(b) Jeffreys v. Gurr, 2 B. & Ad. 833; Pownal v. Ferrand, 6 B. & C. 439. In this case the indorser of a bill being sued by the holder, paid him part of the sum mentioned in the bill; and it was held, that he might recover the same from the acceptor in an action for money paid to his use. And Bayley, J., said: " The law is, that a party, by voluntarily paying the debt of another, does not acquire any right of acand pays the debt which the other owes. Here the surety can recover * what he pays, without proving that the principal debtor either requested him to pay the money, or promised to repay him; for the law implies all this. In receiving him as surety, or in requesting him to become his surety, he will be considered as having requested him to pay the debt; and if such request to pay the debt were express, the general principles of law would imply the promise of repayment. The compulsion in this case must be a legal one; or, in other words, there must be an obligation which the law will enforce. (c)

And, in the third place, where one does voluntarily, and without request, that which he is not compellable to do for another who is compellable to do it. As if one who is not surety, nor bound in any way, pays a debt due from another. He has not the same claim and right as if he had been compellable to pay this debt. For now the law, if there be a subsequent promise to repay the money, will indeed imply the previous request, as, if there had been a previous request, it would have implied a subsequent promise; but it will not imply both the promise and the request, as in the former case. (d) The reason * is, that tion against that other; but if I pay your debt because I am forced to do so, then I may recover the same; for the law raises a promise on the part of the person whose debt I pay, to reimburse me. That principle was fully established in the case of Exall v. Partridge, 8 T. R. 308." - Gris-sell v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N.C. 10. In this case the plaintiffs, having agreed with the defendant to give him a lease of certain premises, caused their attorney to prepare the lease, and paid him for it; and afterwards brought their action against the defendant to recover the amount so paid, and declared in assumpsit for money paid by them for the defendant's use. It was held, that they were entitled to recover, the evidence showing that it was the custom for the landlord's attorney to draw the lease, and for the lessee to pay for it. Park, J., said: "As the plaintiffs were liable to their own attorney in the first instance, and all the evidence shows, that according to the custom the defendant is ultimately bound to pay for the lease, he must be taken to have impliedly assented to the payment made by the plaintiffs, and the action lies for money paid to his use." See also Davies v. Humphreys, 6 M. & W. 153; Nichols v. Bucknam, 117 Mass. 488. (c) Pitt v. Purssord, 8 M. & W. 538. In this case one of two persons, who, as sureties for a third, signed together with the principal a joint and several promissory note, on the note becoming due, paid the amount, though no demand had been made or action brought against him by the holder. It was held, that such payment could not be considered voluntary, and that he might sue his co-surety for contribution. And Alderson, B., said: "This is not a voluntary payment, nor is it like the case where one is liable principal and another as surety. Here the sureties are not liable in default of the principal; they are all primarily liable, and are all equally so. This was not a payment made voluntarily, but was a payment in discharge of a debt due on an instrument on which the defendant was liable."

(d) Wing v. Mill, 1 B. & Ald. 104. In this case a pauper residing in the parish of A received during his illness a weekly allowance from the parish of B, where he was settled. Held, that an apothecary, who attended the pauper, might maintain an action for the amount of his hill against the overseer of B, who expressly promised to pay the same - But without such express promise, such action, it seems, could not be maintained. Paynter v. Williams, l Cr. & M 819, In this case a pauper, whose settlement was in the parish of A, resided in the parish of B, and whilst there received relief from the the debtor shall not be obliged to accept another party as his creditor without his consent. He owes some one; and he may have partial defences, or other reasons for wishing to arrange the debt with him to whom it is due, and not with another; and if another comes in without request or necessity and pays the debt, the debtor is not obliged to substitute him in the place of his original creditor unless he chooses to do it. But he may do this if he so wishes; and if, after the debt is paid by this third party, the debtor choose to promise him repayment, he is held to such promise, and the consideration, although executed, is sufficient, for the law implies a previous request; or, what is the same thing, will not permit the debtor to deny the allegation of such request in the declaration.

It is, however, to be observed, that where the law implies both the previous request and also a subsequent promise, there no other promise than that which is so implied can be enforced, if the consideration for the promise be an executed one. (e)1 parish of A, which relief was afterwards discontinued, the overseers objecting to pay any more unless the pauper moved into his own parish. The pauper was subsequently taken ill and attended by an apothecary, who, after attending him nine weeks, sent a letter to the overseers of A; upon the receipt of which they directed the allowance to be renewed, and it was continued to the time of the pauper's decease. Held, that the overseers of A were liable to pay so much of the apothecary's bill as was incurred after the letter was received. And Bayley, B., said: " I am of opinion that the parish is liable, and that the plaintiff can maintain the present action. The legal liability is not alone sufficient to enable the party to maintain the action, without a retainer or adoption of the plaintiff on the part of the parish. The legal liability of the parish does not give any one who chooses to attend a pauper and supply him with medicines a right to call on them for payment. It is their duty to see that a proper person is employed, and they are to have an option who the medical man shall be. Wing v. Mill does not go the length of saying that a mere legal liability is enough; there must be a retainer or adoption. In that case the parish officers were aware of the attendance, and sanctioned it, because they applied to him to send in his bill." See further Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378: Gleason v. Dyke, 22 Pick. 393; Dearborn v. Bowman, 3 Met. 155; Curtis v. Parks, 55 Cal. 106; Patillo v. Smith, 61 Ga. 265. (e) Kaye v. Dutton, 7 Man. & G. 807. This was an action of assumpsit upon an agreement, whereby, after reciting that one W. in his lifetime mortgaged certain premises to R. and B. to secure £3,500, that R. and B. required W. to procure the plaintiff to join him in a bond, as a collateral security for that sum and interest; that the defendant had, since the death of W., taken upon himself the management of the estate of W., and had paid to R. and B. £3,370; that the plaintiff had been called upon as surety, and had paid to R. and B. £130; that the defendant had repaid him £48, leaving £82 due; that the defendant had agreed to repay the plaintiff the £82 out of the moneys which might arise from the sale of the mortgaged premises, and in the meantime to appropriate the rents towards payment of the same, as the plaintiff had a lien upon the premises for the same; that the defendant had requested the plaintiff to release and convey all his estate and interest in the premises to A. and L., and that that he had already done, reserving to himself a hen on the said property, it was witnessed that, in consideration of the plaintiff's having paid the £130 to It. and B. in part discharge of the mortgage, and in consideration of his having released and conveyed all his estate and interest in the premises to A. & L., and in order to secure to the plaintiff the repayment of the £82, the defendant undertook and agreed with the plaintiff to pay him the same, with interest, out of the proceeds of the premises when sold, and, in the mean time, to appropriate the rents in liquida-tion of the same. The declaration then stated, that, in consideration of the premises, the defendant promised the plaintiff to perform the agreement; and alleged for breach, that, although the defendant had received rents to a sufficient amount, he had failed to pay. Held, that inasmuch as the declaration did not show that the plaintiff had any interest in the premises, except that which he reserved, his release and conveyance, though executed at the defendant's request, formed no legal consideration for the promise alleged to have been made by the latter. And Tindal, C. J., in that case said: " Two objections were made to the declaration, first, that it did not show any consideration for the promise by the defendant; secondly, that the promise was laid in respect of an executed consideration, but was not such a promise as would have been implied by law from that consideration; and that, in point of law, an executed consideration will support no promise, although express, other than that which the law itself would have implied. The cases cited by the defendant, namely, Brown v. Crump, 1 Marsh. 567, 6 Taunt. 300; Granger v. Collins, 6 M. & W. 458; Hopkins v. Logan, 5 M. & W. 241; Jackson v. Cobbin, 8 M. & W. 790; and Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234; S. C. 2 Gale & D. 508, certainly support that proposition to this extent, that, where the consideration is one from which a promise is by law implied, there no express promise made in respect of that consideration after it has been executed, differing from that which by law would be implied, can be enforced. But those cases may have proceeded on the principle that the consideration was exhausted by the promise implied by law, from the very execution of it; and, consequently, any promise made afterwards must be nudum pactum, there remaining no consideration to support it. But the case may, perhaps, be different where there is a consideration from which no promise would be implied by law; that is, where the party suing has sustained a detriment to himself, or conferred a benefit on the defendant, at his request, under circumstances which would not raise any implied promise. In such cases it appears to have been held, in some instances, that the art done at the request of the party charged, is a suffi-cient consideration to render binding a promise afterwards made by him in respect of the act bo done. Hunt v. Bate, and several cases mentioned in the margin of the report of that case, seem to go to that extent; as also do some ethers collected in Boll. Abr. Action sur Case (Q) "- So in Jackson v, Cobbin, 8 M & W. 790, a declaration in assumpsit stated, in substance, that the defendant agreed to let, and the plaintiff to take, a certain messuage and premises on certain specified terms, and that afterwards, in consideration of the premises, and that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, had promised the defendant to perform his part of the agreement, the defendant promised the plaintiff to perform his part of the agreement, and that he then had power to let the messuage and premises to the plaintiff, without restriction as to the purpose for which the same should be used and occupied. Held, on special demurrer, that such a promise could not be implied from the relation of the parties, and that the consideration alleged was insufficient to sustain it. See also Hopkins v. Logan, 5 M. & W. 241; Lattimore v. Garrard, l