(e) A married woman might also so elect as to affect her interest in any personalty; Griggs v. Gibson, L. R. 1 Eq. 685; except, it seems, her reversionary chose in action not alienable under Malins' Act, stat. 20 & 21 Vict. e. 57; Whittle v. Kenning, 2 Ph. 731; Williams v. Wayne, I. R. 1 Eq. 519; see, however, Greenhill v. North British and Mercantile Insurance Co., 1893, 3 Ch. 474, commented upon in Harle v. Jarman, 1895, 2 Ch. 419.

(/) Ardesoife v. Bennet, 2 Dick. 4G3; Barrow v. Barrow, 4 K. & J. 409; Willoughby v. Middleton, 2 J. & H. 344; Griggs v. Gibson, L. R. 1 Eq. 685, 691.

(g) See Re Davidson, 11 Ch. D. 341, 348.

It has been held of late years that, where a female infant has made whilst unmarried a voidable conveyance of her property, or a voidable contract operating in equity as a disposition of her property, and has afterwards married during her infancy, her coverture is no bar to her exercising her choice of avoiding or affirming the conveyance or contract; which is therefore fully binding, if not repudiated by her within a reasonable time after she has attained full age (m). This ruling is unquestionably correct where the property affected would in case of the wife's repudiation of her voidable conveyance or contract belong to her for her separate use or as her separate property under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882; for she can dispose of all such property as if she were a feme sole (n). But as applied to property, to which on repudiation the wife would be entitled under the old law, and especially where the property disposed of in infancy was her reversionary chose in action (o), the doctrine so laid down appears to be at variance with the law of married women's incapacity, as previously understood (p). The rule in question has no application where the infant on her marriage becomes subject to some foreign law, by which she is deprived during her coverture of the capacity of giving her full consent to the conveyance or contract so made before her marriage (q).

Married woman affirming or avoiding her voidable conveyance or contract made whilst single and in infancy.

(h) Above, pp. 828 sq.

(i) Robinson v. Wheelwright, 21 Beav. 214, 6 Be G. M. & G. 535; Bateman v. Faber, 1898, 1 Ch. 144.

(k) This appears to follow from the principles applied in Re Ches-ham, 31 Ch. D. 466. It may, perhaps, be contended that she would at least be bound to apply for an order of the Court removing the restraint (see above, p. 822). But it is thought that, as the making of this order is no mere formality, but lies in the discretion of the Court, the possibility of obtaining it does not give her an alienable interest, and so cause her to be put to her election.

(I) Re Vardon's Trusts, 31 Ch. D. 275; Haynes v. Foster, 1901, 1 Ch. 361.

(m) Wilder v. Pigott, 22 Ch. D. 263; Burnaby v. Equitable Reversionary Interest Socy., 28 Ch. D. 416; Re Hodson, 1894, 2 Ch. 421; Viditz v. O'Hagan, 1900, 2 Ch. 87, 96 - 98, 100; above, pp. 786, 796.

(n) Smith v. Lucas, 18 Ch. D. 531,544; above, pp. 821,828,830.

(o) See cases cited in the last note but one.

(p) See Whittle v. Homing, 2 Ph. 731; Ellison v. Elwin, 13 Sim. 309; Le Vasseur v. Scratton, 14 Sim. 116; Williams v. Mayne, I. R. 1 Eq. 519; none of which were cited in the cases mentioned in note (m). And note that it was considered that a wife's capacity to agree to a conveyance made to her was suspended during her coverture; above, p. 816, n. (a). It is submitted that in the cases cited in note (m), the judges confused the doctrine of election, to take under or against an in-strument, which is a matter depending purely on the rules of equity and the equitable principles of estoppel by conduct (above, pp. 847 - 849), with the election or choice of affirming or disaffirming a voidable conveyance or contract. This, it is thought, is properly a matter depending on the party's capacity at common law; and by the common law, a woman's capacity in this respect appeal's to have been suspended during her coverture. It is not denied that, where by the instrument effecting the voidable conveyance or contract, the infant has derived benefits from other sources, she may be put to her election whether she will claim under or against the instrument: and it appears that Wilder v. Pigott, 22 Ch. D. 263, 267, was really a case of this kind of election; though even so regarded it is in conflict with Williams v. Mayne, I. R. 1 Eq. 519. But in Re Hodson, 1891, 2 Ch. 421, it does not appear that there was any ground to put the wife to her election to take under or against her settlement, which seems to have comprised her own property alone; and it is submitted that Chitty, J., certainly confused this sort of election with the legal capacity of affirming a voidable conveyance.

In connexion with the law of husband and wife, it may be mentioned that, according to a recent decision (r), the title to land situate in England, but belonging to a man or a woman, who is or was domiciled elsewhere and married while domiciled abroad, may be affected by the law of the country, in which the marriage took place. In the case referred to, a Frenchman domiciled in France married there a Frenchwoman without any express contract as to their property, so that by French law they came under the rule of community of goods. The pair then came to England and acquired an English domicile, and the husband became the owner of freehold and leasehold land in England. It was held that, on the husband's death, the wife was entitled, according to the law of community of goods under which she married, to one half of this land (s), as well as of his moveable goods (t), and that these rights must prevail over his testamentary dispositions of his property. The grounds of this decision were that the marriage under the French rule of community of goods constituted an implied contract between the parties as to their proprietary rights, which was equivalent to an express contract to the same effect, and that this contract was provable by parol evidence, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds (u), on the same principle as has been applied in the case of parol agreements of partnership affecting land (x). But of course the wife did not in that case acquire any legal estate or interest in her husband's lands or goods in England. Her rights were contractual only at law, and her interest in the property was merely equitable. So that, although she was enabled to enforce her rights specifically against her husband's devisees of the laud, she would have had no equity or other claim against a purchaser from them taking the legal estate in the lands for value without notice of the marriage contract (y).