Sec 528

A voluntary subscription to a charity, or other object of general interest, when the consideration is the faithful discharge of duty by the party to whom the subscription is made, binds the party giving it, though without other consideration.3 It is a sufficient consideration that the labor and responsibility of the trust is undertaken by the party to whom the subscription is made, though this condition is inferred from the whole transaction, and is not expressly made,4 or by other subscribing Releases by other creditors sufficient consideration to support a release.

Mutual subscriptions to charities bind.

1 Infra, sec 1005; and see supra, sec 379 et seq.; Leake, 2d ed. 619; Stein-man v. Magnus, 11 East, 390; Norman v. Thompson, 4 Ex. 755.

2 Van Rensselaer v. Aiken, 44 N. Y. 126; see infra, sec 997 et seq.

3 Trustees v. Haskell, 73 Me. 140; State Treasurer v. Goss, 9 Vt. 289; Bridgewater Academy v. Gilbert, 2 Pick. 579; Bryant v. Goodenow, 5 Pick. 229; Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537; Mirick v. French, 2 Gray, 420; Barnes v. Perine, 9 Barb. 202; Knox-boro Church v. Beach, 74 N. Y. 72; Phipps v. Jones, 20 Penn. St. 260; Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 113; Edin-boro Acad. v. Robinspn, 37 Penn. St.

210; Caley v. R. R., 80 Penn. St. 363; Petty v. Board, 70 Ind. 290; Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich. 73; Com-stock v. Howd, 15 Mich. 237; Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214; Galt v. Swain, 9 Grat. 633; see Collier v. Baptist Soc, 8 B. Mon. 68; Robertson v. March, 3 Scam. 198; see supra, sec 24, as to uncertain promisee. That such subscriptions must be accepted to bind, see supra, sec 16 a.

4 University of Vermont v. Buell, 2 Vt. 48; Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24 Vt. 189; Homes v. Dana, 12 Mass. 190; Warren v. Stearns, 19 Pick. 73; Mirick v. French, 2 Gray, 420; Ladies' Collegiate Institute v. French, 16 Gray, parties.1 A fortiori is this the case when there is any outlay by trustee or fellow-subscriber on the faith of the subscription sued on.2 "Where something has been done, or some liability or duty assumed, in reliance upon the subscription, in order to carry out the object, the promises are binding and may be enforced, although no pecuniary advantage is to result to the promisors."3 But the endowment, actual and prospective, of a literary institution by others is not a sufficient consideration for a promise to give to such an institution unless payments or subscriptions by others are made on the faith of the promise;4 or unless the promise is the consideration for certain exertions to be made by parties acting for the institution.5 - Whether the fact that B. is induced to subscribe.

196; Berkeley Divinity School v. Jar-vis, 32 Conn. 412; Barnes v. Perine, 9 Barb. 202; Caul v. Gibson, 3 Barr, 416; Graff v. Pitts. R. R., 31 Penn. St. 489; Galt v. Swain, 9 Grat. 633; Commis. v. Perry, 5 Ohio, 56; McClure v. Wilson, 43 III. 356; Method. Ep. Church v. Garvey, 53 111. 401; Hall v. Virginia, 91 111. 535; Mouton v. Noble, 1 La. An. 192; Collier v. B. E. Society, 8 B. Mon. 68; Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214; Philomath College v. Hartless, 6 Oreg. 158; see Petty v. Board, 70 Ind. 290. 1 Miller v. Ballard, 46 111. 377.

2 Knoxboro Church v. Beech, 74 N. Y. 72; Robertson v. March, 3 Scam. 198.

3 Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich. 89, adopted as text in Mete, on Cont. 185; Commissioners v. Perry, 5 Ohio, 59; Peirce v. Ruley, 5 Ind. 69.

In Helfenstein's Est., 77 Penn. St. 331, Sharswood, J., said: "Had the decedent united with others as a subscriber to the fund for the increase of the library to the theological seminary, the note upon which the appellant made his claim might have been sustained under the case of Caul v. Gibson, 3 Barr, 416. Or if the note had been accepted by the trustees before the death of the promisor, it would have stood on the footing of the principle applied in Chambers v. Calhoun, 6 Harris (18 Penn. St.), 13; for in such case, if the trustees assumed the duty imposed upon them by the terms or conditions of the note, it would have been a sufficient consideration to sustain the promise. But, when the decedent died, the trustees had not accepted the note, and his death was a countermand in law of the offer, for such it must be considered until accepted. In Phipps v. Jones, 8 Harris (20 Penn. St.), 260, where there was a subscription with others for the benefit of a proposed association to build a church, the court held that it was a mere proposal, revocable until the association was formed and the promise accepted, and that the death of the subscriber was such a revocation."

4 Hamilton College v. Stewart, 2 Denio, 403; S. C, 1 Comst. 581.

5 Ibid., and cases cited supra. See Pitt v. Gentle, 49 Mo. 74.

In the London Law Times of May 21, 1881, is the following: "We see it stated that Earl Cowper, acting under the advice of the attorney-general, has submitted to pay the subscription of by C. subscribing is a good consideration for B.'s subscription depends upon whether C. loses any right or suffers any detri-

£500, which he had promised towards the restoration of St. Albans Cathedral. It appears the Earl had promised this sum to the faculty committee in 1877. He had paid no portion of it until the committee had not only done the work, to which he did not object, but had also restored the original high roof, in regard to which a controversy had occurred, when he had taken an active part against the faculty committee. Lord Cowper then refused to pay any of his subscription on that ground, and so pleaded in his defence to the action. On the eve of trial this defence has been abandoned. It has always been a moot point whether, and under what conditions, subscriptions promised to a charitable work can be recovered. It seems that in some of the common law courts of the United States attempts to recover subscriptions have met with success. But in Cottage Street Church v. Kendall (121 Mass. 528), cited by Pollock on Contracts, 2d ed. 598, note, the earlier dicta, that 'it is a sufficient consideration that others were led to subscribe by the very subscription of the defendant,' were overruled. Earl Cowper's case seems, however, to show that, in the opinion of the attorney-general, where the work has actually been done, the promised subscription can be legally demanded. This certainly appears to be just."