The control of international relations vested in the General Government is not only exclusive, but all-comprehensive. That is to say, the authority of the United States in its dealings with foreign powers includes not only those powers which the Constitution specifically grants it, but all those powers which sovereign States in general possess with regard to matters of international concern. This general authority in the United States is fairly deducible from the fact that in its dealings with other States the United States appear as the sole representative of the American people; that upon it rests, therefore, the obligation to perform all the duties which International Law imposed upon a sovereign State; and that, therefore, having these duties to perform it is to be presumed to have commensurate powers. "That would appear to be a most unreasonable construction of the Constitution," say the court in the Legal Tender Cases, "which denies to the government created by it the right to employ freely every means, not prohibited, necessary for its preservation, and for the fulfilment of its acknowledged duties." The court then go on to declare: "And here it is to 'be observed it is not indispensable to the existence of any power claimed for the Federal Government that it can be found specified in the words of the Constitution, or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified powers. Its existence may be deduced fairly from more than one of the sub-stantive powers expressly defined, or from them all combined. It is allowable to group together any number of them and infer from them all that the power claimed has been conferred. . . . And it is of importance to observe that Congress has often exercised, without question, powers that are not expressly given nor ancillary to any single enumerated power. Powers thus exercised are what are called by Judge Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, resulting powers, arising from the aggregate powers of the government. He instances the right to sue and make contracts. Many others might be given." 1

This doctrine thus asserted in the Legal Tender Cases has been especially emphasized by the Supreme Court in passing upon the constitutional power of the United States to exclude or expel undesirable aliens. In the Chinese Exclusion Cases2 the court say: "While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which Wong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory. . . . The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and national matters being intrusted to the Government of the Union, the problem of free institutions existing over a widely extended country, having different climates and varied interests, has been happily solved. For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for the national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power."

1 12 Wall. 457; 20 L. ed. 287.

2 130 U. S. 5S1; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623; 32 L. ed. 1068.

And in Ekin v. United States3 the court declare: "It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such case and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. Vattel, lib. 2, 94, 100; 1 Phillimore (3d. ed.), chap. 10, § 220. In the United States this power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in war."

Again in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,4 the following language is used: "The right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, being an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence, and its welfare, the question now before the court is whether the manner in which Congress has exercised this right in sections 6 and 7 of the Act of 1892 is consistent with the Constitution. The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control and make it effective. The only government of this country, which other nations recognize or treat with, is the Government of the Union; and the only American flag known throughout the world is the flag of the United States."

In an earlier chapter we have seen that the power of the United States to annex territory is deducible not merely from such express grants of power, as to enter into treaties, to declare war, etc., but from the national sovereignty of the United States in its international relations.

The reasoning of the court in maintenance of the principle that in all that concerns foreign relations the United States has the same plenitude of constitutional power as that possessed by other sovereign States is sound. This appeal, however, to the fact of "national sovereignty" as a source of federal power is not a valid one outside of the international field. It cannot properly be resorted to when recognition of an international obligation on the part of the United States is not involved, and when, therefore, the matter is purely one relating to the reserved powers of the States or to the private rights of the individuals. To permit the doctrine to apply within these fields would at once render the Federal Government one of unlimited powers.5

3 142 U. S. 651; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep 336: 35 L. ed. 1146. 4 149 U.S.. 698; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; 37 L. ed. 905.

5 The Supreme Court has, however, upon several occasions employed language which would imply the acceptance of the doctrine in this improper manner, or, at least, has appealed to it in support of conclusions reached upon other grounds. Thus in the Legal Tender Cases (12 Wall. 457; 20 L. ed. 287) Justice Bradley says: "The United States is not only a government, but it is a national government, and the only government in this country that has the character of nationality. It is vested with power over all foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all which are forbidden to the state governments. It has jurisdiction over all those general subjects of legislation and sovereignty which affect the interests of the whole people equally and alike, and which require uniformity of regulation and laws. . . . Such being the character of the General Government, it seems to be a self-evident proposition that it is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally conceded to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions."

And in Juillard v. Greenman (110 U. S. 421; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; 28 L. ed. 204) the court derive additional support for its position upholding the constitutionality of the Legal Tender laws, from the doctrine that sovereign nations generally have the power. The court, in its opinion, say: "The power, as incident to the power of borrowing money and issuing bills or notes of the Government for money borrowed, of impressing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the payment of private debts, was a power universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The governments of Europe, acting through the monarch or the legislature, according to the distribution of powers under their respective constitutions, had and have as sovereign a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin. . . . The exercise of this power not being prohibited to Congress by the Constitution, it is included in the power expressly granted to borrow money on the credit of the United States, . . . Congress as the legislature of a sovereign nation, being expressly empowered by the Constitution to lay and collect taxes, etc. . . . and the power to make the notes of the government a legal tender in the payment of private debts being one of the powers belonging to sovereignty in other civilized

In summary, then, we may say that the United States Government though one of complete powers in all that relates to its dealings with foreign States, is, in all other respects, one of limited, enumerated powers.