bi here, or selling them here as those very gloves. (j) But he would have no right to assume the trade-mark which indicated that he was, by an arrangement with the manufacturer, his exclusive representative in this country, and which therefore gave to the buyer an authorized assurance that he was buying the goods he desired to buy.

A question has been raised, in one case at least, whether this trade-mark right may not be connected in some way with a certain place. (k) The case is peculiar in its facts, nor does

(j) Samuel v. Burger, 4 Abb. Pr. 88. The plaintiff in this case had purchased, from one Brindle, a watchmaker of extensive reputation, the exclusive right to stamp Brindle's name upon watches of the plaintiff's own manufacture. The defendants offered for sale watches made by Brindle himself, and stamped with his name. An injunction to prevent such sales was prayed for, but was refused, the court saying that "the rule of law invoked by the plaintiffs might well have been claimed by the defendants as applicable to them, but would not at all avail the plaintiffs, who could not call upon the court to aid them in passing off the watches made by them as those manufactured by Brindle."

(k) Motley v. Downman, 3 My. & Cr. 1. The facts of the case were these. The boxes of tin plates made at the Carmarthen Works were for a long series of years distinguished by the brand M. C. The plaintiff, while lessee of the works, used this mark as his predecessors had done, and subsequently removing his manufactory to other works, at a distance of forty miles, continued to use the same mark upon the plates manufactured at the latter place. For some years the Carmarthen Works remained unoccupied, but afterwards the defendants, styling themselves the M. C. Tin Plate Co. having taken a lease of the works, carried them on, and branded their boxes with the mark M. C. An injunction was obtained against the defendants, but on appeal it was dissolved by Lord Chancellor Cottenham, who said: "If by the successful manufacture of the persons who had carried on these works, the goods made there acquired an extraordinary value, it was an extraordinary value which attached to the premises on which the works were carried on; and, no doubt, when the owner came to dispose of the works again, the circumstance of the reputation which the manufacture of these works had acquired, would enable him to dispose of them on more advantageous terms. The real question is, whether the plaintiffs have acquired a right to prevent other subsequent tenants of the works at Carmarthen from using a mark which it is clear was originally derived from those works; for although they were not called the M. C. works, yet the persons carrying on the manufacture of tin plates at them have always used the mark M. C." A question somewhat similar arose in the case of Woodward v. Lazar, 21 Cal. 448. The plaintiff had leased a lot of land in San Francisco, on which he erected a building, which he used as a hotel, under the name of the " What-Cheer House." Subsequently he purchased an adjoining lot, upon which he erected a larger building, and for a time occupied both buildings as the What-Cheer House, having, however, removed the sign to the larger building. Soon after, he surrendered the leased lot, and continued the business under the same name in the building last erected. The defendant having purchased the firstnamed lot and building, opened a hotel under the name of the "Original WhatCheer House," but was restrained by the court from the further use of that name. It would seem that where the value of a manufactured article is mainly owing to the superior quality of the raw material of which it is made; as, for instance, where ore dug at a particular place produces a superior quality of iron, and the product is known by a particular trademark, that that mark might become inseparably connected with the place, and not follow the original user to another place. This view may have influenced the decision of the court in the case of Motley v. Downman. In the case of Newman v. Alvord, 35 How. Pr. 108, the plaintiffs, living in Akron, N. Y., were makers of water lime, and their products were widely known in the market by the name of Akron water lime. The defendants, living in Onondaga, a distant town, and also makers of water lime, re-named their own quarry, calling it Onondaga Akron, and this name they placed on their goods. Plaintiffs applied for an injuncbj * it settle the legal questions which arise in it. We are unable to see any good reason for enlarging or qualifying, by any reference to place, the right which belongs to the manufacturer, to protect, by his trade-mark, the public against deception, and secure to himself the advantage he has gained by the greater excellence of his work.

We exhibit in our notes some cases showing that the law of trade-marks, or, at least, analogous principles, have been extended beyond manufactured articles (to which, at first and for a long time, they were confined), to such things as omnibuses, places of amusement, hotels, publishers of periodicals, and the like. The only good reason on which this extension can rest, would seem to be that it is only an extension of protection to the public against fraud. (l) tion, claiming the word Akron as their trade-mark. In granting the relief prayed for, Judge Marvin said : "The name of the place where the cement is made indicates to the public far more than the place of manufacture. The article manufactured is taken from the earth. It is a bed or quarry of lime. There is no special art or skill in making it into cement. The process is the same everywhere, and yet the cement made from different beds differs greatly in quality and value. To the purchaser the name of the manufacturer is of no importance. He knows that the quality of the article is derived from the raw material; that is, the bed or quarry; and he understands that the article thus labelled by the defendants is the genuine article, which he has long known and used." The injunction was granted, and on appeal the decree was affirmed. 49 Barb. 588. See Hall v. Barrons, 9 Jur. (n. s.) 482; 10 Jur. (n. s.) 55. But such a trade-mark could not be appropriated as against another inhabitant of the same place. The Brooklyn White Lead Co. v. Masury, 25 Barb. 416. But see Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb. 608.

(l) In Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keene, 213, the plaintiffs were proprietors of a line of omnibuses, under the name of the London Conveyance Co. The defendants, owners of a rival line, adopted a similar name, and painted it upon their vehicles in the same colors, and in letters of the same form, and accompanied with other words and devices closely imitating those used by the plaintiff. An injunction restraining the defendants from such colorable imitation of the plaintiff's name was granted by Lord Langdale, and the ground on which the relief was granted is thus stated: "It is not to be said that the plaintiffs have any exclusive right to the words 'Conveyance Company,' or 'London Conveyance Company,' but they have a right to call upon this court to restrain the defendant from fraudulently using precisely the same words and devices which they have taken for the purpose of distinguishing their property, and thereby depriving them of the fair profits of their business, by attracting custom on the false representation that carriages, really the defendants', belong to and are under the management of the plaintiffs. In Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 322, the plaintiffs had, by agreement with the proprietor of the Revere House, obtained the privilege of transporting passengers between that house and the railroad depots; and, as incident thereto, the exclusive right of using the words "Revere House" as a badge on his coaches and on the caps of his drivers. A similar agreement had previously existed between the hotel proprietor and the defendant, but had been terminated by mutual consent. In an action on the case it was held, that the plaintiff might recover the damage to his business resulting from the defendant's continuing to use said badges after the termination of his agreement. The same was held in Stone v. Carlan, 13 law Rep. 360, under precisely the same state of facts. In Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sandf. S. C. 725, the plaintiffs were the proprietors of the Irving House, in New York. The defendant afterwards opened a public-house in the same city, called the Irving Hotel. It appeared that persons intending to go to the former place had been actually deceived by the similarity of name, and had

* The statute does not expressly determine this ques bk tion. The first paragraph of the first section contains nothing which limits the trade-mark to goods or merchandise; but the third paragraph might seem to have this effect, because it requires a record of "the class of merchandise and the particular description of goods " to which the trade-mark is, or is to be, appropriated.