A guarantor is entitled to a just protection. But this principle is not carried so far as to permit him to compel the creditor unreasonably to proceed against the principal debtor. (x) 1 Prom some cases it may be doubted whether he has any power in this way. In one case, (y) it was held, that a surety, guaranty will be understood to be continuing, unless expressly limited. But the contrary opinion was expressed in White v. Reed, 15 Conn. 457. In that case the defendant gave the plaintiff a writing in these words: "For any sum that my son G. may become indebted to you, not exceeding $200, 1 will hold myself accountable. Held, that the terms of this instrument were satisfied when any indebtedness within the amount limited was incurred by G., and consequently that it was not a continuing guaranty. So in Boyce v. Ewart, 1 Bice, 126, the guaranty was in these words: "The bearer is about to commence business, to assist him in which he will need your aid, which, if you render, we will, in case of failure, indemnify you to the amount of $4,000." Held, that it was not a continuing guaranty, but applicable to the bearer's commencing in business, and that, as soon as the bearer had refunded $4,000, the guaranty ceased. In Fellows v. Prentiss, 3 Denio, 512, a guaranty in these words: " I hereby agree to guarantee to you the payment of such an amount of goods, at a credit of one year, interest after' six months, not exceeding $500, as you may credit to A," was held, not to be a continuing guaranty, but it was held to be exhausted by a single purchase of goods to the amount of $500. See also Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82; Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 26; Chapman v. Sutton, 2 C. B. 684; Tanner v. Moore, 11 Jur. 11; Allnut v. Ashendon, 5 Man. & G. 392; Hitchcock v. Humphrey, id. 559; Martin v. Wright, 9 Jur. 178; Johnston v. Nicholls, 1 C. B. 251; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Kercheval,

2 Mich. 504; Agawam Bank v. Strever, 16 Barb. 82.

(x) It seems to be well settled that mere delay by the creditor to proceed against the principal, although requested to do so by the surety, will not in and of itself discharge the surety. Huffman v. Hulbert, 13 Wend. 377; Davis v. Higgins, who was injured by a delay in suing the principal debtor, was not discharged, on the ground that he might have insured a prompt demand against the debtor, by making himself an indorser instead of a surety. But this would have secured only a demand, and not a suit; and it seems hard and severe to say that because one does not secure to himself the precise and immediate demand and notice necessary to hold indorsers, he shall not be entitled to any care or diligence on the part of the creditor. It would seem to be a just and reasonable rule, that the guaranteed creditor should use in collecting the debt from the original debtor, the same care and diligence which prudent creditors commonly use in collecting their debts; they have certainly no right to neglect a guaranteed debt because it is guaranteed. (yy)

3 N. H. 231; Bellows v. Lovell, 5 Pick. 307; Erie Bank v. Gibson, 1 Watts, 143; Cope v. Smith, 8 S. & R. 110; Johnson v. Planter's Bank, 4 Sm. & M. 165; Beebe v. Dudley, 6 Foster (N. H.), 249; Bickford v. Gibbs, 8 Cush. 184. But if this delay of the creditor operates to the injury of the surety, as if the principal debtor was at the time of the request solvent, but afterwards became insolvent, and the surety will not be able to collect the amount, he is pro tanto discharged. Row v. Pulver, 1 Cowen, 246; State v. Reynolds, 3 Mo. 95; Herrick v. Borst, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 650. And see note (c), post. See Miller v. Ber-key, 27 Penn. St. 317. See also, for a general statement of the duties arising from the relation of principal and surety, Huey v. Pinney, 5 Minn. 310.

(i) Townsend v. Riddle, 2 N. H. 448. And Woodbury, J., said: "Here the character of the defendant as a surety did not appear on the face of the contract, nor was it proved that the plaintiff knew him to be only a surety. Here he was not liable as a mere indorser on the same instrument, or as a guarantor on a separate one. No time for an adjustment with the principal was fixed by law; no delay was given to him after a request by the surety for a prosecution; no new engagement for forbearance appears to have been entered into between the creditor and debtor."

1 Harris v. Newell, 42 Wis. 687, decided that a surety was not discharged if the creditor after notice from him failed to proceed against the principal, but that equity, in some cases, would interfere to compel the principal to pay, or the creditor to proceed against him.

If the surety requests the creditor to collect the debt, and there is refusal and delay, and subsequent insolvency, it would seem difficult to resist the surety's claim to be discharged. (z) * In 1816 it was said by the Supreme Court of New York, in a case where such facts were pleaded and demurred to, that the plea was good, and the defence sufficient. (a) 1 Chancel(yy) Hoffman v. Bechtel, 53 Penn. St. 190. For a case in which the right to recover was lost by laches, see Whiting v. Stacey, 15 Gray, 270.

{z) In the Trent Navigation Co. v. Harley, 10 East, 35, Lord Ellenborough said: " The only question is, whether the laches of the obligees, in not calling upon the principal so soon as they might have done, if the accounts had been properly examined from time to time, be an estoppel at law [in an action] against the sureties? I know of no such estoppel at law, whatever remedy there may be in equity." And in Dawson v. Laws, 23 E. L. & E. 365, the Vice-Chancellor said, that in order to discharge sureties for the faithful performance of duties by their principal, from their obligation, there must be such an act of connivance as enabled the party to get the fund in his hands, or such an act of gross negligence as to amount to a wilful shutting of the person's eyes to the fraud which the party was about to commit, or something approximating to it.