So, it is a general proposition, that where clauses are repugnant and incompatible, the earlier prevails in deeds and other instruments inter vivos, if the inconsistency be not so great as to avoid the instrument for uncertainty. (o) But in the construc(k) Per Buller, J., in Duke of Northumberland v. Errington, 5 T. R. 526. Thus, if a man in the month of February make a lease for years, reserving a yearly rent payable at the feasts of St. Michael the Archangel [Sept. 29], and the Annunciation of our Lady [March 25], during the term, the law shall make transposition of the feasts, namely, at the feasts of the Annunciation and St. Michael the Archangel, that the rent may be paid yearly during the term. Co. Litt. 217 b. See also 1 Jarman on Wills, 437 et seq.

(l) "Note, reader," saith Lord Coke, "although mala grammatica non vitiat instrumenta, yet in expositione instrumentorum mala grammatica, quod fieri possit, vitanda est." Finch's case, 6 Rep. 39.

(m) Com. Dig. tit. Parols (A. 14); Jenk. Cent. 180; Bold v. Molineux, Dyer, 14 b; Baring v. Christie, 5 East, 398; Rex v. Inhabitants of St. Mary's, 1 B. & Ald. 327.

(n) Guier's case, Dyer, 46 b; Carbonel v. Davies, 1 Stra. 394; Staniland v. Hopkins, 9 M. & W. 178, 192; Gray v. Clark, 11 Vt. 583. Where A demises to B, for the term of his natural life, the demise is, prima facie, for the life of B. But where A demised to B, his executors and administrators, for the term of his natural life, and the lease contained a covenant by A for the quiet enjoyment of the premises by B, his executors, etc., during the natural life of A, it was held, that the word 'his' in the demising clause must be referred to A, the grantor, and not to B, though his name was the last antecedent. Doe v. Dodd, 5 B. & Ad. 689. In scire facias against bail, the notice to the defendant was dated on the 3d day of October, 1842, and stated that the execution was returnable on the 3d Tuesday of October next. Held, that the word "next" referred to the 3d Tuesday of the mouth, and not to the month, and that it was sufficient. Nettleton v. Billings, 13 N. H. 446. See Osgood v. Hutchins, 6 id. 374;

Prescot v.------, Cro. Jac. 646 ; Buckley v. Guildbank, id. 678; Bunn v. Thomas, 2 Johns. 190; Tompkins v. Corwin, 9 Cowen, 255. The rule is, ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, si sententia non impediat. Bold v. Molineux, Dyer, 14 b. (o) Shep. Touch. 88; Cother v. Merrick, Hardw. 94; Carter v. Kungstead, Owen, 84; Doe v. Biggs, 2 Taunt. 109. In the body of a deed of settlement were these words: "£1,000 sterling, lawful money of Ireland." The Vice-Chancellor, in giving judgment in the case, said: "It being then impossible to affix a meaning to the words, 'sterling lawful money of tion * of wills, it has been said that the latter cause pre vails, on the ground that it is presumed to be a subsequent thought or purpose of the testator, and therefore to express his last will. (p)

An inaccurate description, and even a wrong name of a person, will not necessarily defeat an instrument. But it is said that an error like this cannot be corrected by construction, unless there is enough beside in the instrument to identify the person, and thus to supply the means of making the correction. That is, taking the whole instrument together, there must be a reasonable certainty as to the person. It is also said, that only those cases fall within the rule in which the description so far * as it is false applies to no person, and so far as it is true applies only to one. But even if the name or description, where erroneous, applies to a wrong person, we think the law would permit correction of the error by construction, where the instrument, as a whole, showed certainly that it was an error, and also showed

Ireland,' taken altogether, I must deal with them according to the rule of law as to construing a deed; which is, that if yon find the first words have a clear meaning, but those that follow are inconsistent with them, to reject the latter.' Cope v. Cope, 15 Sim. US See White v. Hancock, 2 C. B. 830; Hardman v. Hardman, Cro. Elk. 886; Youde v. Jones, 13 M. & W. 534. If anything he granted generally, and there follow restrictive words, which go to destroy the grant, they are rejected as being repugnant to that which is first granted. See Stukely v. Butler, Hob. 168,172,173, F. Moore, 880. Not so, however, where the words that follow are only explanatory, and are not repugnant to the grant; as in case of a feoffment of two acres, habendum the one in fee, and the other in tail, the habendum only explains the manner of taking, and does not restrain the gift. Jackson v Ireland, 3 Wend. 99, 23 Am. Jur. 277, 278. Where the condition of a bond for the payment of money is, that the bond shall be void if the money is not paid, it is held, that the condition is void for repugnancy. Mills v. Wright, 1 Freem. 247, nom. Wells v. Wright, 2 Mod. 285; Wells v. Tregusan, 2 Salk. 463, 11 Mod. 191; Vernon v. Alsop, 1 Lev. 77, Sid. 105; Gaily v. Gully, 1 Hawks, 20; Stockton v. Turner, 7 J. J. Marsh. 192. In 39 H. 6, 10 a, pl. 15, it is said by Littleton to have been adjudged that such a condition was good, and that a plea to an action on the bond, that the defendant had not paid the money, was a good bar. And with equal certainty how the error might and should be corrected. (q) l

Prisot affirmed the case, and said that he was of counsel in the matter when he was serjeant. But that decision cannot now be considered as law. Where, however, the payee of a note, at the time it was signed by the makers, and as a part of the same transaction, indorsed thereon a prom ise "not to compel payment thereof, but to receive the amount when convenient for the promisors to pay it," it was held, that the indorsement must be taken as part of the instrument, and that the payee never could maintain an action thereon. Barnard v. Cashing, 4 Met. 230. It has been laid down, that where A grants land to B, and afterwards in the same deed he grants the same land to C, the grantee first named takes the whole land. Jenk. Cent. 256. If the inconsistency between parts of an instrument is such as to render its meaning wholly uncertain and insensible, it will be void. Doe v. Fleming, 5 Tyrw. 1013.