The subject-matter of the contract is to be fully considered. (q) There are very many words and phrases which have one meaning in ordinary narration or composition, and quite another when they are used as technical words in relation to some special subject; and it is obvious, that, if this be the subject-matter of the contract, it must be supposed that the words are used in this specific and technical sense.

So, too, the situation of the parties at the time, and of the property which is the subject-matter of the contract, and the intention and purpose of the parties in making the contract, will often be of great service in guiding the construction; because, as has been said, this intention will be carried into effect so far as the rules of language and the rules of law will permit. (qq) So the moral rule above referred to may be applicable; because a * party will be held to that meaning which he knew the other party supposed the words to bear, if this can be done without making a new contract for the parties.

Indeed, the very idea and purpose of construction imply a previous uncertainty as to the meaning of the contract; for where this is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and nothing for construction to do. A court would not, by construction of a contract, defeat the express stipulations of the parties. And if a contract is false to the actual meaning and purpose

(q) The King v. Mashiter, 1 Nev. & P. 326, 327. Where an executrix promised to pay a simple contract debt, "when sufficient effects were received" from the estate of the testator, it was held, that this most be understood to mean effects legally applicable to the debt in question, and that the executrix might first pay a bond debt. Bowerbank v. Monteiro, 4 Taunt. 844. So, where it was agreed in a charter-party to employ a captured ship, "as soon as sentence of condemnation should have passed," it was held, that a legal sentence was meant. Unwin v. Wolseley, 1 T. R. 674. If an annuity be granted to one, "pro consilio impenso et impendendo"

(for past and future counsel), if the grantee be a physician, this shall be understood of his advice as a physician; and if he be a lawyer, of his advice in legal matters. Shep. Touch, p. 86. See Littlefield v. Winslow, 19 Me. 394, 398; Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162, 214; Robinson v. Fiske, 25 Me. 401; Philbrook v. New England Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 37 id. 137.

(qq) Thus, a contract to convey "a house and lot of land in Amity Street, Lynn, Mass.," was held to mean a house and land owned by the vendor when the contract was made. Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545.

• 502 * reason is obvious. The same parties make all the contract, and may be supposed to have had the same purpose and object * in view in all of it, and if this purpose is more clear and certain in some parts than in others, those which are obscure may be illustrated by the light of others. Thus, the condition of a bond may be considered to explain the obligatory part. (v) And the recital in a deed or agreement has sometimes great influence in the interpretation of other parts of the instrument. (w) The contract may be contained in several instruments, which, if made at the same time, between the same parties, and in relation to the same subject, will be held to constitute but one contract, (x) and the court will read them in such order of time v. Homersham, 4 M. & S. 426. See also Ramsden v. Hylton, 2 Ves. 210; Lampon v. Corke, 5 B. & Ald. 606; Simons v. Johnson, 3 B. & Ad. 175; Lyman v. Clark, 9 Mass. 235; Rich v. Lord, 18 Pick. 325; Jackson v. Stackhonse, 1 Cowen, 122; Mclntyre v. Williamson, 1 Edw. Ch. 34. For the construction of sweeping clauses, see Moore v. Magrath, Cowp. 9. - For the effect of recitals upon the construction of mercantile instruments, see Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169, 184; Lawrence v. McCalmot, 2 id. 426, 449. - In Browning v. Wright, 2 B. & P. 13, A, after granting certain premises in fee to B, and after warranting the same against himself and his heirs, covenanted, that, notwithstanding any act by him done to the contrary, he was seised of the premises in fee, and that he had full power, etc., to convey the same; he then covenanted for himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, to make a cartway, and that B should quietly enjoy without interruption from himself or any persons claiming under him, and, lastly, that he, his heirs and assigns, and all persons claiming under him, should make further assurance. Held, that the intervening general words, "full power, etc., to convey," were either part of the preceding special covenant; or, if not, that they were qualified by all the other special covenants against the acts of himself and his heirs. See the admirable opinion of Lord Eldon. See also Hesse v. Stevenson, 3 B. & P. 565; Nind v. Marshall, 3 J. B. Moore, 703; Broughton v. Conway, Dyer, 240 a; Cole v. Hawes, 2 Johns. Cas. 205; Whallon v. Kauffman, 19 Johns. 97; Barton v. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 530; Saward v. Antsey, 10 J. B. Moore, 55; Chapin v. Clemitson, 1 Barb. 311; Mills v. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98. -Where, in a statute, general words follow particular ones, the rule is to construe them, as applicable to subjects ejusdem generis. Thus, in Sandiman v. Breach, 7 B. & C. 96, a question arose upon the Statute 29 Car. II. c. 7, which enacts "that no tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer, or other person or persons, shall do or exercise any worldly labor, business, or work of their ordinary callings, upon the Lord's day." It was contended, that under the words "other person or persons" the drivers of stage-coaches were included. Held, otherwise for the above reasons. See The Queen v. Nevill, 8 Q. B. 452. - For the application of this rule to deeds of conveyance where there are particular enumerations or descriptions, see Doe v. Meyrick, 2 Cromp. & J. 223; Jackson v. Stevens, 16 Johns. 110. See also Hall v. Mayhew, 15 Md. 551. Where there was a sale of land for a sum in gross, and the title papers upon which the purchaser relied described the quantity as being estimated to contain 482 acres and 32 perches, be the same more or less, the tract was found to contain but 378 acres. Held, that the purchaser was not entitled to an abatement for the deficiency. Parts struck out of an instrument may, it seems, be regarded in its construction. Strickland v. Maxwell, 2 Cromp. & M. 539. As land cannot pass as an "appurtenance " to land, so neither can a railroad pass as an appurtenance to another railroad. Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, etc. R. R. Co. 58 Penn. St. 253,