This section is from the book "The Constitutional Law Of The United States", by Westel Woodbury Willoughby. Also available from Amazon: Constitutional Law.
The fact that goods are manufactured for export does not render their manufacture an element in the interstate or foreign commercial transaction.
22 U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; 39 L. ed. 325. In Kidd v. Pearson (128 U. S. 1: 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; 32 L. ed. 346) the court say: "No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly expressed in economic and political literature, than that between manufacture and commerce. Manufacture is transformation - the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for use. The functions of commerce are different. The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce; and the regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense embraces the regulation at least of such transportation. If it be held that the term includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the State, with the power to regulate not only manufactures but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining - in short, every branch of human industry. For is there of them that does not contemplate, more or less clearly, an interstate or foreign market? Does not the wheat grower of the Northwest or the cotton planter of the South, plant, cultivate and harvest his crop with an eye on the prices at Liverpool, New York and Chicago? The power being vested in Congress and denied to the States, it would follow as an inevitable
This principle is clearly laid down in Coe v. Errol.23 In this case the court held that certain logs cut in New Hampshire and hauled to a river town for transportation to the State of Maine, but not yet actually started upon their final way to that State, had not become articles of interstate commerce. The court sayv:
"Does the owner's state of mind in relation to the goods, that is, his intent to export them, and his partial preparation to do so, exempt them [as articles of interstate commerce] from taxation ? . . . There must be a point of time when they ceased to be governed exclusively by the domestic law and begin to be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, and that moment seems to us to be a legitimate one for this purpose, in which they commence their final movement from the State of their origin, to that of their destination."
 
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