In University v. Livingston, Sup. Ct. of Iowa, 1881 (13 Rep. 584), the suit was to recover the amount of a subscription to the University of Des Moines in the following terms: " ' For and in consideration of securing to the Baptist denomination of Iowa the property situate in Des Moines, and known as the University of Des Moines, we, the undersigned, hereby bind ourselves, individually, to pay the sums set opposite our names, when, in the aggregate, $10,000 is so secured: provided the said amount is pledged by August 1, 1870. Grinnell, March 20, 1869.' The defendant had judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The judgment was affirmed in the supreme court. 'Thequestion,' said Day, J., ' involved in this case is whether the proof shows without conflict that the subscription sued upon was without consideration. In Meth. E. Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, which is comparatively a recent case, and which contains the latest utterance of the supreme court of Massachusetts upon the question of subscriptions, the following language is employed: ' The performance of gratuitous promises depends wholly upon the good-will which prompted them, and will not be enforced by the law. The general rule is that, in order to support an action, the promise must have been made upon a legal consideration moving from the promisee to the promisor. Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37. To constitute such consideration there must be either a benefit to the maker of the promise, or a loss, trouble, or inconvenience to, or a charge or obligation resting upon, the party to whom the promise is made.' In this case, most of the Massachusetts cases cited by appellant's counsel are referred to, and it is declared that ' in every case in which this court has sustained an action upon a promise of this description the promisee's acceptance of the defendant's promise was shown either by express vote or contract, assuming a liability or obligation, legal or equitable, or else by some unequivocal act, merit by his subscription. If he does - if his promise, by the law to which he is subject, binds him;l - if he pays up, either in whole or in part, or gives a sealed instrument or negotiable paper on which his liability is fixed, then in such case B. is bound.2 Supposing, however, that the subscription is merely tentative - supposing that from the whole state of facts involved it is to be gathered that until certain independent conditions are complete the money shall not be due - then there is no consideration until these conditions are complete.3 such as advancing or expending money, or erecting a building, in accordance with the terms of the contract, and upon the faith of the defendant's promise.' In this case the plaintiff did not enter into any undertaking on account of the subscription in suit. The college building had been purchased, and the debt in question had been contracted, before that time. The plaintiff did not even obligate itself to raise the sum of $10,000. The case is, in principle, very like Stewart v. Trustees, 2 Den. 403; S. C, 1 N. Y. 581, in which it was held there could be no recovery. See Limerick Academy v. Davis, 11 Mass. 113. In most of the authorities cited by appellant it will be found that the promisee entered into some undertaking, assumed some liability, or made some promise upon the faith of the subscription sought to be enforced. Nothing of the kind was done in this case. In our opinion, the court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendant upon the proof admitted.' "

1 See supra, sec 523; infra, sec 595.

2 Infra, sec 595; Gilman v. Veazie, 24 Me. 202; George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533; Cong. Soc. in Troy v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164; Fisher v. Ellis, 3 Pick. 323; Trustees v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 506; Amherst Acad. v. Cowles, 6 Pick. 427; Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537; Mirick v. French, 2 Gray, 420; Brigham v. Mead, 10 Allen, 245; Mann v. Cook,.

20 Conn. 178; Garrett v. R. R., 78 Penn. St. 465; Miller v. Ballard, 46 111. 377; Peirce v. Ruley, 5 Ind. 69; Comstock v. Howd, 15 Mich. 237; Smith v. Plank-Road Co., 30 Ala. 650. As to effect of seal, see Ball v. Dunster-ville, 4 T. R. 313; Cooch v. Goodman, 2 Q. B. 580.

3 Infra, sec 545 et seq.; Ives v. Sterling, 6 Met. 310; M'Auley v. Billenger, 20 Johns. 89; Ayers's App., 28 Penn. St. 179; Commissioners v. Perry, 5 Ohio, 58; Stuart v. R. R., 32 Grat. 146; supra, sec 16 a.

In Ladies' Coll. Inst. v. French, 16 Gray, 196, where the implied promise of the promisee to disburse in conformity with the terms of the subscription was held a sufficient consideration, Chapman, C. J., said: "Subscriptions of this character have been made the subject of litigation in many instances; and the earlier cases in our reports contain dicta, some of which have not been sustained by later decisions. But in the cases of Amherst Acad. v. Cowls, 6 Pick.'427; Williams College v. Danforth, 12 Pick. 541; and Thompson p. Page, 1 Met. 565, their validity is established, and the ground of it is definitely stated. It is held that by accepting such a subscription, the promisee agrees on his part with the subscribers, that he will hold and appropriate the funds subscribed in conformity with the terms and objects of sonally to him in consideration of his services.1 - Until some action is taken on the basis of a subscription to a benevolent or other enterprise, it may be revoked.2 "The promise, in such case, stands as a mere offer, and may, by necessary implication, be revoked at any time before it is acted on. It is the expending of money, etc., or incurring of legal liability on the faith of a promise, which gives the right of action, and without which there is no right of action. Until action upon it, there is no mutuality, and, being only an offer, and susceptible of revocation at anytime before being acted upon, it follows that the death (or insanity) of the promisor, before the offer is acted upon, is a revocation of the offer."3 It would be otherwise, as has been already stated, if other parties had made themselves legally liable on the faith of the subscription claimed to be revoked.