The implied limitations upon the Federal Government are: first, those implied in the express limitations; and second, those which arise from the general nature of the American federal State. The Constitution looks to a preservation of the several States in the administrative autonomy that is allotted to them, and from this is deduced the principle that the Federal Government may not, unless it be absolutely necessary to its own efficiency, interfere with the free operation of state governments either by way of imposing upon them the performance of duties, or of unduly restraining their freedom of action by way of taxation or otherwise.

27 Indeed, in the eyes of some, of Hamilton at least, there were affirmative reasons why these limitations should not be expressly stated. In The Federalist, No. 84, after showing that Bills of Rights were "stipulations between Kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince," whereas in constitutions " the people in reality surrendered nothing," Hamilton proceeds: " I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? . . . Men disposed to usurp . . . might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given and that the provision against the liberty of the press afforded a clear implica, tion, that a right to prescribe proper regulations concerning it, was intended to be vested in the National Government."

28 See chapter XLV (Prohibitions On Congress. 405. Absolute And Qualified Prohibitions).

The principles governing the deduction of implied from express limitations upon the Federal Government are the same as those applicable to the construction of implied powers.

In Fairbank v. United States 29 the court say: "We are not here confronted with a question of the extent of the powers of Congress, but one of the limitations imposed by the Constitution on its action, and it seems to us clear that the same rule and spirit of construction must also be recognized. If powers granted are to be taken as broadly ited and as carrying with them authority to pass those acts which may be reasonably necessary to carry them into full execution; in other words, if the Constitution in its grant of powers La to be so construed that Congress shall be able to carry into full effect the powers granted, it is equally imperative that, where prohibition or limitation is placed upon the power of Congress, that prohibition or limitation should be enforced in its it and to its entirety. It would be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is to be liberally construed, and that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed. Especially is this true when, in respect to grants of powers, there is, as heretofore noticed, the help found in the last clause of the eighth section, and no such helping clause in respect to prohibitions and limitations. The true spirit of constitutional interpretation in both directions is to give full, liberal construction to the language, aiming ever to show fidelity to the spirit and purpose."