1 A broker acting for the plaintiff made a contract for the sale of goods to the defendant, sending a note to each party, but signing only that sent to the seller; he. however, entered the contract in his book, in which he signed both notes. The defendant authorized by parol, * although, for the first and third, which relate to real property, his authority must be in writing, (u)1 We have seen that a broker may be an agent of either party, or of both, as to the statute of frauds; but if there be any material contended for the plaintiffs, that this was a contract between them and the defendant, and that, although Hathaway was employed by the plaintiffs only as their agent, yet, when the defendant dealt with him, he became his agent also, and that his memorandum of the agreement took the case out of the statute of frauds. . . . Cases were cited from the English authorities, as to similar contracts made by brokers; but these authorities are not applicable to the present case. A broker in England is a known legal public officer, governed by statute; and those who deal with him are to find out who his principals are. He cannot act as principal without violating his oath; and he is also liable to a penalty if he does. 1 Tom-lin's Law Dictionary, 274. Hathaway was engaged in buying and selling fish, as well for himself as for others; and it does not distinctly appear whether this purchase was made wholly for the plaintiffs or not. But however this may have been, the defendant did not deal with Hathaway as a broker or agent, but as the contracting party; and if the defendant had himself signed the memorandum, he would not have been liable in this action by the plaintiffs; for the contract was in terms a contract with Hathaway" With respect to the entry of the broker in his private book, and the bought and sold notes delivered by him to the parties, the law is not altogether settled. It seems to be settled that the bought and sold notes constitute a sufficient memorandum, without any entry in the broker's book. Dickinson v. Lilwal, 1 Stark. 128; Rucker v. Cammeyer, 1 Esp. 105; Chapman c.

Partridge, 5 id. 256; Hawes v. Forster, 1 Moody & R. 368; Goom v. Aflalo, 6 B. & C. 117; Sivewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 103,6 Eng. L. & Eq. 286. But for this purpose the bought and sold notes must correspond. Cumming v. Roebuck, Holt, N. P. 172; Grant v. Fletcher, 5 B. & C. 436; Gregson v. Ruck, 4 Q. B. 737; Thornton v. Kempster, 5 Taunt. 786, Peltier v. Collins, 3 Wend. 459. Where the broker has made an entry of the contract in his book, and has also delivered bought and sold notes to the parties, there has been a conflict of opinion as to whether the entry in the broker's book or the bought and sold notes constitute the contract. But the Court of Queen's Bench, in the recent case of Sivewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 103, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 286, held, that the entry is in such case the binding contract. See further upon this point, Townend v. Drakeford, I Car. & K. 20; per Parke, B., in Pitts v. Beckett, 13 M. & W. 746; Heyman v. Neal, 2 Camp. 337; Thornton v. Charles, 9 M. & W. 802; Thornton v. Meux, Moody & M. 43; Hawes v. Forster, 1 Moody & R. 368; Mews v Carr, 1 H. & N. 484.

(u) Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Sch. & L. 22; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 250; Mort-lock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292; Graham v. Musson, 7 Scott, 769; Waller v. Hendon, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 50, pl. 26; Yin. Abr. tit. Contract and Agreement (H), pl. 45; McWhorter v. McMalum, 10 Paige, 386; Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 107; Worrall v. Munn, 1 Seld. 229; Alna v. Plummer, 4 Greenl. 258; Johnson v. Somers, 1 Humph. 268.

1 In many States it is expressly provided by statute that agents' authority to make contracts relating to real estate must be in writing. This is the case in Arkansas, California, Dakota, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and other States. See Stimson's Am. Stat. Law, Sec. 4140, clause (5), and Sec. 4143. Where the statute does not so provide, however, parol authority is sufficient. Heard v. Pilley, 4 Ch. 548; Rutenberg v. Main, 47 Cal. 213; Watson v. Brightwell, 60 Ga. 212 ; Rose v. Hayden, 35 Kan. 106, 112; Riley v. Minor, 29 Mo. 439 ; Moody v. Smith, 70 N. T. 598; Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 630. But see contra, Hackenbnrg v. Gartskamp, 30 La, An. 898; Telle v. Taylor, 42 La. An. 1165.

diversity between the entry in the broker's book and the con-tract, - as the omission by the broker of a stipulation in the contract, - the entry is not sufficient to take the case from the statute, (uu) A factor is only an agent of his principal This distinction is more fully stated in the section on bought and sold notes.

Telegrams signed by a defendant may, it seems, when sufficiently definite, take a case from the statute, (uv)l

As to the question what the written agreement must contain, the general answer is, all that belongs essentially to the agreement,(v)2 and more than this is not needed; nor can parol evidence * be received to supply anything which is wanting in the writing, to make it the written agreement on which

(uu) Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen, 353.

(uv) Hazard v. Day, 14 Allen, 487; Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307.

(v) Seagood v. Meale, Prec in Ch 560; Rose v. Cunynghame, 11 Ves. 550; Clark v. Wright, I Atk. 12; Montacute v. Maxwell, I P. Wms. 618; Roberts v. Tucker, 3 Exch. 632; Archer v. Baynes, 5 Exch. 625 , Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Johns. Ch. 273; Bailey v. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399; Waterman v. Meigs, 4 Cush. 497; Morton v. Dean, 13 Met. 385; Burke r. Haley, 2 Gilman, 614; Adams v. M'Millan, 7 Port. 73; Abeel v. Radcliff, 13 Johns. 297; Barickman v Kuykendall, 6 Blackf. 21. -It must contain the names of the parties. Champion v. Plummer, 5 Esp. 240, 4

B. & P. 253. In this case the plaintiff had purchased of the defendant certain merchandise, which the defendant refused to deliver. The only memorandum of the bargain was a short note written by the plaintiff's clerk in a common memorandum-book, which was signed by the defendant, but made no mention of the name of the plaintiff. And Mansfield,