Sec 536

The assumption by A. of an indebtedness on condition of B. doing a particular thing, is a consideration to support B.'s promise to do that thing.5 Hence a promise by A. to buy certain property in consideration of B. undertaking to supply the money binds A., such promise by B. being a sufficient consideration.6 And a promise by the residents of a town that they will pay a tax levied on the town in consideration of allowance of discount is binding.7 And a party may make himself liable as guarantor without any consideration passing between principal and guarantor. "It is enough, if the person for whom the guarantor becomes surety has benefit, or the person to whom the guaranty is given suffer inconvenience, as an inducement to the surety to become guarantee to the principal debtor."1 But unless a guarantee is contemporaneous with and an incident of a debt, it requires an independent consideration in the way of an indulgence from the creditor, to make it valid.2

Assuming collateral indebtedness a valid consideration.

1 Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455; Barber v. Fox, 2 Wms. Saund. 136; New Hampshire Bk. v. Colcord, 15 N. H. 119. In Cline v. Templeton, 78 Ky. 550, Hines, J., said: "That there is no cause of action either at common law or under the statutes, in behalf of a woman for seduction, is clearly established. (Woodward v. Anderson, 9 Bush, 624.) It is laid down, both in Parsons on Contracts and in Chitty on Contracts, that an agreement to forbear to prosecute a claim which is wholly and certainly unsustainable at law or in equity is no consideration for a promise. (Parsons, vol. i. p. 440; Chitty, vol. i. pp. 35 to 46.) This proposition appears to be so well established that further citation of authorities seems to us unnecessary. We need not discuss the question as to whether past cohabitation is a good consideration for a promise, since it is admitted that the sole consideration was the agreement to forbear suit.".

2 Graham v. Johnson, L. R. 8 Eq. 36.

3 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 489; see Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294; Knotts v. Preble, 50 111. 226. For criticisms on Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, see supra, sec 532.

4 Supra, sec 533.

5 Stadt v. Lill, 9 East, 348; Homes v. Dana, 12 Mass. 190; Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. 29; Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; supra, sec 506-7.

6 Skidmore v. Bradford, L. R. 8 Eq. 134; see Bryant v. Goodnow, 5 Pick. 228.

7 Baileyville v. Lowell, 20 Me. 178.

Sec 537

Marriage is a valuable consideration as between the parties;3 and hence a settlement by a man on his wife, or by the wife on her husband, in consideration of marriage is as valid and binding, even against subsequent bona fide purchasers for value, as would be a sale of the same property for a full price.4 - A promise by a third party to either the intended husband or the intended wife, it has been held, will be sustained by the consideration of the projected marriage.5 - Marriage, however, ceases to be Marriage is a valuable consideration.

1 Best, C. J., Morley v. Boothby, 3 Bing. 113.

2 D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476; Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 129; Mecorney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. 85; Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. 29. As to guarantee, see supra, sec 515; infra, sec 570.

3 Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cow. 537; Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437; Whitehall v. Lonsey, 2 Yeates, 109; Frank's App., 59 Penn. St. 190; Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560; Huston v. Can-trel, 11 Leigh, 136.

4 Supra, sec 377; Richardson v. Hor-ton, 7 Beav. 112; Clarke v. Wright, 6 H. & N. 849; Price v. Jenkins, L. R.

5 C. D. 619; Kevan v. Crawford, L. R.

6 C. D. 29; Gale v. Gale, L. R. 6 C. D. 144; Tomlinson v. Matthews, 98 111. 178; Latimer v. Glenn, 2 Bush, 535; Miller v. Edwards, 17 Bush, 397; Wall v. Scales, 1 Dev. Eq. 476; Ploss v. Thomas, 6 Mo. Ap. 157; Magniac v, Thompson, 7 Pet. 348. In Magniac v. Thompson, it was said by the court:.

"Nothing can be clearer, both upon principle and authority, than the doctrine that to make an ante-nuptial settlement void as a fraud upon creditors, it is necessary that both parties should concur in, or have cognizance of, the intended fraud. If the settlor alone intended a fraud, and the other party have no notice of it, but is innocent of it, she is not and cannot be affected by it."

5 Shadwell v. Shadwell, 9 C. B. N. S. 159; see supra, sec 497. In Stratton v. Stratton, 58 N. H. 473, there was an ante-nuptial agreement that if the wife would take a farm, on which she held a mortgage, and the husband would carry it on, she would contribute the products to the support of the family and herself after marriage. Marriage took place, and the husband made valuable improvements at his own expense. After two years the wife conveyed the farm to another in violation of his rights. The court said: "The disabilities and extensive suspension a good consideration in cases where the husband is largely insolvent at the marriage, and the wife knows that the conveyance to her is to defraud his creditors.1 But such a settlement will not be set aside on ground of fraud unless on clear proof of the wife's complicity.2 - A marriage settlement in fraud of marital rights will be set aside.3.