is also a clear illiistration of the rule of

So, if by the bill of lading the goods are deliverable to the order of the consignor or his assigns, the property therein does not pass to the consignee, so as to defeat this right, although they may be delivered on board the consignee's own vessel, (k) or on one chartered by him, (kk) and although the bill of hiding expressed that the consignee was to pay no freight, the goods "being owner's property. "(I) But it might be otherwise if it appeared by the bill of lading that the goods were put on board to be carried for and on * account and risk of the consignee. (m) So if the goods are intended for a market foreign to the residence of the consignee, and never designed to come into the actual possession of the charterer, then it would seem that a delivery on board of the vessel, whether owned or hired by the purchaser or not, has been held final, and the right of stoppage in transitu gone. (n)1 the text. The purchaser lived in America; the consignor, in Havana. The former sent his own vessel to Havana for a cargo of molasses, which was shipped on board the vessel, consigned to the vendee, and to be delivered to him at his port of residence; it was held, that the vendor had the right to stop the goods at any time before they came into the actual possession of the vendee, and the case of Stubbs v. Lund was fully approved. See also Thompson v. Trail, 2 C. & P. 334; Buckley v. Eurniss, 15 Wend. 137; s. c. 17 Wend. 504: The case of Bolin v. Huff-nagle, 1 Rawle, 1, seems in direct conflict with these authorities, and we think cannot be supported. But see the opinion of Parke, B., in Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 Exch. 708. The case of Turner v. The Trustees of Liverpool Docks, in the Exchequer Chamber, 6 E. L. & E. 507; s. c. 6 Exch. 543, is an important case on this point. There A. & Co., residing in Charleston, America, consigned cotton to B. & Co., living at Liverpool, and delivered it on B. & Co.'s own vessel at Charleston, taking a bill of lading to deliver to their order or their assigns, they paving no freight, "being owner's property." The consignors indorsed the bill to the " Bank of Liverpool or order." The consignees became bankrupt before the cotton arrived at Liverpool. The consignors, on its arrival, claimed to stop the cargo in transitu. The assignees in bankruptcy claimed the cotton, as having been so completely delivered as to vest in the baukrupts as soon as it was put on board their own vessel at Charleston, specially appointed by them to bring home such cargo. Patteson, J., said: " There is no doubt that the delivery of goods on board the purchaser's own ship is a delivery to him, unless the vendor protects himself by special terms restraining the effect of such delivery. In the present case, the vendors, by the terms of the bill of lading, made the cotton deliverable at Liverpool to their order or assigns, and therefore there was not a delivery of the cotton to the purchasers as owners, although there was a delivery on board their ship. The vendors still reserved to themselves, at the time of the delivery to the captain, a jus disponendi, of the goods, which he by signing the bill acknowledged." See also Ellershaw v. Magniac, 6 Exch. 570, n.; Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 Exch. 691; Wait v. Baker, id. 1; Mitchel v. Ede, 11 A. & E. 888; Jen-kyns v. Brown, 14 Q. B. 496; Key v. Cotesworth, 14 E. L. & E. 435; s c. 7 Exch. 595; Aguirre v. Parmelee, 22 Conn. 473; Brindley v. Cilwyn Slate Co, 55 L. J. Q. B. 67: Ex parte Rosevear Co., 11 Ch. D. 560. See note (n), post.

(k) Wait v. Baker, 2 Exch. 1.

(kk) Berndtson v. Strang, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 481.

(/) Turner v. Trustees of Liverpool Docks, 6 E. L & E. 507; s. c. 6 Exch. 543.

(m) Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 Exch. 691; Wilmshurst v. Bowker, 7 Man. & G. 882; Jenkyns v. Brown, 14 Q. B. 496.

(n) This distinction is fully supported

1 In Bethell v. Clark, 19 Q. B. D. 553; 20 Q. B. D. 615, goods were purchased by merchants in London of manufacturers in Wolverhampton, and directions were given to send them by rail to a ship then loading at London consigned to Melbourne, and this

As the goods may pass constructively into the possession of the consignee, so they may be transferred by him before they reach him, in such a way as to destroy the consignor's right of stoppage in transitu. This may be done by an indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading. This instrument is now (as we had occasion to say in an earlier part of this work) (<<) by the custom of merchants, which is adopted by the courts and made a rule of law, regarded as negotiable; or, more accurately speaking, as quasi negotiable, its indorsement and delivery operating as a symbolic delivery of the goods mentioned in it. (p) And by Fowler v. Kymer, cited in 3 East, 396, and recognized in Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. 457; Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me. 93; and Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 308, supports the same view. The court there said: " We think it very clear that a delivery of the corn on board of a vessel appointed by the vendee to receive it, not for the purpose of transportation to him, or to a place appointed by him, to be delivered there for his use, but to be shipped by such vessel, in his name, from his own place of residence and business, to a third person, was a termination of the transit, and the right of the vendor to stop in transitu was at an end." In Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837, it was held, that if goods are sold to be shipped to some ultimate destination, of which the vendor had knowledge, but were first to go into the hands of an agent of the purchaser, and there await the purchaser's orders, the right of stoppage in transitu was determined on delivery to such agent. See also the still later case of Cowas-jee v. Thompson. 5 Moore, P. C. 165. there goods contracted to be sold and delivered " free on board," to be paid for by cash or bills, at the option of the purchasers, were delivered on board, and receipts taken from the mate by the lighterman employed by the sellers, who handed the same over to them. The sellers apprised the purchasers of the delivery, who elected to pay for the goods by a bill, which the sellers having drawn, was duly accepted by the purchasers. The sellers retained the mate's receipts for the goods, but the master signed the bill of lading in the purchasers names, who, while the bill they accepted was running, became insolvent. In such circumstances, held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (reversing the verdict and judgment of the Supreme Court at Bombay), that trover would not lie for the goods, for that on their delivery on board the vessel they were no longer in transitu, so as to be stopped by the sellers; and that the retention of the receipts by the sellers was immaterial, as. alter their election to be paid by a bill, the receipts of the mate were not essential to the transaction between the seller and purchaser. See also Schotsmans v. Lancashire K. R. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 332.