(y) Burrell v. North, 2 Car. & K. 680; Davy v. Mason, 1 Car. & M. 45; D'Anjou v. Deagle, 3 Har. & J. 206.

(z) But the agent must have an authority for this purpose, or be held out as having it Therefore, where a common carrier sent his wagon to Nashville with a load of cotton, and the driver was a young negro who had never been allowed to make contracts for hauling, and who had never before been intrusted with the wagon and team alone, and who was particularly instructed to bring home a load of salt, and not to receive goods of any kind for carriage, notwithstanding which he did receive goods for carriage, and the goods were damaged; it was held, that the owner of the team was not liable. Jenkins v. Picket, 9 Yerg. 480. See Ford v. Mitchell, 21 Ind. 54.

(a) Thus where a ship is not put up for freight, but employed by the owner on his own account; and the master receives goods of another person on board as part of his privilege, taking to himself the freight and: commissions, the owner of the ship is not liable in case of embezzlement, or for the conduct of the master in relation to such goods. King v. Lenox, 19 Johns. 235. See also Butler v. Basing, 2 C. & P. 613; Reynolds v. Toppan, 15

Mass. 370; Citizens Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Co. 2 Story, 16; Allen v. Sew-all, 2 Wend. 327, 6 "id. 335; Walter v. Brewer, 11 Mass. 99.

(b) Thus, where the owners of a stagecoach employed a driver, under a contract that he should receive a certain sum of money per month, and the compensation which should be paid for the carriage of small parcels, it was held, that the owners would be answerable for the negligence of the driver in not delivering a parcel of that description, intrusted to him to carry, unless this arrangement was known to the proprietor of the goods, so that he contracted with the driver as principal. Bean v. Sturtevant, 7 N. H. 146. See also Allen v. Sewall, 2 Wend. 327; s. c. 6 id. 335; Hosea v. McCrory, 12 Ala. 349; Chouteau v. Steamboat, 16 Mo. 216; Whitmore v. Steamboat Caroline, 20 id. 513. See also the case of Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co. 23 Vt. 186, in which these points are thoroughly considered. See the facts of the case stated post, p. * 187, note (s). One of the points made was whether the defendants were to be held as common carriers of the bank-bills in question. Upon this point Redfield, J., said: "It seems to us that when a natural person, or a corporation, whose powers are altogether unrestricted, erect a steamboat, appoint a captain, and other agents, to take the entire control of their boat, and thus enter upon the carrying business, from port to port, they do constitute the captain their general agent to carry all such commodities as he may choose to contract to carry within the scope of the powers of the owners of the boat. If this were not so, it would form a wonderful exception to the general law of agency, and one in which the public would not very readily acquiesce. There is hardly any business in the country, where it is so important to maintain the authority of agents, as in this matter of carrying, by these invisible corporations, who have no local habitation, and no existence, or power of action, except through these same agents, by whom almost the entire carrying business of the country is now conducted. If, then, the captains of these boats are to be regarded as the general agents of the owners, - and we hardly conceive how it can be regarded otherwise, - whatever commodities, within the limits of the powers of the owners, the captains, as their general agents, assume to carry for hire, the liability of the owners as carriers is thereby fixed, and they will be held responsible for all losses, unless, from the course of business of these boats, the plaintiffs did know, or upon reasonable inquiry might have learned, that the captains were intrusted with no such authority. Prima facie the owners are liable for all contracts for carrying, made by the captains or other general agents for that purpose, within the powers of the owners themselves, and the onus rests upon them to show that the plaintiffs had made a private contract with the captain, which it was understood, should be kept from the knowledge of the defendants, or else had given credit exclusively to the captain. But it does not appear to us, that the mere fact that the captain was, by the company, permitted to take the perquisites of carrying these parcels, will be sufficient to exonerate the company from liability. Their suffering him to continue to carry bank-bills ought, we think, to be regarded as fixing their responsibility, and allowing the captain to take the perquisites, as an arrangement among themselves."

A ship may be a common carrier, whether in the hands of her owner, or chartered by him to another.1 But she may be chartered in two ways. If the hirer provides and pays the officers and crew, in this case the owner is not more liable for their acts than if he had sold the ship. (c) 2 If the owner agrees to man the ship, and then the hirer hires ship, officers, and crew, * of the owner, the owner alone is in general responsible for the acts of the officers and men in reference to the goods, because his possession and control of the ship for that voyage are sufficient to render him thus liable. (d) The owner of the ship is certainly liable for the acts of those whom he provides and pays, where the goods were laden on board on his credit, trusting to him as the owner of the ship, he knowing this trust, and by his words or conduct authorizing it, and so accepting the responsibility. So an owner of a ferry who has leased it and placed the lessee in possession, is not liable for loss of goods in crossing the ferry.

(c) James v. Jones, 3 Esp. 27; Vallejo v. Wheeler, Cowp. 143; Frazer v. Marsh, 13 East, 238; Reynolds v. Toppan, 15 Mass. 370.

(d) Parish v. Crawford, Stra. 1251; Emery v. Hersey, 4 Greenl. 407; Mclntire v. Browne, 1 Johns. 229.

(e) Ladd v. Chotard, Minor (Ala.), 366.

1 In Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. D. 19, Brett, J., declared that all ship-owners who carry goods for hire, whether common carriers or not, were, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary, liable as insurers; but Cockburn, C. J., on appeal, reversing the decision below, said that a ship-owner who is not a common carrier does not insure the goods bailed to him for carriage. lb. 423.

2 Marquette Bank v. Stewart, 26 Mich. 83.

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