The authority that administrative agents may constitutionally exercise in the promulgation of rules and ordinances regulating in detail the execution of the laws the enforcement of which has been placed in their hands, and the legal force to be given to these rules thus administratively established, has given rise to many adjudications. These rules, it is to be observed, fall into two general classes. First, those established by an administrative superior and directed solely to the administrative inferior; secondly, those binding of course the administrative inferiors, but primarily directed to the private citizen, and fixing the manner in which the requirements of the statute are to be met by him. This second class of rules is, in turn, divisible into two classes; those to which a criminal penalty is attached for their violation, and those merely defining the manner in which rights created by the statute are to be enjoyed.

The first of these two main classes of administrative ordinances differ from those of the second class in that though valid as between the administrative superior and his inferior, they do not create legal rights which the private citizen may enforce in the courts. Of this class, for example, are certain of the civil service regulations which the Presidents of the United States have issued under authority of the Civil Service Acts, fixing the classes to be included in the "classified service," providing for examinations for admission to the service, and declaring the conditions under which promotions and removals may be made.

As to those rules or ordinances, established by executive agents, providing the modes under which private persons may receive the privileges granted by law or be held responsible for violations of the duties imposed therein, it may in general be said that the executive may establish all special regulations that fall within the general field of the authority granted by law, and which are reasonably calculated to secure the execution of the legislative will as laid down in the statutes.

13 In re Municipal Suffrage, 160 Mass. 566: Santo v. Iowa, 2 Iowa, 105. Cf. Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America; Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., 168.

With reference to many of the Army and Navy Regulations issued by the President it is to be observed that these derive their force not from congressional authorization, but directly from the constitutional power of President as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy; and this, too, notwithstanding the constitutional provision that Congress may make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. In the early case of United States v. Eliason14 the court say: "The power of the executive to establish rules and regulations for the government of the army, is undoubted. . . . Such regulations cannot be questioned or denied because they may be thought unwise or mistaken."

An administrative officer in the execution of his duties may not change the express provisions of the law, even though these provisions no longer seem the best adapted to secure the end desired by Congress. Thus in Merritt v. Welsh15 a customs officer was not permitted to substitute a different test from that fixed by Congress for the determination of the quality of imported sugars. "If experience shows," the opinion declares, "that Congress acted under a mistaken impression, that does not authorize the Treasury Department or the courts to take the part of legislative guardians and, by construction, to make new laws which they imagine Congress would have made had it been properly informed, but which Congress itself, on being properly informed has not, as yet, seen fit to make."

Thus again, in Morrill v. Jones16 the court say: "The Secretary of the Treasury cannot, by his regulations, alter or amend a revenue law. All he can do is to regulate the mode of proceeding to carry into effect what Congress has enacted. In the present case, we are entirely satisfied the regulation acted upon by the collector was in excess of the power of the Secretary. The statute clearly includes animals of all classes. The regulation seeks to confine its operation to animals of 'Superior stock.' This is manifestly an attempt to put into the body of the statute a limitation which Congress did not think it necessary to prescribe. Congress was willing to admit, duty free, all animals specially imported for breeding purposes; the Secretary thought this privilege should be confined to such animals as were adapted to the improvement of breeds already in the United States. In our opinion, the object of the Secretary could only be accomplished by an amendment of the law. That is not the office of a treasury regulation."

14 16 Pet. 291; 10 L. ed. 968.

15 104 U. S. 694; 26 L. ed. 896.

16 106 U. S. 466; 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; 27 L. ed. 267.