(d) Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770; Selby v. Selby, 3 Meriv. 2; Hubert v. Moreau, 12 J. B. Moore, 216; Anderson v. Harold, 10 Ohio, 399; Hubert i?. Turner, 4 Scott, N. R. 486; Bailey v. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399. Wade ". Newberm, 77 N. C. 460; Guthrie v. Anderson, 47 Kan. 383; 30 Pac. Rep. 459. And a fortiori a mere alteration of the instrument in the handwriting of the party sought to be charged, will not be sufficient. It has been held, that indorsements of payments are independent writings, and must be proved to be signed by the party sought to be charged, or by his consent. Tur-rell v. Morgan, 7 Minn. 368; Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770.

(e) Thus, in Propert v. Parker, 1 Russ. & M. 625, it was held, that if the defendant himself write the agreement for the purchase of a leasehold house, and states his own name in the third person, as "Mr. A. B. has agreed;" this is a good contract within the statute of frauds, though he does not otherwise sign the agreement; the Master of the Rolls observing that "what the statute of frauds requires is, that the party who is sought to be charged shall, by writing his own name, have attested that he has entered into the contract." So in Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653, where the defendant wrote in his own book a memorandum of the contract, and requested the other's signature, this was held to be a sufficient acknowledgment of the contract, and his name was considered as signed though not appearing at the end, but in the body of the memorandum. And Lord Abinger, said: "The statute of frauds requires that there should be a note or memorandum of the contract in writing, signed by the party to be charged. And the cases have decided that, although the signature be in the beginning or middle of the instrument, it is as binding as if at the foot of it; the question being always open to the jury, whether the party, not having signed it regularly at the foot, meant to be bound by it as it stood, or whether it was left so unsigned because he refused to complete it. But when it is ascertained that he meant to be bound by it as a complete contract, the statute is satisfied, there being a note in writing showing the terms of the contract, and recognized by him. I think in this case the requisitions of the statute are fully complied with." Again, in Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. 102; 8. c. nom. Clason v. Bailey, 14 id. 484, it was held, that a following: "The lease renewed, Mrs. Stokes to pay the king's tax, also to pay Moore £24 a year, half yearly;" it was held, that this was not a memorandum signed within the statute. And Skymer, C. B., said: "The question in this case is, whether the written note stated in the pleadings is such an agreement as is within the meaning of the statute of frauds. These are instructions to the attorney for the preparation of the lease. This is no formal signature of the defendant's name, but one term of the instructions is, that the rent is to be paid to Moore; and the question is, whether the name so inserted and written by the defendant is a sufficient signing. The purport of the statute is manifest, to avoid all parol agreements, and that none should have effect but those signed in the manner therein specified. It is argued, that the name being inserted in any part of the writing is a sufficient signature. The meaning of the statute is, that it should amount to an acknowledgment by the party that it is his agreement, and if the name does not give such authenticity to the instrument, it does not amount to what the statute requires. Here the insertion of the name has not this effect. This memorandum might be drawn subject to additions or alterations, and does not appear to be the final agreement of the parties, and indeed, as far as we can admit parol evidence, it is proved not to be so, for the subject of repairs is not mentioned in the instructions; which shows that the ends of the statute are not to be obtained, if so informal a paper is to be admitted as a written agreement. No case has been adduced in point, but it has been compared to the case of wills, where a name written in the introduction has been considered as a signature; but that seems to me a very different case. The cases on wills have been where the instrument, importing to be the final instrument of the party, has been formally attested, and it is in its nature complete, and the only question has been, whether the form of the statute has been complied with. In the present case I think it is by no means so, and it would be of very dangerous tendency to admit the memorandum to be an agreement within the statute." Eyre, B.: "I think this cannot be considered such a signature as the statute requires. The signature is to have the effect of giving authenticity to the whole instrument, and if the name is inserted so as to have that effect, I do not think it signifies much in what part of the instrument it is to be found: it is perhaps difficult, except in the case of a letter with a postscript, to find an instance where a name inserted in the middle of a writing can well have that effect; and there the name, being generally found in a particular place by the common usage of mankind, it may very probably have the effect of a legal signature, and extend to the whole; but 1 do not understand how a name inserted in the body of an instrument, and applicable to particular purposes, can amount to such an authentication as is required by the statute." See also Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. 83; Cowie v. Remfry, 10 Jur. 789.

(f) Thus, in Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox, 219, where an agreement was made for the renewal of a lease by the defendant to the plaintiff, and the defendant wrote instructions to an attorney, from whence the same was to be prepared, in the words by the seller in his order-book, on the fly-leaf of which, at the beginning, his name was * written, and a signature by memorandum of a contract for the purchase of goods, written by a broker employed to make the purchase, in his book, in the presence of the vendor, the names of the vendor and vendee, and the terms of the purchase being in the body of the memorandum, but not subscribed by the parties, is a sufficient memorandum within the statute of frauds. See also Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Meriv. 53; Penniman v. Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87; Knight v. Crock-ford, 1 Esp. 190; Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238. And it is not necessary that the name should be written after the writing of the agreement. One may write the contract on a piece of paper on which his name has been previously Placed. The delivery of the memoran-um shows the intention that the name should operate as a signature. And therefore, where the defendant had written, signed, and delivered a complete memorandum, and afterwards at the plaintiff's request made an alteration on the paper, for the purpose of correcting a mistake, and redelivered the paper to the plaintiff, it was held, that a signature to this alteration was unnecessary, because authenticated by the signature already on the paper. Bluck v. Gompertz, 7 Exch. 862. And Pollock, C. B., said: "We think that words introduced into a paper signed by a party, or an alteration in it, may be con-sidered as authenticated, by a signature already on the paper, if it is plain that they were meant to be so authenticated. The act of signing after the introduction of the words is not absolutely necessary." See also Kronheim v. Johnson, 7 Ch. D. 60.