(o)R e Hughes, 1898, 1 Ch. 529.

(p) Cooke v. Fuller, 26 Beav. 99; Munt v. Glynes, 20 W. R. 823; Waite v. Morland, 38 Ch. D.

135, 138

(q) See note (n), above.

(r) See Re Insole, L. R. 1 Eq. 470, 473.

(s) See note (m), above.

(t) Waite v. Morland, 38 Ch. D. 135; Hill v. Cooper, 1893. 2 Q. B. 85.

Protection order.

Separation order.

When an absolute decree has been made under the Divorce Acts (z) for the dissolution of a marriage, all the rights which the former husband and wife previously enjoyed in respect of each other's property, independently of the provisions of any settlement, are immediately extinguished (a). Thus if the divorced persons were entitled to lands at common law as tenants by entireties (b), they become joint tenants, having the same respective interests as if they were strangers, upon the dissolution of the marriage (c). So if the divorced wife were entitled at common law to an estate in fee simple in freeholds, all the husband's previously existing estate or interest therein, whether during the joint lives only or as tenant by the curtesy potential or initiate, would be at an end; and she could thenceforth enjoy and convey the same as a single woman without his interference or concurrence (d). The husband would be equally deprived of all interest in the wife's copyholds (d). And if the wife were entitled at common law to a term of years, the husband's interest therein would be as effectually extinguished as if he had died in her lifetime without making any disposition thereof [d). The husband also loses by divorce all his right to succeed to his wife's chattels upon her death and intestacy (e). But divorce only extinguishes the rights which were given to the parties in each other's property by the rules of common law or equity in virtue of their relation of husband and wife. And it is now established that a decree for the dissolution of a marriage does not deprive either party of any interest in any property which is limited by any settlement to him or her by name (f). If, however, the wife were so entitled under any settlement, but without power of anticipation, the restraint on anticipation would cease to be operative after the divorce; as the wife is thereby made single. But of course the restraint would revive, if it were not limited to the particular coverture dissolved, and the woman were to marry again without having disposed of the property in the interval (g). It appears that upon divorce either party loses any interest in property which was limited to him or her, not by name, but under the description of the husband or wife of the other; for he or she then ceases to answer that description (h). The effect of a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground of the canonical disability of impotence is to render the marriage void, and appears to resemble the effect of a divorce as regards the extinguishment of the parties' common law rights in each other's property (i); for the marriage was voidable only, and was binding on the parties until they were released by the decree (k). But the consequences of such a decree differ from those of a divorce with respect to interests limited by any settlement made in consideration of the marriage to take effect in the parties' favour after the solemnization thereof; as these interests are avoided upon the pronouncement of the decree, no valid marriage having taken place (l). When a marriage is void for some legal disability, that is, any impediment raised by common law or statute to the formation of a valid marriage (m) - such as the existence of a previous marriage (n) or of such relationship between the parties as brings them within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity (o) - the marriage is altogether void ah initio, and the parties have never occupied the position of husband and wife or acquired the rights resulting therefrom (p). So that a decree of nullity on the ground of some legal disability has no effect in dissolving the marriage tie; it is not necessary to establish, but is merely declaratory of the invalidity of the marriage (q).

Effect of divorce.

(u) Stats. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, ss. 8, 9.

{x) Bathe v. Bank of England, 4 K. & J. 564, 568; Re Kingsley's Trusts, 26 Beav. 84; Cooke v. Fuller, ib. 99; Be Elliott, L. R. 2 P. & M. 274; Waite v. Mor-land, 38 Ch. D. 135, 138.

(y) Stat. 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39, ss. 4, 5, extended by 2 Edw. VII. c. 28, s. 5 (1).

(z) Stats. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, ss. 27 - 31, 57; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 144, s. 7; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 81; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 32, s. 3. In the interval between the making of a decree nisi and a decree absolute for the dissolution of a marriage, the wife remains a married woman; Norman v. Villars, 2 Ex. D. 359: but the husband is not entitled to exercise his marital rights in respect of her property to her prejudice; Prole v. Soady, L. P. 3 Ch. 220.

(a) Wells v. Malbon, 31 Beav. 48; Wilkinson v. Gibson, L. P. 4 Eq. 162; Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220; Codrington v. Codrington, L. P. 7 H. L. 854; Thornley v. Thornley, 1893, 2 Ch. 229.

(b) See Wms. Real Prop. 305, 19th ed.

(c) Thornley v. Thornley, 1893, 2 Ch. 229.

{d) This follows from the principle laid down in the cases cited in note (a), above.

(e) Wilkinson v. Gibson, L. R. 4 Eq. 162.

(/) Fitzgerald v. Chapman, 1 Ch. D. 563; Burton v. Sturgeon, 2 Ch. D. 318. The Court has power, after a decree of nullity or dissolution of marriage, to make an order varying the provisions of any ante-nuptial or post - nuptial settlement which has been made on the parties, for the benefit either of the children of the marriage or of their parents; see stats. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 5; 41 Vict. c. 19, s. 3; Wms. Pers. Prop. 512, 513, 15th ed.

(g) See cases cited above, p. 822, n. (x).

Nullity of marriage, effect of decree of.

(h) Re Morrieson, 40 Ch. D. 30, Kay, J., declining to follow Bullmore v. Wynter, 22 Ch. D. G19, Fry, J.