The Constitution does not in express terms confer upon Congress the power to legislate with reference to matters maritime, but the grant to the judiciary of jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, a jurisdiction which has, as we have seen, been held to be exclusive - has been construed to give to the federal legislature a power over the law which the federal courts are thus called upon to interpret and apply. In The Lottawanna case, the court say: "It is hardly necessary to argue that the maritime law is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country. . . . Each State adopts the maritime law, not as a code having any independent or inherent force, proprio vigore, but as its own law, with such modifications and qualifications as it sees fit. . . . To ascertain, therefore, what the maritime law of the country is, it is not enough to read the French, German, Italian and other foreign works on the subject, or the codes which they have formed; but we must have regard to our own legal history, Constitution, legislation, usages, and adjudications, as well."

In this case the court seem to indicate that the authority of Congress to legislate with reference to matters of maritime interest is derived from its control of commerce, which includes navigation between the States, and between the United States and foreign States. But in later cases Congress is explicitly recognized to have a legislative power flowing directly from the grant to the federal courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In Ex parte Garnett17 the court say: "It is unnecessary to invoke the power given to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, in order to find authority to pass the law in question. The act of Congress which limits the liability of ship owners was passed in amendment of the maritime law of the country, and the power to make such amendment is coextensive with that law. It is not confined to the boundaries or class of subjects which limit and characterize the power to regulate commerce; but, in maritime matters, it extends to all matters and places to which the maritime law extends." 18

15 130 U. S. 527; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612; 32 L. ed. 1017.

16 Section 586.

17 141 U. S. 1; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840; 35 L. ed. 631.

So also, in Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co.19 the court say: "As the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as this jurisdiction is held to be exclusive, the power of legislation on the same subject must necessarily be in the national legislature, and not in the state legislature." 20