Sec 515

It may be, however, that a consideration is only part performed, as where one party agrees to do another a continuous service, and while this service has been begun but has not yet been completed, the party benefited promises to pay for it.3 Under this rule, a promise for the support of an illegitimate child is retrospective as well as prospective;4 and so of marriage.5 The same view has been taken in regard to the consideration of a lessee permanently occupying and paying rent.6 Promises made in respect to existing debts, also, when the obligation of such debts continues, though they may not be technically suable, are to be regarded as made on a continuous consideration.7 The same rule was held where the plaintiff declared that, in consideration he had bought three parcels of land in a particular day, the defendant afterwards promised to make him a sufficient assurance; the assurance being the substance of the sale.8 But a mere tenancy from year to year is not sufficient to sustain a promise to put on any repairs which are not the ordinary duty of a landlord.9 - A continuous guaranty is, from the nature of the case, a continuing consideration; and a continuous guaranty is one which is meant to remain in force until terminated by its own limitations; or by notice.10

Continuing consideration will support promise.

1 Hopkins v. Logan, 5 M. & W. 241.

2 Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234.

3 Mete, on Cont. 202; Cotten v. Wes-cott, 3 Bulst. 187; Pearle v. Unger, Cro. Eliz. 94; 1 Leon. 102; Carroll v. Nixon, 4 W. & S. 517; Carman v. Noble, 9 Barr, 366. As to continuous promises, see supra, sec 9-14.

4 Shenk v. Mingle, 13 S. & R. 29; Maurer v. Mitchell, 9 W. & S. 69; Wiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 252.

5 Bac. Ab. Ass. D., Marsh v. Rains-ford, 2 Leon. 111; infra, sec 537.

6 Pearle v. Unger, Cro. Eliz. 94; S.

C, 1 Leon. 102; 1 Ch. on Cont. 11th Am. ed. 73.

7 Supra, sec 513; 1 Ch. on Cont. 11th Am. ed. 74; 2 Steph. Com. 114; Hodge v. Vavisor, 1 Roll. R. 413.

8 Warcop v. Morse, Cro. Eliz. 138.

9 1 Ch. on Con. 11th Am. ed. 74; Brown v. Crump, 1 Marsh. 567; Horse-fall v. Mather, Holt, N. P. 7.

10 Brandt on Suretyship, sec 130 et seq.; Heffield v. Meadows, L. R. 4 C. P. 595; Nottingham Hide Co. v. Bothrill, L. R. 8 C. P. 694; Mussey v. Rayner, 22 Pick. 223; Boston, etc. Glass Co. v.

Sec 516

That a consideration should be required to sustain a promise, and yet that the amount of this consideration should be a matter as to which, unless fraud or undue influence be set up, the courts will not adjudicate, seems unreasonable; yet it must be remembered that if the courts were required to determine in each case whether the consideration was adequate, prices would have to be fixed not by parties, but by courts. A consideration, it is said by Tindal, C. J., is sufficient if it consists of "any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant or a stranger derives a benefit or advantage, or any labor, detriment, or inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff, however small the detriment or inconvenience may be, if such act is performed or inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff with the consent, express or implied, of the defendant."1 And as sufficient considerations have been held the dating an account,2 the showing of a deed,3 and the making an affidavit in exposition of a case,4 the parting with a letter which belonged to the promisee,5 the trust manifested in a bailee by depositing with him goods for delivery.6

Amount of consideration not material.

Moore, 119 Mass. 435; Melendy v. Capen, 120 Mass. 222; Hotchkiss v. Barnes, 34 Conn. 29; Carrol v. Nixon,

4 W. & S. 517; Carman v. Noble, 9 Barr, 366; and see as instances Wood v. Priestner, L. R. 2 Ex. 282; Hitchcock v. Humfrey, 5 M. & G. 559; Burgess v. Eve, L. R. 13 Eq. 450.

1 Tindal, C. J., Laythoarp v. Bryant, 3 Scott, 250; citing Selwyn's N. P., tit. "Assumpsit;" adopted in Leake, 2d ed. 611; 1 Ch. on Con. 11th Am. ed. 29. That detriment is essential see supra, sec 505. - That its amount is immaterial, see Westlake v. Adams,.

5 C. B. N. S. 248; Harrison v. Guest, 8 H. L. Ca. 481; Erwin v. Parham, 12 How. 197; Slater v. Maxwell, 6 Wall. 273; Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60; Lee v. Kirby, 104 Mass. 420; Rutgers p. Lucet, 2 John. Ca. 92; Worth p. Case, 42 N. Y. 362; Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596; Wintermute v. Snyder, 2 Green. Ch. 489; Weber v. Weitling, 3.

C. E. Green, 441; Harlan v. Harlan, 20 Penn. St. 303; Cummings's App., 67 Penn. St. 404; Duncan v. Sanders, 50 111. 475; Stevenson v. Robertson, 55 Iowa, 689; Butler v. Haskell, 4 Desaus. 651; Woodruff v. McDonald, 33 Ark. 97. In Brooks v. Haigh, 10 Ad. & El. 323, it was held that a piece of paper on which a void contract is drawn is a sufficient consideration for a guaranty of 10,000/.

2 Haws v. Smith, 2 Lev. 122.

3 Sturlyn v. Albany, Cro. Eliz. 67.

4 Brooks v. Ball, 18 John. 337.

5 Wilkinson v. Oliveira, 1 Bing. N. C. 490; Lang. Cont. 1016.

6 Supra, sec 505. And see generally to same eifect Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. Jun. 246; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & Le. 488; Eyre v. Potter, 15 How. 42; Bedel v. Loomis, 11 N. H. 9; Howard v. Edgell, 17 Vt. 9; Park v. Johnson, 4 Allen, 266. That "the smallest spark" of consideration will suffice,.

"If a contract is deliberately made without fraud and with full consideration of all the circumstances, the least consideration will be sufficient."1