This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
It was once held that the assignment of an instrument must be of as high a nature as the instrument assigned. (d) But this rule has been very much relaxed, if not overthrown; and indeed it has been determined that the equitable interest in a chose in action may be assigned for a valuable consideration * by a mere delivery of the evidence of the contract; and that it is not necessary that the assignment should be in writing. (e)1 So the equitable interest in a judgment may be assigned by a delivery of the execution. (/) But a mere agreement to assign without any delivery, actual or symbolical, of the writing evidencing the debt; or an indorsement upon the instrument directing the debtor to pay a portion of the amount due, to a third person, such indorsement being notified to the debtor, but the writing remaining in the hands of the creditor, does not constitute a sufficient assignment. (g)
We may, however, say, that now the assignment of a debt may be by parol, and may be inferred from the conduct and acts of the party. (gg)
(d) Perkins v. Parker, 1 Mass. 117; Wood v. Partridge, 11 id. 488. In this case, Parker, C. J., said: " It is uniformly holden, that an assignment of an instrument under seal must be by deed; in other words, that the instrument of transfer must be of as high a nature as the instrument transferred."
(e) "There are cases in the old books which show that debts and even deeds may be assigned by parol; and we are satisfied that there is no sensible ground upon which a writing shall be held necessary to prove an assignment of a contract, which assignment has been executed by delivery, any more than in the assignment of a personal chattel." Per Parker, C. J., Jones v. Witter, 13 Mass. 304. See also Dunn v. Snell, 15 Mass. 481; Palmer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 292; Vose v. Handy, 2 Greenl.322, 334; Bobbins v. Bacon, 3 id. 346; Porter v. Ballard, 26 Me. 448; Pres-cott v. Hull, 17 Johns. 284, 292; Kurd v. Stuart, 19 Johns. 342; Thompson v. Emery, 7 Foster (N. H.), 269; Tibbits v. George, 5 A. & E. 107; Heath v. Hall, 4 Taunt. 326.
(f) Dunn v. Snell, 15 Mass. 481.
(g) Whittle v. Skinner, 23 Vt. 531; Palmer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 282, by way of compensation for its destruction by the act of a foreign government, either out of reprisals made by the former upon the latter, or out of a fund set apart by the former for the purpose, in accordance with a treaty by which it has renounced all claims of its citizens upon the latter, is an interest legally capable of being assigned by such owner, even before bis own government has taken any steps toward securing to him an indemnity for his loss Leonard v. Nye, 125 Mass. 455; Jones v. Dexter, 125 Mass 469. See also Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529; Butler v. Gorely 146 U.S. 303. - K.
(gg) Gurnsey v. Gardner, 49 Me. 167.
1 An oral assignment of an account, or a portion of it, for a valid consideration, is good, and vests in the assignee the right to collect the debt in his own name. Risley v. Phenix Bank, 82 N. Y. 318. See also Switzer v. Smith, 35 Ia. 269. - K.
An order or draft upon a particular fund, purporting to appropriate that fund to its payment, or directly implying this, is, after notice, an equitable assignment of the fund, and needs no acceptance to have this effect. (gh)
The cause of action which a buyer of land has against the seller for his misrepresentation, is personal, and does not pass by an assignment of the contract. (gi) A holder of a debt or claim, assigning it for valuable consideration, warrants its genuineness and legal force, unless he communicates all the facts bearing upon the case, when the buyer takes the risk. (gj)
 
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