered must be taken to be the agent of the company. Then, having received a parcel to be conveyed to Cardiff, when their line only