(d) Re Lumley, 1896, 2 Ch. 690; see also Re Davenport, 1895, 1 Ch. 361.

(e) Stat. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 19.

(/) Re Stonor's Trusts, 24 Ch. D. 195; fie Whitaker, 34 Ch. D. 227; Hancock v. Hancock, 38 Ch. D. 78; see Wms. Pers. Prop. 376, 493, 15th ed.

(g) Stevens v. Trevor-Garrick, 1893, 2 Ch. 307; Buckland v. Buckland, 1900, 2 Ch. 534; see Wms. Pers. Prop. 487, 493, 15th ed.

(A) See Hope v. Hope, 1892, 2 Ch. 336,341; Thornley v. Thornley, 1893, 2 Ch. 229; Re Lumley, 1896, 2 Ch. 690; Wms. Conv. Stat. 382, 383, 418, 419, 421.

(i) Hope v. Hope, 1892, 2 Ch. 336; see above, p. 176; Wms. Real Prop. 300, 311, 19th ed.

(k) It appears that, after the coverture has come to an end, the quality of separate property also ceases, and the husband can assert his common law right to have his wife's term by survivorship without the necessity of taking out administration to her: see Co. Litt. 46b, 300a, 351a; 2 Black. Comm.433 - 435; Re Lambert's Estate, 39 Ch. D. 626; Hope v. Hope, ubi sup.

(I) Re Drummond and Davie's Contract, 1891, 1 Ch. 524, deciding that a wife can now bar the

Although if any such property be given to a married woman with a restraint on anticipation, she is under the like incapacity to deprive herself of the benefit thereof by any disposition, which she may purport to make, as attached with respect to her dealing with her equitable separate estate subject to a similar restraint (m). It appears, however, that where a wife enjoys a legal estate or interest by virtue of the Act of 1882 in any separate property, subject to a restraint on anticipation, and disposes of the property to a purchaser taking for value in good faith and without notice of the restraint, the purchaser will obtain a good title to the property; for the restraint on alienation is an incumbrance affecting the property in equity only and not at law (n). It is held that the Act of 1882 confers upon married women a special capacity only to hold and dispose of property, which is by virtue of the Act made their separate property, and does not invest them with the same general capacity in respect of all property as is enjoyed by single women. Thus it was decided that a will made by a woman during coverture and not re-executed by her when she became a widow was not effectual by virtue of the Act to pass property acquired by her after her husband's death (o). And the consequences of this ruling were only removed by the Married Women's Property Act, 1893 (p), which provided in effect that the will made during coverture of a woman who might die after the passing of that Act (q) should take effect as if it had been executed immediately before her death, whether she had or had not any-separate property at the time of making it, and need not be re-executed or re-published after her husband's death. So it has been considered that the Act did not repeal the rule that husband and wife are one person in law (r), but left it to take effect, where not modified or interfered with; whence it follows that on a gift of land or other property made since the Act to a husband and his wife and others in joint tenancy or tenancy in common, the husband and wife still become entitled to the share of one person only between them (s). And it has been further held that the Act only enables a married woman to hold and dispose of, as her separate property, estates and interests to which she is entitled for her own use beneficially, and not those to which she is entitled upon any trust (t). The consequence of this decision is that, where since the Act (u) any hereditaments have been limited to a wife upon any trust or have devolved upon her as executrix or administratrix (x), she cannot dispose of the same pursuant to the trust by her own act alone, unless the hereditaments be freehold or copyhold and she be a bare trustee thereof (y): but her husband takes the estate or interest therein bestowed on him by the rules of law or equity apart from the Act, and must accordingly join in alienating the same by the appropriate method of conveyance. That is to say, if the property be freehold, it must be assured by deed executed by the husband and wife and duly acknowledged by the wife (z); if copyhold, by surrender by the husband and wife, the wife being separately examined, or in the case of an equitable estate in copyholds, by a similar surrender or by deed acknowledged (a); and if leasehold, by the husband's assignment with the wife's concurrence (b). It has been decided that, where any hereditaments are vested in a married woman as mortgagee, the mortgage being her separate property, she can convey the same, upon repayment of the mortgage money, as if she were single (c). And it has been held that, if she be a trustee of the mortgage, and the hereditaments be freehold or copyhold, she can also convey them, on repayment of the money secured, as a feme sole; for on such repayment she becomes a bare trustee thereof (d). This doctrine, however, can have no application to leaseholds for years vested in a married woman as mortgagee, where she is a trustee of the mortgage money (e). It has been further decided that, where a married woman is one of several mortgagees, who became entitled to lands since the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (/), and has made a conveyance thereof as a feme sole upon a transfer of the mortgage, a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to raise the objection that she might have been a trustee of the mortgage money, where no notice of any such trust appeared upon the title (g). In that case, however, the lands mortgaged were freehold, and the wife alone might make a valid conveyance of them as a bare trustee. If they had been leasehold she could not have done this; and it is submitted that, in the last-mentioned decision, the wrong test was applied. Where several men are jointly entitled to leasehold lands on a trust, which is not disclosed, a purchaser taking a conveyance from them for value and without notice obtains the legal estate and is not affected in equity by the trust (h). But if one of such trustees be a married woman, the purchaser does not get a good title by reason of his having had no notice of the trust; as, if the woman's husband did not assure her share of the lands, the purchaser obtains no legal estate therein. It is submitted that in such case the proper objection for a purchaser to take is this: that, as the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, confers only a special and not a general capacity of conveyance on a married woman, it is incumbent on any one who proposes to make title through any conveyance of land made by a wife alone, to prove either that she was entitled to the estate or interest assured as her separate property, or that, if she were a trustee thereof, she had power to convey the same as a bare trustee.