6. After she has obtained a protection order (s), or a separation order (/).

7. A wife may enter into a binding agreement to compromise proceedings in any matrimonial cause between her husband and herself (u); and may in consideration of any such compromise make a valid contract to live apart from her husband. She may also enter into a binding agreement founded upon other valuable consideration than the compromise of such proceedings, to live separate from her husband (x). But on the compromise of any matrimonial cause or the execution of an agreement for separation, a wife has no greater capacity to dispose of her property, whether by conveyance or contract, than she has at any other time (y). So that if she be entitled to freeholds at common law, she cannot dispose separately in London.

4. Wife of an alien never in England contracting as feme sole.

5. During judicial separation.

6. After protection or separation order.

7. To compromise a matrimonial cause, or to live apart from her husband.

(p) Bac. Abr. Customs of London (D); 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, 124, 125, 2nded.; see Caudell v. Shaw, 4 T. R. 361; Beard v. Webb, 2 B. & P. 93.

(q) De Gaillon v. L'Aigle, 1 Bos. & Pul 357; Kay v. Duchesse de Pienne, 3 Camp. 123; Harden v. Keverberg, 2 M. & W. 61; see Walford v. Duchesse de Pienne, 2 Esp. 554; Franks v. Duchesse de Pienne, ib. 587; De Wahl v. Braune, 1 H. & N. 178.

(>•) Stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, ss. 25, 26; above, p. 823.

(s); Stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21; above, p. 825.

(t) Stat. 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39, ss. 4, 5; above, p. 825.

(u) Wilson v. Wilson, 1 H. L. C. 538; Rowley v. Rowley, L. R. 1 Sc. App. 63; Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch. D. 605, 621; Rose v. Rose, 8 P. D. 98; Cahill v. Cahill, 8 App. Cas. 420, 429, 435, 436.

(x) Hunt v. Hunt, 4 De G. F. & J. 221; Marshall v. Marshall, 5 P. D. 19; Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch. D. 605; Clark v. Clark, 10 P. D. 188; Aldridge v. Aldridge, 13 P. D. 210; McGregor v. McGregor, 20 Q. B. D. 529; Re Weston, 1900, 2 Ch. 164.

(y) Stamper v. Barker, 5 Madd. 157; Slatter v. Blatter, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 28; Vansittart v. Vansittart, 4 K. & J. 62; Cahill v. Cahill, 8 App. Cas. 420; Harle v. Jarman, 1895, 2 Ch. 419. of any interest therein, as a part of any such compromise or agreement, except as provided by the Fines and Recoveries Act (s). And. it appears that, if she he entitled to separate property subject to a restraint on alienation, she cannot make any disposition thereof, either by way of conveyance or contract, as a term of any such compromise or agreement (a). 8. In a policy of insurance effected by a married woman before the year 1883 on her own life or the life of her husband for her separate use by virtue of the Married Women's Property Act, 1870 (J).

8. Policy of insurance under Married Women's Property Act, 1870.

Besides these exceptional cases, in which a married woman appears to be enabled to enter into a perfect contract binding herself personally at law, her agreement may, in certain instances, operate as a disposition of property (c). Thus where a married woman is entitled to a general power of appointment over any property and contracts by some instrument not complying with all the formalities required by the power to exercise the same in favour of a purchaser, effect will be given to the contract in equity by way of relief against the defective execution of the power and the specific enforcement of the disposition so made against those entitled in default of appointment (d) in the same manner as if she had been a single woman or a man (e). But in such cases, the Court must be satisfied that the formalities which have not been observed are no more than matters of form; and that the donee of the power has not, by their non-observance, been deprived of any of the protection, which a due exercise of the power would have afforded her. Otherwise the Court will not relieve against the defective execution of the power (/). Again, where a married woman is entitled to any interest in land, of which she can only dispose by deed acknowledged with her husband's concurrence under the Fines and Recoveries Act (g), and by such a deed she enters into a contract which would, if she were sui juris, bind her interest in equity - for example, a contract to sell, mortgage or settle the same - then such contract will operate in equity as an effective disposition of her interest (h).

Wife's contract operating as a disposition of property.

(z) Cahill v. Cahill, 8 App. Cas. 420; Sarle v. Jarman, 1895, 2 Ch. 419; see above, p. 817.

(a) See cases cited above, p. 822, n. (x); Cahill v. Cahill, 8 App. Cas. 420, 429, 430.

(b) Stat. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93, s. 10, repealed, except as to acts done and rights acquired thereunder, by stat. 45 & 46 Vict, c. 75, s. 22, and replaced by s. 11 of that Act, which, however, only enables a wife to effect such a policy by virtue of the power of contracting given to her by that Act.

(e) The essence of a true contract at law is the creation of an obligation binding the contractor personally; and it is foreign to the nature of a contract that it should bind or affect the contractor's property until he has been sued thereon and judgment given against him, or that its validity should depend on the fact of the contractor's being possessed of property at the time either of making or of enforcing the agreement; see Turner, L. J., Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G-. P. & J. 494, 519, 520; James, L. J., Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 17 Ch. D.454, 461. Where a married woman entitled to property of which she is restrained from anticipating the income, enters into one of these exceptional contracts by which she can bind herself personally at law, execution of a judgment against her in an action on the contract cannot be had against such property so long as it is affected by the restraint; Sill v. Cooper, 1893, 2 Q. B. 85; see above, pp. 821,822; Hyde v. Hyde, 13 P. D. 166; Hood Barrs v. Cathcart, 1894, 2 Q. B. 559, 567 sq.; Hood Barrs v. Heriot, 1896, A. C. 174; Whiteley v. Edwards, 1896, 2 Q. B. 48.