11. Payment Of Gift Deposits

Two rules have been set up relating to donees. By one of these a gift by the depositor of his book and actual delivery constitutes a good gift; by the other rule something more than the gift and delivery of the book is needful to perfect the gift.

a. Two kinds of Gifts. It may be remarked that there are two kinds of gifts : those made during life and called inter vivos gifts, and gifts called donatio mortis causa, or gifts in expectation of death. All gifts, of course, are made during life, but when a donor is prompted by the belief that his death is impending, it is a donatio mortis causa, and if he dies his gift becomes effective. The same elements are present in both kinds of gift. "There must be a purpose to give; this purpose must be expressed in words or signs; and it must be executed by the actual delivery of the thing given to the donee or some one for his use. In every valid gift a present title must rest in the donee, irrevocable in the ordinary case of a gift inter vivos, revocable only upon the recovery of the donor in gifts mortis causa." 2

1 Palmer v. Providence Savings Institution, 14 R. I. 68.

2 Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 187.

6. Valid Gifts. What, then, is needful to constitute a gift of a savings-bank deposit? A delivery of the pass book, with the intention to give it, followed by the donee's acceptance. This is the law in most states, but not in Pennsylvania. There, possession affords no presumption of ownership; "something more is necessary than the manual delivery of the book or paper in order to make a valid gift."1 It would seem, therefore, that besides the delivery of the book, a writing of some kind expressing the donor's purpose must also be given to the donee. Since this is the rule in that state, the rules herein given have no application there.

Such are the rules that apply to gifts. It may not always be easy for a teller or other officer to determine whether the person bringing a pass book is the donee. When a book is brought by a non-depositor, the utmost caution ought to be exercised before paying the presenter. It is easy often for pass books to get into the possession of persons who have no right to them. When a person appears claiming to be the donee, the bank should make doubly sure that the presenter is not a thief; if the donor is alive, it ought not to be difficult in most cases for the donee to bring adequate written authority to the bank of the gift.

12. Payment To Administrator

Most banks will not pay on the request of the donee of a depositor who is dead, but only on the order of an executor or administrator of the depositor's estate. Many of them have a rule that on a depositor's death the fund shad be paid only to his personal representative; the rule relating to the possession of the book as authority of the bank to pay ceases to have any effect. The payment, therefore, to a donee in such a case, is improper

1 Walsh's Appeal , 122 Pa 187.

But a payment to an administrator is by no means a perfect protection to a bank. If the depositor has made a gift of his deposit, and the bank questions it and administration is taken out and the administrator makes a disposition of a portion of his deposit to any other person than the donee, he has a good claim against the bank. Thus a mother delivered her book and order to her daughter, who notified the bank of her mother's act. The depositor died and an administrator on her estate drew out the money and never paid it over to her. She sued the bank and recovered the full amount of the deposit.

Although a deposit is paid to an administrator on presentation of the book, and observing all the other legal requirements on the supposition that the depositor is dead, after an absence of seven years without any knowledge of him, nevertheless the bank is not protected by any of its ordinary rules from liability to such a depositor should he appear. Such a case has arisen in Massachusetts. The bank contended that seven years' absence upon leaving one's usual home or place of business, without being heard of, authorized the court that dealt with the depositor's estate to regard him as dead. "The error," said the Supreme Court, "consists in this, that those facts are only presumptive evidence of death, and may always be controlled by other evidence showing that the fact was otherwise. When the presumption arising from the absence of seven years is overthrown by the actual presence of the supposed dead man, it leaves no ground for sustaining the jurisdiction."1