(f) Hart v. Sattley, 3 Camp. 528. This was an action to recover the price of a hogshead of gin. The plaintiffs were spirit merchants in London, who had been in the habit of supplying spirits to the defendant, a publican near Dart-month, in Devonshire. In these previous dealings, the course had been for the plaintiff to ship the goods on board a Dartmouth trader, in the river Thames, and the defendant had always received them. The hogshead of gin in question was verbally ordered by the defendant of the plaintiff's traveller, and was shipped in the same manner as the others had been. There was no evidence either that it had been delivered to the defendant in .Devonshire, or that he refused to accept it. On the trial, before Chambre, J., the statute of frauds being relied on in defence, the learned judge said: "I think, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant must be considered as having constituted the master of the ship his agent, to accept and receive the goods." His lordship would seem to have rested his opinion, in some degree, upon the previous course of dealing between the parties. But the case must be considered as overruled by subsequent decisions. Thus, in Hanson v. Armitage, 5 B. & Ald. 557, it appeared that the plaintiffs, merchants in London, had been in the habit of selling goods to the defendant, resident in the country, and of delivering them to a wharfinger in London, to be forwarded to the defendant by the first ship. In pursuance of a parol order from the defendant, goods were delivered to and accepted by the wharfinger, to be forwarded in the usual manner. Held, that this, not being an acceptance by the buyer, was not sufficient to take the" case out of the statute. And in the recent case of Meredith v. Meigh, 2 Ellis & B. 364, the facts were, that goods were delivered by the vendor in Cornwall, on board a ship not named by the purchaser, and a bill of lading was signed by the captain, making them deliverable to carriers at Liverpool, named by the pur. chaser, for the purpose of receiving and forwarding the goods to him, in Staffordshire. A copy of the bill of lading was sent to the carriers at Liverpool, and on the 25th of April the purchaser received notice of the shipment of the goods, and did not repudiate the contract before the 6th of May, when he received information from the vendor that the ship and the goods were lost before they reached Liverpool In an action by the vendor for the price of the goods, it was heldt that there was no evidence to go to the jury of an acceptance and actual receipt of the goods by the defendant within the statute of frauds. And Lord Campbell said: " Considering that no ship was named by the vendee, the mere delivery of the goods on board the Marietta, and the signing the bill of lading by the captain, was not sufficient acceptance and receipt, within the statute. Hart v. Sattley, 3 Camp. 528, if it be supposed to lay down such law, must be considered to have been overturned by subsequent decisions, in which I concur." And Crompton, J., said: "The delivery of goods to a carrier for the purpose of being carried, or to a wharfinger to be forwarded to the vendee by the first ship, in the usual manner, is not evidence of an acceptance and receipt, within the statute of frauds." And see Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376.

(g) See Coats v, Chaplin, 3 Q. B. 483.

1 Taylor v. Smith, 40 Weekly Rep. 486 (C. A. 1892); Hausman v. Nye, 62 Ind. 485; Atherton v. Newhall, 123 Mass. 141: Fontaine v. Bush, 40 Minn. 141; Allard v. Greasert, 61 N. Y. 1.

(h) In Bushel v. Wheeler, 15 Q. B. 442, n., the defendant, living at Hereford, ordered goods, at a price above £10, of the plaintiff, living at Bristol, and directed that they should be sent by The Hereford, sloop, to Hereford. They were sent accordingly; and a letter of advice was also sent to the defendaut, with an invoice, stating the credit to be three months. On their arrival at Hereford, they were placed in the warehouse of the owner of the sloop, where the defendant saw them; and he then said to the warehouseman that he would not take them; but he made no communication to the plaintiff till the end of five months, when he repudiated the goods. In an action for the price of the goods, the judge before whom the cause was tried, having instructed the jury that there was no acceptance and actual receipt sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, it was held, that this instruction was erroneous, and that he should have left them to find, upon these facts, whether or not there had been sueh acceptance and actual receipt. And Lord Denman said: "The general intention of the statute is, that there should be a writing; this, as well as the acception for the case of delivery and acceptance, has been construed literally. Still, it must be a question whether there has been an acceptance and actual receipt. It is not necessary that the purchaser himself should form a judgment on the articles sent; he may depute another to do so; or he may rely upon the seller. The defendant here orders the goods to be sent by a particular vessel which he names, and he receives the invoice, which states a three months' credit. He allows the goods to remain till that credit is expired, giving no notice to the seller, though he did say to his own agent that he would not take them. Now, such a lapse of time, connected with the other circumstauces, might show an acceptance; whether there was an acceptance or not, is a question of fact. I do not think that the mere taking by the carrier is a receipt by the vendee; but the jury here should have been allowed to exercise a judgment on the question whether there was an actual receipt," Williams, J.: "When it is once settled that manual occupation is not essential to an actual receipt, and it is not now contended that it is, it becomes a question whether there have been circumstances constituting an actual receipt.

The larger the bulk, the more impracticable it is that there should be a manual receipt; something there must be in the nature of constructive receipt, as there is constructive delivery. It being then once established that there may be an actual receipt by acquiescence, wherever such a case is set up it becomes a question for the jury whether there is an actual receipt. And all the facts must be submitted to their consideration, for the determination of that question." Coleridge, J.: "I agree that the acceptance must be, in the words of one of the cases cited, strong and unequivocal.' Maberley v. Sheppard, 10 Bing. 101. But that is quite consistent with its being constructive. Therefore, in almost all cases, it is a question for the jury, whether particular instances of acting or forbearing to act amount to acceptance and actual receipt. Here goods are ordered by the vendee to be sent by a particular carrier, and, in effect, to a particular warehouse; and that is done in a reasonable time. That comes to the same thing as if they had been ordered to be sent to the vendee's own house, and sent accordingly. In such a case, the vendee would have had the right to look at the goods, and to return them if they did not correspond to order. But here the vendee takes no notice of the arrival, and makes no communication to the party to whom alone a communication was necessary. The question must go to the jurv." But see this case commented on in Norman v. Phillips, 14 M. & W. 277. In Snow v. Warner, 10 Met. 132, it was held, that goods are received and accepted by the purchaser, within the statute of frauds, when they are transported by the seller to the place of delivery appointed by the agent who contracted for them, and are there deliv. ered to another agent of the purchaser, and are by him shipped to a port where the purchaser had given him general directions to ship goods of the same kind. And Hubbard, J., in that case, said: "The authorities cited by the defendant's counsel, and upon which he relies, go to establish the doctrine, that a constructive delivery to a wharfinger, or a shipmaster, or to other persons engaged in receiving the goods of others, will not be a compliance with the statute of frauds, to bind the party as having accepted the goods There was also, apparently, a leaning in the mind of Lord