Bush, 463; Bacon v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227; Jervis v. Berridge, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 351; see Riley v. Farnsworth, 116 Mass. 223; as the agreed price, Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444; McElroy v. Buck, 35 Mich. 434; Norm v. Blair, 39 Ind. 90; a warranty of quality, if a condition of contract, Newbery v. Wall, 65 N. Y. 484; Smith v. Dallas, 35 Ind. 255; a description of the subject-matter, Scanlan v. Geddes, 112 Mass. 15; Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444; Fisher v. Kuhn, 54 Miss. 480. Thus, in a memorandum of a lease the term should appear. Parker v. Tainter, 123 Mass. 185; Riley v. Williams, id. 506. An offer in writing, signed by the maker thereof, is a sufficient memorandum. Stewart v. Eddowes, L. R. 9 C. P. 311; Himrod Furnace Co. v. Cleveland, Ac R. Co. 22 Ohio St. 451; Argus Co. v. Mayor, etc of Albany, 55 N. Y. 495; Lowber v. Connit, 36 Wis. 176; West Un. Tel. Co. v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 86 Bl. 246. A receipt for money, Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444 , and a recorded vote of a corporation, signed by its clerk, Grimes v. Hamilton Co. 37 la. 290; [a sheriff's return on an execution showing a sale, Stearns v. Edson, 63 Vt. 259,] are each a good memorandum. A letter to a third person stating the contract may be used as a memorandum against the writer. Gibson v Holland, L. R. 1 C. P. 1; Moss v. Atkinson, 44 Cal. 3; Wood v. Davis, 82 111. 311; Moore v. Mountcastle, 61 Mo. 424; Kleeman v. Collins, 9 Bush, 460. So an escrow. Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437. The plaintiff and defendant had a "deal" for wool, on January 11th, and a memorandum containing all the terms was drawn up, signed by the plaintiff, and handed to the defendant. On February 8th the defendant wrote to the plaintiff,"I shall consider the 'deal' off, as you have not completed your part of the contract,*' as in fact the plaintiff had; and on February 9th, in response to a request of the plaintiff to see a copy of the contract contained in the memorandum, the defendant wrote, enclosing a copy,"I beg to enclose copy of your letter of the 11th of January" Held, that there was a sufficient memorandum in writing signed by the defendant to satisfy the statute of frauds. Buxton v. Rust, L. R. 7 Ex. 279. - K.

(z) The leading case in this country, in opposition to Wain v. Warlters, is Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 122. In that case the action was brought on an undertaking of the defendants indorsed on a promissory note, and in the words following: "We acknowledge ourselves to be holden as surety for the payment of the within note." And the defendants were held liable.

1 In the following decisions it is held that the consideration must be expressed Foster v. Napier, 74 Ala. 393; Eppich v. Clifford, 6 Col. 493; Weldin v. Porter, 4 Houst. 236; Hargroves v. Cooke, 15 Ga. 321; Fry v. Platt. 32 Kan. 62; Hutton v. Padgett, 26 Mo. 228; Nichols v. Allen, 23 Minn. 542; O'Bannon v. Chumasero, 3 Mont. 419; Underwood v. Campbell, 14 N. H. 393; Barney v. Forbes, 118 N. Y. 580. This rule is expressed in the statutes of Alabama, Minnesota, Nevada, and Oregon. The contrary rule is expressed in the statutes of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Virginia. See Stimson's Am. Stat. Law, § 4142.

it has been held, and is undoubtedly the prevailing rule, that although the consideration be not named as such, if it can be distinctly collected from the whole instrument what it really was, this satisfies the statute. (b)1 And it is sufficiently expressed by the words " for value received." (bb)

Of the form of the agreement, it need only be said that it *must be adequately expressive of the intent and obligation of the parties. It may be one or many pieces of paper; provided that the several pieces are so connected by mutual reference or otherwise that there can be no uncertainty as to the meaning and effect of them all, when taken together and viewed as a whole, (c) But this connection of several parts cannot be established by extrinsic evidence, (d)1 If there is an agreement on one paper, and something additional on another, and a signature on another paper, that is not a written and signed agreement, unless these several parts require by their own statement the union of the others; for if they may be read apart, or in other connections, evidence is not admissible to prove that they were actually intended to be read together. In general, the written agreement must be certain; but it may be certain in itself;(e)2 that is, it may itself declare the purposes and promises of the agreement definitely; or it may be capable of being made certain by reference to a certain standard. (f) If a contract

(b) Bainbridge v. Wade, 16 Q. B. 89, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 236; Steele v. Hoe, 14 Q. B. 431; Goldshede v. Swan, 1 Exch. 154; Kennaway v. Treleavan, 5 M. & W. 498; Chapman v. Sutton, 2 C. B. 634; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309; Newbury v. Armstrong, 6 Bing. 201; Short-rede p. Cheek, I A. & E. 57; s. c. 3 Nev. & M. 866; Peate v Dickon, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 322; Lysaght v. Walker, 5 Bligh (v. 8.), 1; Jarvis v. Wilkins, 7 M. & W. 410; Roters v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. 218, 13 Wend. 114; Marquand v. Hipper, 12 Wend. 520; Waterbury v. Graham, 4 Sandf 215; Laing v. Lee, 1 Spencer, 337. In the following cases the consideration did not sufficiently appear*. Raikes v. Todd, 8 A. & E. 846; James v. Williams, 3 Nev. & M. 196; Bentham v. Cooper, 5 M. & W. 621; Clancy v. Piggott, 4 Nev. & M. 496; Jenkins v. Reynolds, 6 J. B. Moore, 86; Hawes v. Armstrong, 1 Scott, 661; Price v. Richardson, 15 M. & W. 539; Wain v. Warlters, 5 East, 10; Mor-lev v. Boothby, 3 Bins. 107; Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 B. & Ald. 595; Jenkins v. Reynolds, 3 Brod. & B. 14. Even " value received" has been said to be enough. Watson v. McLaren, 19 Wend. 557; Day v. Elmore, 4 Wis. 190; Cooper v. Dedrick, 22 Barb. 516 The consideration may be collected from the whole instrument, and may be inferred from its character as well as its terms. It need not therefore be expressed in a guaranty written upon a contemporaneous agreement expressing a consideration; for the agreement and the guaranty of its performance being contemporaneous, the consideration for the one enures to and sustains the other. Bailey v. Freeman, 11 Johns. 221; Hanford v. Rogers, 11 Barb. 18. So, too, if the agreement upon which the contemporaneous guaranty is written itself imports a consideration; as if it be an instrument under seal, or a promissory note. Leonnard v. Vreden-ourgh, 8 Johns. 29; Manro v. Durham, 3 Hill, 584; Childs v. Barnum, 11 Barb. 14. The words "value received" have been held sufficiently to express a consideration. Watson v. McLaren, 19 Wend. 557; Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35; Edelen v. Gough, 5 Gill, 103. Where the words import either a past or concurrent consideration, the latter construction will be given. See cases cited at the beginning of this note.